Highlights

• US faces a critical national security risk due to over-reliance on Chinese rare earth elements for defense and technology infrastructure.
• Policy recommendations include accelerating domestic project permitting
• Building allied processing capacity
• Establishing transparent mineral sourcing
• A strategic shift is needed from reactive leadership to proactive readiness in managing strategic mineral supply chains.

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A new policy essay by Evans M. Sackey, SJD Candidate, Emory University School of Law, argues that the United States is replaying a familiar national-security error: reacting to resource shocks after they become crises. In “From the Arab Oil Embargo to Rare Earths: How Reactive Leadership Endangers U.S. National Security (opens in a new tab)” (Aug. 31, 2025), Sackey draws a straight line from the 1973 oil embargo to today’s rare earth element (REE) exposure, warning that delayed action—amid China’s dominance in mining and processing—puts critical defense and technology programs at risk.

Study Summary & Key Findings

Sackey’s analysis uses the 1973 embargo as a case study in reactive policy, then maps the same pattern to REEs—inputs essential to precision-guided munitions, fighter aircraft, radars, secure comms, EVs, and wind turbines. The paper contends that the U.S. has underinvested in domestic capacity, tolerated permitting and data bottlenecks, and over-relied on imports, particularly where China holds overwhelming midstream leverage. Stockpiling is framed as necessary but insufficient because current authorities primarily unlock material in declared emergencies. The paper further notes recent Chinese export controls and earlier coercive episodes (e.g., Japan 2010) as clear evidence that REEs can be weaponized.

Implications for Policy & Markets

For policymakers, the essay’s message is blunt: treat REEs as defense infrastructure. That means accelerating permitting for responsibly developed domestic projects; building allied separation, metals, and magnet capacity; establishing transparent provenance to meet 2027 DoD magnet rules; and updating stockpile tools to manage operational (not only emergency) risk. For markets, the throughline is price and availability: until non-Chinese midstream capacity scales, expect cost premiums, longer lead times, and episodic shocks—with traders and offtake structures acting as interim stabilizers. Industrial buyers should budget for a “pay now or pay later” reality: proactive diversification costs less than production stoppages.

Limitations & Caveats

This is a policy essay, not an empirical, peer-reviewed econometric study. Quantitative claims (e.g., import-reliance levels) can vary by year and product class; some citations predate 2025 market shifts. The paper does not cost out trade-offs among speed, ESG standards, and community consent, nor does it detail the capital stack required to bridge the midstream magnet bottleneck. Finally, “reactive leadership” is a useful framing, but the essay offers high-level prescriptions rather than an implementation roadmap (governance, funding, and timelines) needed to translate urgency into steel-in-the-ground capacity.

Conclusion

Sackey’s core argument lands: the U.S. lacks strategic foresight on REEs and risks repeating an avoidable vulnerability. The practical takeaway for government and industry is alignment: couple fast-tracked, responsible domestic capacity with allied midstream build-out and operational stockpiles, so that export controls—or the next geopolitical squall—cannot throttle defense readiness or derail the energy transition. In short: move from reaction to readiness, and build the mine-to-magnet backbone the strategy demands.

Citation: Evans M. Sackey (Lead Author), Emory University School of Law (SJD Candidate). From the Arab Oil Embargo to Rare Earths: How Reactive Leadership Endangers U.S. National Security. Policy essay/working paper, August 31, 2025.

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