Highlights

• U.S. diplomat and critical minerals expert Melissa Sanderson warns that Western nations walked away from mining and processing 25 years ago, allowing China to build strategic dominance that poses ongoing supply chain vulnerabilities.
• The U.S.-Japan critical minerals action plan announced March 19 aims to reduce China dependence, coming as data shows China selectively redirecting rare earth magnet exports away from the United States.
• American Rare Earths’ Wyoming projects represent domestic supply potential, but financing, permitting, and downstream conversion challenges remain unresolved across the broader U.S. rare earth ecosystem.

A March 5 episode (opens in a new tab) of the Rare Earth Exchanges™ podcast featuring Daniel O’Connor, Dustin Olsen, and Melissa Sanderson landed as more than a sector conversation. In light of events over the past two weeks, it now reads like an early warning on a strategic vulnerability that continues to widen.

Sanderson is not a casual commentator. She has served as a U.S. diplomat for 21 years, held senior roles at Freeport-McMoRan, sits on the board of American Rare Earths (opens in a new tab), and serves as co-chair of the Critical Minerals Institute (opens in a new tab). Public profiles also describe her as a geostrategic adviser focused on mining, ESG, and supply-chain resilience.

Melissa Sanderson

During the podcast Sanderson argued that the United States and Europe effectively walked away from mining, processing, and related “ugly manufacturing” roughly 25 years ago, while China accepted the environmental and political costs of building dominance. She says COVID exposed the fragility of that model, but that Western governments still underestimate how long it will take to rebuild a mine-to-magnet chain.

That point now looks more timely than theoretical. On March 19, the United States and Japan announced a new action plan on critical minerals and rare earths aimed at reducing dependence on China, including coordinated trade tools, stockpiling, geological cooperation, and mechanisms to respond to supply disruption and economic coercion. On March 20, Reuters also reported that China’s rare-earth magnet exports rose overall in early 2026 even as shipments to the United States fell, underscoring Sanderson’s central point: leverage does not require a total cutoff; it can operate through selective allocation and shifting trade flows.

The podcast also doubled as a platform for American Rare Earths’ Wyoming narrative. Sanderson highlighted Halleck Creek and the Cowboy State Mine as a potentially large domestic source of light and heavy rare earths. Public company filings support parts of that story: American Rare Earths has disclosed a non-binding EXIM letter of interest for up to $456 million and has described Halleck Creek as a large Wyoming resource under phased development.

Still, investors should separate strategic logic from project certainty. The podcast makes a compelling geopolitical case, but financing, permitting, metallurgy, and downstream conversion remain unresolved across the wider U.S. rare earth ecosystem. Sanderson’s strongest line may have been the simplest: the clock is ticking.  Regardless Sanderson is a wealth of knowledge and experience in this sector.

For Rare Earth Exchanges readers, the relevance is broader than mining. Critical minerals sit upstream of medical devices, imaging systems, advanced electronics, AI infrastructure, and national resilience. The supply-chain story is no longer background noise. It is becoming policy.