Highlights
- A Yale study reveals the Trump administration's 2025 AI Action Plan aims to accelerate innovation and maintain global AI leadership, but faces significant supply chain challenges.
- The global AI ecosystem remains tightly interconnected, with China dominating rare earth production and the U.S. dependent on international chip fabrication.
- Decoupling AI technologies between the U.S. and Chinese blocs is structurally unattainable due to deep technological and mineral supply interdependencies.
In a recent paper,ย Emmie Hine (opens in a new tab)ย (Yale Digital Ethics Center, University of Bologna, KU Leuven) andย Luciano Floridi (opens in a new tab)ย (Yale University, University of Bologna) dissect the Trump administrationโs July 2025 AI Action Plan and its supporting executive orders.ย The aim according to the researchers? Accelerateinnovation, build American AI infrastructure, and lead global AI diplomacy. While framed as a bold new vision, the authors argue the plan largely continues prior U.S. efforts to maintain competitiveness against China, now layered with distinctly Republican cultural and political priorities.
Most crucial for investors and supply-chain watchers: the study underscores that deep interdependencies in rare earths and semiconductors render full AI โdecouplingโ between U.S. and Chinese blocs nearly impossible. China still mines ~70% and processes ~90% of global rare earths, while U.S. chip giant Nvidia commands a 92% GPU market share but relies on Taiwanโs TSMC for fabrication. This dual chokehold keeps the worldโs AI ecosystem bound together despite combative rhetoric.
Implications for Rare Earths and AI
For rare earth investors, this report is a reminder that Washingtonโs AI strategy is inseparable from critical minerals. AI data centers, chip fabs, and defense-linked computing infrastructure all depend on steady flows of neodymium, dysprosium, terbium, and other rare earths. While the Action Plan outlines big ambitions for U.S. chip sovereignty, rare earth policy is notably downplayedโsuggesting it may be relegated to quieter, less visible industrial initiatives.
The takeaway: markets should expect heightened government support for U.S. rare earth projects, but with limited ability to break Chinaโs dominance in the medium termโjust as Rare Earth Exchanges (REEx) has forecasted.ย ย Investors should watch for strategic stockpiling, subsidy expansion, and cross-sector deals (as seen in the July 2025 U.S.โChina rare earthโNvidia trade linkage).
The Limits of the Plan
Hine and Floridi highlight several structural and political constraints:
| Challenges | Summary |
|---|---|
| Supply chain knots | Rare earths and chips remain too globally interdependent for clean bloc separation |
| Legal challenges | New ideological neutrality mandates for AI may face constitutional tests |
| Alliance friction | Past U.S. tech diplomacy (e.g., on Huawei/5G) alienated allies, raising doubts about sustaining an โAI alliance.โ |
| Industrial lab | U.S. onshoring of chipmaking wonโt mature until at least 2026โ2027, keeping reliance on Taiwan intact. |
Conclusion
The study concludes that while the AI Action Plan marks the clearest articulation yet of the Trump administrationโs ambitions, rare earth supply chains remain the Achillesโ heel of U.S. technological independence. Decoupling may be politically popular but structurally unattainable. For rare earth investors, this underscores both the opportunityโexpanded U.S. support for domestic mining and processingโand the enduring reality of Chinaโs leverage.
Citation: Hine E, Floridi L. Winning the AI Race? The US AI Action Plan in Context. Yale Digital Ethics Center (opens in a new tab); University of Bologna; KU Leuven. September 2025.
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