Highlights

• China controls approximately 70% of global rare earth mining and 90% of processing, creating a near-monopoly in critical minerals.
• Western initiatives like U.S. DoD price supports and G7 standards are emerging as potential counterbalances to China's dominance.
• Strategic market suppression and low-cost tactics have historically discouraged competing rare earth production projects worldwide.

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Today’s Luxembourg Times (opens in a new tab) piece correctly lays out China’s dominance. The numbers—~70% of global mining, ~90% of processing, and ~93% of magnet manufacturing—are consistent with industry and trade data. The history is also on point: Deng Xiaoping’s “China has rare earths” vision, the 1990s boom, and the controversial Magnequench acquisition that shifted U.S. production to Tianjin and Ningbo. The description of Beijing’s use of low prices to squeeze out rivals is historically accurate, aligning with market behavior seen from 2000 onward.

The Stretch Marks

Where the article leans speculative is in the fatalist tone. Quoting executives like Zhang Xigang of Rising Nonferrous Metals, it suggests Western efforts are “destined to fail.” That claim lacks nuance, although Rare Earth Exchanges frequently acknowledges the urgent need for industrial policy in the West for any hope of parity.  While cost parity remains a steep hill, initiatives like the U.S. DoD-backed price floor for MP Materials and G7 standards-setting discussions are real counters, and the Chinese are getting nervous.

Investors should not mistake entrenched dominance for permanence.

The Spin Zone

The narrative frames Beijing as almost benevolent in keeping prices low. In truth, this is not charity but strategic market suppression—a calculated tactic to discourage competing projects while maintaining global dependence. The framing risks downplaying the weaponization potential of these minerals, which has been evident in Japan’s 2010 standoff and recent U.S.-EU complaints.

Where to Probe Harder

The article repeats a common refrain: that Western buyers “always chase the lowest cost.” True, but that ignores emerging defense-driven demand where cost is secondary to security of supply. By leaving this underexplored, the piece risks giving the impression that non-China supply has no commercial pathway. That’s misleading—premium, guaranteed non-China magnets already have buyers in aerospace, defense, and soon, EV OEMs under political pressure. 

The Investor’s Take

Yes, Beijing remains the low-cost producer with scale and tech advantage. However, the “inevitability” bias that runs through the article is the weakest link. History shows that commodities' dominance rarely lasts forever. Watch for Western subsidies, more industrial policy, premium defense markets, and recycling technologies to open cracks in China’s armor.

Verdict: The reporting is factually solid on data and history, but weighted by narrative bias toward Chinese inevitability. Investors should treat it as a useful recap—but not a prophecy.

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