Highlights

• China controls 85-90% of global rare earth magnet production.
• The U.S. currently holds less than 1% market share in rare earth magnet production.
• Global magnet demand is projected to double by 2035, driven by sectors such as electric vehicles, renewable energy, and advanced electronics.
• The U.S. is working to establish domestic magnet production through initiatives like MP Materials.
• Realistic independence for U.S. magnet production is not expected until the mid-2030s.

---

China overwhelmingly dominates rare earth magnet manufacturing, accounting for roughly 85–90% of global supply. In 2023, Chinese factories produced about 240,000 tonnes of rare-earth permanent magnets (mainly NdFeB and some SmCo), dwarfing output from the rest of the world. By comparison, Japan produces only on the order of 10–15 thousand tonnes (around 5–10% of world supply), and all of Europe just a few thousand tonnes (≈2–3%). The United States currently has virtually no large-scale NdFeB magnet production – less than 1% of global output – relying almost entirely on imports. (As of 2025, the U.S.’s only significant rare-earth magnet project, MP Materials’ new plant, is still in commissioning.) plus groups such as Electron Energy Corp (opens in a new tab) (part of Permag).

About 90% of the magnets in the world today originate from China, thanks to its vertically integrated supply chain and massive scale. Chinese magnet producers such as JL MAG, Ningbo Yunsheng, and others each boast tens of thousands of tons in annual capacity, far outstripping any non-Chinese competitors as tracked by Rare Earth Exchanges (REEx). See the REEx Magnet Manufacturing Rankings.

This imbalance did not happen by accident. China’s dominance is the result of decades of strategic investment and pricing policies that undercut Western producers, allowing it to build an order-of-magnitude larger magnet industry than any other country. As of 2025, the U.S. has essentially 0% market share in NdFeB magnet manufacturing (with only niche SmCo magnet makers for defense applications) per REEx reporting. Even Japan’s and Europe’s contributions have plateaued at small fractions of global output. This means that nearly all high-performance magnets used in EVs, wind turbines, electronics, and defense systems worldwide are made in China, either for direct export or embedded in finished products. China’s magnet supremacy represents a major supply chain vulnerability for the U.S. and its allies since Beijing can influence prices or restrict exports of these critical components at will. Recent Chinese export control measures – and temporary magnet export halts during trade disputes – have only underscored how dependent the world is on Chinese magnets.

Surging Global and Regional Magnet Demand to 2030

Global demand for rare earth permanent magnets is skyrocketing, driven by the electrification of transportation, renewable energy expansion, and advanced electronics. Analysts project that worldwide magnet demand will more than double over the next decade – growing from roughly 260,000 tonnes in 2024 to around 607,000 tonnes by 2035, reports Reuters’ (opens in a new tab) Eric Onstad.

This corresponds to ~7–8% compound annual growth, far outpacing general metals demand growth. The primary drivers are electric vehicle (EV) motors and wind turbine generators, which heavily use NdFeB magnets for their high power-to-weight ratio. (Each EV can contain 1–2 kg of NdFeB material, and a single large wind turbine can require hundreds of kilograms of magnets.) Consumer electronics, robotics, and defense systems are also contributing to rising magnet requirements.

According to Adamas Intelligence, global demand for rare earth magnets is projected to surge from approximately 259,000 tonnes in 2024 to well over 500,000 tonnes by 2035. This rapid growth is fueled by the clean energy transition (EVs and wind power) and other high-tech applications, and it highlights the urgency for a new magnet supply outside of China.

What About Magnet Demand in China?

China not only produces the lion’s share of magnets but is also a huge consumer of them – its domestic EV industry, electronics manufacturing, and renewable projects are voraciously absorbing magnets. China currently accounts for about two-thirds of global EV sales, which translates into a significant share of magnet usage, cites analysts such as Henry Sanderson of Voltrush (opens in a new tab).

Out of the 240,000+ tonnes China produced in 2023, a large portion was used in China’s own industries (or in Chinese-made products exported globally), while the remainder was exported as standalone magnets. For example, in one recent month (July 2023), according to Discovery Alert (opens in a new tab), China exported 5,577 tonnes of finished permanent magnets, with the European Union importing 38% of that volume and the United States 11%. This suggests China’s internal consumption that month was the other ~50% of output. As Chinese EV production and wind installations continue to grow, China’s domestic magnet demand is expected to keep pace, though China’s output is still forecast to exceed internal needs (maintaining its role as a net exporter through 2030). In absolute terms, China will likely remain the single largest magnet end-user_ simply due to the scale of its EV, appliance, and electronics industries – even as other regions grow faster in percentage terms.

What About Demand in America?

The United States today is a major magnet consumer, but much of its “demand” is hidden in imported goods. In 2024, according to a Reuters analysis (opens in a new tab) U.S. manufacturers directly consumed roughly 10,000 tonnes of rare earth magnets, nearly all of which were imported. In addition, an estimated ~30,000 tonnes of magnets were embedded in imported finished products (like imported electric cars, motors, wind turbine components, and electronics). Taking those together, the U.S.’s total magnet requirements in 2024 effectively approached ~40,000 tonnes.

Looking ahead, U.S. magnet demand is poised to grow faster than any other region. Adamas Intelligence forecasts U.S. demand for NdFeB magnets will rise at roughly 17% per year in the coming years – the highest growth rate globally. This reflects the U.S.’s accelerating adoption of EVs, expansion of offshore wind projects, and the needs of its defense sector. Although with Trump 2.0 and the Big Beautiful Bill cutting green energy incentives, this may change. We can’t be certain at this point.

At a 17% CAGR, America’s direct-use magnet demand would double roughly every 4–5 years. By 2030, U.S. annual magnet consumption (excluding imports within assembled goods) could reach on the order of 20,000–25,000 tonnes, and including magnets inside imported products, U.S. total usage could be well above 50,000 tonnes per year by 2030. In other words, the U.S. magnet market is set to expand significantly, from a very small base toward a sizeable share of global demand by the end of the decade.

Did you know that the United States is projected to have the fastest magnet demand growth of any major market, at ~17% annually, according to Adamas?  The analyst and conference firm forecasts for U.S. NdFeB magnet demand (in thousands of tonnes, excluding magnets in imported assemblies) climbing from under 10 kt in 2020 to roughly 50 kt by 2035. Even with such rapid growth, China’s domestic consumption will remain larger in absolute terms, given China’s massive EV and industrial base.

And On to Rest of world (Europe, Japan, etc.)

Other regions are also seeing rising magnet needs. Europe’s demand is expanding quickly due to its EV production targets and renewable energy build-out. In mid-2023, the EU’s imports of Chinese magnets spiked – e.g. over 2,100 tonnes in a single month (July 2023) (opens in a new tab) – as European automakers and wind turbine manufacturers scrambled to secure supplies. This implies an annualized rate of ~25,000+ tonnes of magnet imports for Europe, which is in line with Europe’s growing share of EV manufacturing. By 2030, Europe’s magnet demand could be in the tens of thousands of tonnes per year (likely on par with or even exceeding the U.S., depending on EV rollout speed). Japan and South Korea also consume significant amounts of magnets (for automotive and electronics sectors), but their demand growth is more modest and, like others, they remain heavily reliant on Chinese supply.

Overall, global magnet demand by 2030 is expected to reach roughly 400,000+ tonnes annually (up from 270,000 tonnes in the early 2020s), with China supplying the bulk of that and consuming a large fraction itself, as cited by both Reuters (opens in a new tab) and REEx.

This surging demand outside China – especially in the U.S. and Europe – is exactly why there is intense focus on building non-Chinese magnet supply chains.

U.S. Efforts to Build Domestic Magnet Supply (MP Materials, DoD, Apple & More)

Closing the magnet supply gap has become a strategic priority for the United States. In recent years, MP Materials– the operator of the Mountain Pass rare earth mine in California and considered a “national treasure trove” by REEx – has emerged as the flagship U.S. effort to create a mine-to-magnet supply chain on American soil. In 2023, MP Materials began construction of a magnet manufacturing plant in Fort Worth, Texas (the “Independence” facility), with strong backing from the U.S. government.

In fact, the Department of Defense (DoD) inked a deal in mid-2025 to financially support MP’s magnet output: the Pentagon will guarantee a minimum price for MP’s NdPr (neodymium-praseodymium) supply, ensuring the venture’s profitability despite China’s low prices. Under this deal, the DoD will also take a 15% equity stake in MP Materials, underscoring the strategic importance of the project. MP’s Texas factory is forecast to start commercial production by the end of 2025, initially ramping to ~1,000 tonnes per year of NdFeB magnet output.

Subsequent phases are planned to expand the Texas facility to ~3,000 tpa, and MP has announced a second U.S. magnet factory (location TBD) that would add another ~7,000 tpa in capacity. In total, MP Materials aims to produce ~10,000 tonnes per year of magnet output within a few years, which is roughly equivalent to the entire current U.S. annual magnet consumption (10,000 tonnes in 2024), according to Reuters reporting. Notably, the 10,000 t figure refers only to magnets directly purchased in the U.S.; it does not include the ~30,000 t of magnets contained in imported products each year. Still, if MP ultimately produces 10,000 tpa, it would be a game-changer – essentially creating domestic capacity overnight, at least theoretically, to supply 100% of today’s U.S. direct-magnet demand (albeit only ~25% of total national needs if counting magnets in imported goods).

Apple’s $500M commitment: In addition to DoD support, the private sector (led by tech companies and automakers) is investing in U.S. magnet production. A high-profile example is Apple’s partnership with MP Materials, announced in July 2025.

Apple committed to a $500 million multi-year deal to purchase American-made rare earth magnets from MP’s Texas plant. This first-of-its-kind agreement will see Apple sourcing 100% recycled rare earth magnets domestically for use in its devices. As part of the deal, Apple and MP will jointly develop a new recycling facility at Mountain Pass (California) to process end-of-life electronics and scrap into refined rare earths for magnets. Essentially, Apple is helping MP “close the loop” by supplying recycled feedstock and providing a guaranteed offtake for magnets, which de-risks MP’s expansion. Apple-specific magnet production lines will be built at the Fort Worth factory to serve Apple’s needs, but this capacity will also bolster MP’s overall output. The Apple and DoD partnerships together ensure that a large portion of MP’s future magnet output is spoken for – supporting U.S. defense applications and the supply chain for consumer electronics – and they help fund the scaling up of MP’s facilities.

How much demand could MP’s output supply? In theory, once MP Materials reaches its planned 10,000 tpa magnet capacity, it could supply roughly 100% of the current U.S. domestic magnet demand (again, excluding magnets in imported finished products). However, U.S. demand is rising fast; by 2030, the U.S. might require 20k+ tonnes of magnets annually for its own manufacturing. This means MP’s 10k output would cover only about 50% of U.S. needs by 2030 (even less if we aspire to cover the magnets inside imported goods as well). In other words, MP Materials alone – even at full planned capacity – is not sufficient to make the U.S. “magnet independent” in the long run. It is a crucial start, but additional sources will be needed to keep up with demand growth. Recognizing this, the DoD contract with MP explicitly envisions a second facility (to bring MP to 10k tpa), and U.S. policymakers have issued grants to other magnet ventures, too.

What Could Go Wrong — And Why “MP Alone” Won’t Get America to Magnet Independence

First REEx delineates the feasible risk factors (the short list that actually matters) for investors, government officials, and policymakers to consider.

1. Single-point-of-failure risk

MP Materials is the flagship, but one company is not a supply chain. Even after Fort Worth starts up (~1,000 tpa initially), MP’s full build-out to ~10,000 tpa only matches today’s U.S. direct magnet purchases and excludes ~30,000 t embedded in imported products. If U.S. demand grows into the 2030s—as forecasts suggest—MP’s 10 kt covers a shrinking share unless multiple U.S./allied plants scale in parallel.

2. Upstream bottlenecks

Dy/Tb heavy rare earths. High-temperature EV/defense magnets need dysprosium/terbium. Refining is overwhelmingly China-centric; a large slice of heavy REE feed comes from Myanmar, where crackdowns and conflict have repeatedly disrupted supply. Any hiccup chokes Western magnet output first. REEx suggests the upstream challenges are not trivial.

3. Midstream build risk (separation/refining) is real.

Even well-funded projects can stall once they meet U.S. permitting, wastewater, and cost curves—see Lynas’s uncertainty on its Texas heavy RE plant despite a DoD grant. Without dependable non-China separation for NdPr—and especially Dy/Tb—magnet factories starve. REEx understands that the U.S. government still does not understand the full extent of risk midstream.

4. Technology & equipment choke points

Much of the know-how for sintered NdFeB (powder metallurgy, grain boundary diffusion, QA) is tacit and closely held. Hitachi/Proterial historically sat on a thicket of process IP; meanwhile, China has tightened export controls on magnet-making technologies and dual-use items, raising the bar for rapid Western replication. Do not underestimate this reality.

5. Beijing policy risk: pricing and licenses.

China can depress prices (undercutting new entrants) or tighten export licenses on REEs/magnets, as seen with new controls this year. Either move can stall Western capex or starve plants of inputs.

6. Qualification drag (auto/aero PPAP)

Magnet suppliers must pass rigorous multi-year qualification (PPAP/APQP) for EV and aerospace platforms. You don’t displace incumbent China-sourced parts in a single model year; volume awards trail successful pilot runs by years.

7. Recycling is necessary—but not on an instant scale

Apple’s $500M deal jump-starts U.S. circular feedstock, yet end-of-life and manufacturing scrap flows take time to aggregate and purify at industrial volumes;“100% recycled” Apple lines won’t backstop the broader U.S. EV/wind build-out anytime soon. To date, about 1% of all magnets originate from recycling. 

8. Demand outruns capacity.

Adamas and others see global NdFeB demand compounding at ~8–9% through the 2030s. U.S. is expected to be the fastest-growing major market. If consumption doubles while U.S. capacity crawls, independence recedes.

Why MP Materials isn’t enough (even if everything goes right)

• Scale math: MP’s target ~10,000 tpa ≈ U.S. direct magnet purchases in 2024—but not the ~30,000 t embedded in imported vehicles, motors, and electronics. To cover total national usage, America would need multiple MP-scale plants plus reshored downstream assembly (so those embedded magnets are made here, not imported).
• Timing: Reuters and MP/DoD disclosures point to ~1,000 tpa initial output by end-2025, with later phases and a second plant to reach ~10,000 tpa—not within a single year.
• Feedstock & heavy REE exposure: Without reliable non-China Dy/Tb supply and U.S./ally separation at scale, U.S. magnet plants remain vulnerable.

Is the claim “by next year we’ll make all the magnets we need” plausible?

Again, President Trump just the other day on Fox News declared we would be making more magnets than we would need within a year. Is this correct?  No.

The public data show initial MP output (~1 kt) starting around late 2025 (and that’s an if), with years of ramp to reach ~10 kt—and that still ignores embedded magnets in imports and all the risk factors delineated above. Other U.S. ventures remain pilot/early-scale. Given qualification cycles and feedstock constraints, the U.S. cannot meet all domestic magnet needs within one year—it’s virtually impossible.

A more Probable Timeline (risk-adjusted)

According to REEx analyses an adjusted timeline is included in the table below.

Year	Activity/Milestones
2025–2026	MP Phase-1 output begins; U.S. domestic production covers <10–15% of direct U.S. magnet demand; dependence on Chinese magnets remains dominant. Export-license and price-war risks persist
2027–2028	If MP’s second U.S. facility progresses and one or two U.S./EU projects scale, U.S. domestic capacity could reach ~10–15 kt. Depending on demand growth, that’s ~30–50% of direct U.S. demand—but still well short when counting embedded magnets. Heavy REE supply and PPAP gates remain the swing factors.
2029–2032	2029–2032: With successful ramps (MP ~10 kt + allied capacity), the U.S. and close allies might cover a majority of direct demand in best-case scenarios; full independence (including embedded magnets) still unlikely without reshoring assembly and securing Dy/Tb supply chains
Mid-2030s	Earliest realistic window for functional independence if multiple MP-scale plants operate, non-China separation and heavy REE streams are established, recycling scales materially, and OEMs complete platform requalification. Any policy, price, or permitting setback pushes this right.

REEx Takeaway on Risk

The U.S. is finally building a magnet industry—helped by DoD price floors and Apple’s offtake/recycling—but one plant (even two) doesn’t equal independence. And as this media has promulgated, without a comprehensive and enduring industrial policy the probability of myriad problems rises.

The bottlenecks are upstream (Dy/Tb), midstream (separation), and downstream (qualification/scale). On the numbers and the risks, “all the magnets we need next year” is not in the cards; mid-2030s is the defensible, risk-aware horizon for meaningful independence—if execution holds.

Other U.S. and allied magnet projects

Beyond MP, several other players are trying to establish a non-Chinese magnet supply. In the U.S., Noveon Magnetics (a Texas-based startup, formerly Urban Mining) has been developing NdFeB magnet production using recycled materials; it reportedly has a pilot output of a couple of hundred tonnes and plans to scale towards 1,000–2,000 tpa in the near term, with ambitions up to 10,000 tpa longer-term. Notably, General Motors signed a deal with Noveon to source magnets for certain EV models, indicating automakers’ eagerness to secure non-Chinese magnets.

REEx has also reported another U.S. effort, USA Rare Earth (USARE), with plans for a 5,000 tpa magnet factory (leveraging technology licensed from Hitachi), though as of 2025, it is in pilot-stage development. On the materials side, companies like Lynas (Australia) and Iluka Resources are building rare earth separation facilities that could feed magnet production outside China. Europe and Japan are also investing: for example, Neo Performance Materials is commissioning a 2,000 tpa NdFeB magnet plant in Estonia (with EU support), Germany’s VAC is expanding capacity (aiming for ~6,000 tpa), and Japan’s Hitachi Metals (Proterial) and TDK continue to produce a few thousand tonnes domestically. These non-Chinese sources combined still constitute a small fraction of global supply, but they are critical developments for supply chain diversification, a vital imperative.

In summary, the U.S. – with help from allies and private partners – is standing up a domestic magnet industry essentially from scratch, using tools like DoD funding, corporate offtake agreements (Apple/MP), and recycling initiatives. The coming 5–10 years will determine how quickly this new capacity can scale and whether it can begin to displace Chinese magnet imports in a meaningful way.

REEx Bottom line

Achieving U.S. independence from Chinese rare earth magnets by next year (or even within a couple of years) is not feasible, given the current state of production, according to REEx analyses. Even by 2030, the U.S. will likely remain partially reliant on Chinese (or overseas) magnets, unless there is an unprecedented acceleration of domestic projects, which would require an Operation Warp Speed type of response paired with more comprehensive industrial policy.

Realistically, experts inform REEx it will be the mid-2030s or beyond before U.S. and allied nations can collectively produce all the magnets needed for their industries – and that assumes sustained investments and success in scaling up new operations.

All data analyzed by REEX and others reinforce that we are still years away from the U.S. making “all the magnets we need” domestically. It will take massive capacity build-out (tens of thousands of tonnes per year of new production), technological innovation (such as magnet recycling and new magnet chemistries), and continued government and private-sector support to close the gap.

In summary, the U.S. is on a path toward greater magnet self-sufficiency – via MP Materials and similar initiatives – but full independence from Chinese magnets is unlikely to be realized before the 2030s, given demand is growing as fast as (or faster than) new supply. However, this timeline could be compressed with more government actions under an emergency declaration.

For the foreseeable future, China will remain the primary source of rare earth magnets, and the U.S. will need to strategically manage this dependency while its domestic industry catches up.

Sources: Rare Earth Exchanges magnet market database and analysiswordpress-1542803-6000058.cloudwaysapps.comwordpress-1542803-6000058.cloudwaysapps.com; Reuters (Eric Onstad), “US rare earth pricing system… to challenge China’s dominance,” July 14, 2025reuters.com (opens in a new tab)reuters.com (opens in a new tab); Apple Newsroom, July 15, 2025apple.com (opens in a new tab)apple.com (opens in a new tab); Discovery Alert (John Zadeh), China’s Rare Earth Export Strategy, May 2025discoveryalert.com.au (opens in a new tab)discoveryalert.com.au (opens in a new tab); Discovery Alert, China’s Permanent Magnet Exports Surge, Aug 2025discoveryalert.com.au (opens in a new tab); CarbonCredits.com, July 31, 2025carboncredits.com (opens in a new tab)carboncredits.com (opens in a new tab).