Highlights

• Chinese researchers have mapped dysprosium flows across provinces.
• There is a 41% supply gap in dysprosium from 2010-2022.
• Only 6% of dysprosium is contributed by recycling within the same period.
• Electric vehicles now consume 31% of the demand for dysprosium.
• There are potential supply risks due to limited mining and import dependencies.
• Strategic provincial recycling and dismantling could transform waste into a critical resource for clean energy technologies.

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A new Journal of Cleaner Production study led by Yan-Fei Liu (opens in a new tab) of Tsinghua University (with co-authors from Peking University, Chinese Academy of Geological Sciences, China University of Geosciences–Beijing, Zhengzhou University, and the Chinese Research Academy of Environmental Sciences) maps China’s province-by-province dysprosium (Dy) flows, stocks, and recycling potential from 2010–2022—and the findings are stark.

What the study found

Researchers built a resource–economy coupling model to trace Dy from mining through manufacturing and end-of-life. They report a 41% Dy supply gap at the mining/beneficiation stage (2011–2022), despite China’s dominance in NdFeB magnet production. In-use Dy stocks reached 12,879 t in 2022—57.6× higher than in 2010—yet recycling contributed only ~6% of cumulative demand over the study window. Stocks have shifted north→south, with eight provinces (including Guangdong, Shandong, Jiangsu, Henan, Hebei, Zhejiang, Sichuan, Inner Mongolia) holding >51% of in-use Dy. The largest near-term “urban mines”: industrial robots, E-waste (ACs, fridges, washers, phones, PCs), vehicles, and wind turbines—but recovery is hampered by a mismatch between where waste is generated and where dismantling capacity sits.

Why it matters

Dysprosium hardens NdFeB magnets for EVs, wind turbines, robotics, and electronics—all central to decarbonization. With EVs now the single biggest Dy consumer (31% of 2022 demand) and wind close behind, the study warns that primary supply quotas and import fragility (notably reliance on Myanmar ionic clays) risk widening the gap—even as in-use stocks surge. The authors argue that a targeted, provincial build-out of formal recycling and dismantling could unlock significant secondary Dy, improve supply resilience, and cut environmental burdens associated with heavy rare earth mining.

Implications for policy & industry

• Map and build where the metal is: Prioritize coastal and high-demand provinces (e.g., Guangdong, Jiangsu, Shandong, Sichuan) for E-waste and vehicle dismantling, and locate wind-turbine magnet recovery hubs in Inner Mongolia/Xinjiang/Qinghai.
• Tighten the chain: Standardize collection, enable inter-provincial flows, and expand formal capacity to displace informal recycling that drives pollution and material loss.
• Design for recovery: Encourage Dy-lean magnet chemistries, component marking, and end-of-life take-back to raise yields over time.
• De-risk imports: Treat Dy sourcing as a strategic exposure in EV and wind build-outs; diversify feedstocks while the secondary system scales.

Limitations

This is a provincial MFA reliant on heterogeneous datasets, assumptions about Dy intensities and product lifetimes, and excludes some low-share end uses (e.g., MRIs, high-speed rail) due to limited provincial data. The authors’ uncertainty analysis shows notable variance for per-capita stocks and the supply gap, but cross-checks against prior work support the overall direction and scale.

Conclusion

China’s Dy challenge is not just a mining problem—it’s a logistics and siting problem. The metal is already locked inside products, concentrated in specific provinces. Build the right recycling capacity in the right places, and the country can turn today’s waste into tomorrow’s strategic supply—stabilizing costs and strengthening the clean-energy transition.

Citation: Liu, Y.-F., et al. “Unlocking the recycling potential of dysprosium for balancing supply and demand across Chinese provinces.” Journal of Cleaner Production 524 (2025): 146483. Tsinghua University (lead), Peking University, Chinese Academy of Geological Sciences, China University of Geosciences–Beijing, Zhengzhou University, Chinese Research Academy of Environmental Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2025.146483 (opens in a new tab)

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