Highlights

• U.S.-China trade framework may delay 100% tariffs if China eases rare earth export controls, but the agreement remains vague with no binding treaty yet signed.
• China cut rare earth export values by half in May 2025, demonstrating weaponized supply-chain leverage that confirms systematic risk despite any temporary deal.
• Investors should focus on non-Chinese upstream and midstream rare earth plays, as framework agreements don't solve U.S. lack of processing, separation, and magnet production capacity.

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In what some could interpret as a surprise twist, the Donald Trump-led U.S. administration reports that a “framework” trade deal with Xi Jinping’s China may stave off a looming 100% U.S. tariff — if China drops or delays proposed export controls on rare-earth minerals. According to Scott Bessent (U.S. Treasury Secretary), China is ready to make a deal, and the rare-earth minestrone is central to it.   Some of the mainstream media declare (opens in a new tab) “TACO (opens in a new tab).”  Regardless of the rare-earth supply chain, this is no mere side story. China already cut rare-earth export values nearly in half in May 2025, a clear signal that it can — and will — wield its dominance as a trade lever.   Of course ,this means the U.S. and allies have no choice but to re-industrialize.

What Rare Earth Exchanges (REEx) can verify thus far. China has historically controlled a very large share of global rare-earth production and processing, giving it choke-point power.

Chinese export controls on rare-earth elements (licensing delays, restricted elements) were and are real, triggered at least by April 2025.  A U.S.–China trade framework was announced, referencing rare-earth elements among controlled items and export permit discussions.

But the more speculative to ponder. While the mainstream article quotes “100% tariffs” and heavy reliance on the rare-earth dynamic, the exact terms — which rare‐earths, what volumes, what timeline — remain vague. The phrase “framework” suggests a framework only, not a full binding treaty.  The article’s gloss on “Trump always chickens out (T A C O)” is a media jab rather than a supply-chain fact. It extrapolates motive (chickening out) rather than supply-chain mechanics.

REEx has suggested that the U.S. and POTUS have no choice but to deal with China, given China's leverage over the rare-earth element supply chain. Our primary recourse is to re-industrialize, and hence why this media supports President Trump’s primary intentions.

It’s not clear that the U.S. will completely avoid the tariffs — the article says, “most likely” and “intended to avoid”. There’s no public, signed final deal yet that includes all rare‐earth provisions.

Media such as NBC (opens in a new tab) frame it as “T A C O – Trump always chickens out,” implying personal weakness rather than strategic nuance. That language signals editorial bias rather than analytical impartiality.  There’s a tendency to treat rare-earths as a silver-bullet “win” for the U.S. rather than as part of a longer-term resilience challenge. Reports gloss over the fact that just access to rare-earths isn’t enough — processing, separation, magnets, and actual supply-chain logistics still matter. Recent U.S. mainstream media, such as NBC, underplay Chinese asymmetry: even with a framework, they retain the regulatory tool (export licenses) and can pick and choose. One expert noted: “Many analysts expect China to maintain the export controls … and green-light exports selectively to favored partners.”

So, Why This Matters for Rare Earth Investing

Start with supply-chain leverage. China’s willingness to use rare-earth export controls as trade-war leverage confirms our thesis of weaponized interdependence. (See our prior coverage on the high reliance of U.S./European manufacturing on Chinese rare-earth feedstocks.)

What of short-term relief vs long-term structural risk?  Even if China temporarily agrees to resume exports or fast-track licenses, the systemic risk remains: U.S. and allies still lack midstream separation, magnet production, and full redundancy. That’s the core business case for rare-earth plays outside China.

So, firms with upstream ore access (Australia, U.S.), or those building processing/refining capacity in friendly jurisdictions, may see elevated strategic value. A “deal” with China may ease immediate pain but should not lull investors into thinking the supply-chain problem is solved.

Finally, the negotiation optics matter. A “framework” (versus a full treaty) means markets may interpret this as a tentative truce, not a durable resolution. Volatility remains.  Thus far, it's been all framework, no treaty.

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