Highlights

• NATO officially recognizes rare earth elements as a critical defense security variable, not just an industrial issue.
• Western defense procurement will increasingly prioritize secure, non-Chinese sourcing of critical raw materials.
• NATO and EU are developing strategic roadmaps to reduce dependency on China for essential defense minerals.

A Defence Blog article (opens in a new tab) today (September 13, 2025) highlights a genuine shift: NATO and European defense leaders are now openly prioritizing critical raw materials (CRMs) as a matter of security. This follows the June 2024 Defence-Critical Supply Chain Security Roadmap (opens in a new tab) and NATO’s December 2024 list of twelve essential CRMs. Reporting that neodymium and dysprosium underpin radars and sensors, or that beryllium and titanium support propulsion and structures, is factual and underscores the rare earth dependency baked into modern defense. The EU’s March 2025 Critical Raw Materials Act and July 2025 stockpiling strategy are also on record, confirming Brussels’ growing assertiveness in the minerals space.

Where the Story Runs Ahead

The article frames NATO’s new “High Visibility Project” as a decisive move to secure supply, yet concrete results remain speculative. Stockpiling discussions and joint procurement platforms should certainly be promising, but lack detail on timelines, volumes, or binding commitments. Similarly, citing private industry “expansion” of upstream control—through Rheinmetall, MBDA, and CSG—leans on broad strokes rather than hard numbers. Readers should treat this as directional intent rather than proof of reduced vulnerability.

A Subtle Tilt in Emphasis

The piece carries an institutional bias: portraying NATO and EU initiatives as coherent, coordinated, and rapidly impactful. The reality is messier. European national governments often guard their resource sovereignty, and substitution technologies cited by IISS remain experimental. Costs, regulatory hurdles, and the absence of scalable non-Chinese refining capacity dilute the neatness of the narrative. Meanwhile, the article pays little attention to China’s continued dominance in heavy rare earth production—still the choke point for military-grade NdFeB magnets.

Why It Matters for Rare Earth Supply Chains

The notable takeaway isn’t NATO’s rhetoric but its recognition: rare earths are no longer just an industrial issue but a defense readiness variable. Security should be priced into the value chain economics ex China.  This elevates rare earth policy into the same tier as energy security.

What does this mean for investors and supply chain strategists?  It should be a clearer signal. Western defense procurement will increasingly reward suppliers who can prove secure, non-Chinese sourcing—even if costs run higher (again, that security premium). That shift could accelerate funding into projects in Australia, North America, and Africa, but without rapid scaling, NATO’s ambitions risk colliding with the same bottlenecks confronting the civilian EV and wind sectors.

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