Highlights

• China's new export restrictions extend control over rare earth elements and permanent magnets, affecting global technology and defense supply chains.
• The policy applies Foreign Direct Product Rule in reverse, potentially impacting global manufacturing where Chinese-origin processing technology is used.
• U.S. remains years away from full mine-to-magnet independence, highlighting the strategic importance of developing domestic critical minerals supply chains.

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Beijing’s latest Announcement No. 61 from the Ministry of Commerce marks a major escalation in the global resource chess match. The new export restrictions—first analyzed by Gracelin Baskaran of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)—extend China’s grip not only over rare earth elements but also permanent magnets, the linchpin of everything from fighter jets to wind turbines. But as Rare Earth Exchanges has consistently argued, every policy maneuver from Beijing must be read through both an economic and geopolitical lens.

The Fine Print Behind the Drama

Baskaran’s analysis correctly identifies that this round of restrictions applies the Foreign Direct Product Rule (FDPR) in reverse—a striking innovation. China is effectively saying: if a product anywhere in the world contains even trace Chinese-origin rare earths or processing technology, it falls under Beijing’s export control. That’s not hype; it’s real policy with enforcement teeth.

She also gets the sector math right: China controls roughly 70% of rare earth mining, 90%of separation, and over 90% of magnet manufacturing. Those figures are consistent with U.S. Geological Survey data and REEx’s own 2025 tracking of Chinese refining throughput.

Where the Analysis Leans Heavy

Baskaran’s claim that the new rules could “largely deny export licenses to companies affiliated with foreign militaries” may overstate immediacy. While the language is hawkish, implementation has historically been selective—China often uses “case-by-case” reviews to extract diplomatic concessions, not impose blanket bans. The framing of this as a clear “weaponization” of supply is partially correct, but it misses the commercial dimension: China’s magnet export curbs also serve to preserve domestic feedstock for its booming EV and defense sectors. This isn’t pure geopolitics—it’s industrial policy wrapped in strategy.

The Missing Piece: America’s Still-Fragile Midstream

The article’s closing section—highlighting Lynas-Noveon’s new partnership and the Department of War’s $400 million equity stake in MP Materials—is accurate, and it matters. But the deeper reality is that even with government price floors and offtake guarantees, the U.S. remains five years from full mine-to-magnet independence.

REEx’s own assessment finds MP’s Mountain Pass heavy-rare-earth line still uncommissioned and USA Rare Earth’s Stillwater magnet plant pre-revenue. These are promising signals, not completed supply chains.

What Investors Should Watch

• Policy vs. Practice: Will Beijing actually enforce FDPR-style jurisdiction globally?
• Western Readiness: Can the U.S. sustain capital-intensive midstream projects amid volatile pricing?
• Timing Risk: China’s export discretion can change overnight; investors betting on stability are betting on politics.

CSIS is right to sound the alarm—but investors should also see this as confirmation of why the West must double down on separation, metallization, and magnet production at home. The race isn’t about dominance—it’s about resilience.

Citation: Gracelin Baskaran, “China’s New Rare Earth and Magnet Restrictions Threaten U.S. Defense Supply Chains (opens in a new tab),” CSIS Critical Questions, Oct 9, 2025.

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