Highlights

• EXIM announces $100 billion to secure U.S. and allied supply chains for critical minerals, LNG, and nuclear energy.
• This is the largest single financing signal from Washington in years, with early project allocations favoring copper and energy over rare earth supply chain gaps.
• Despite chair John Jovanovic teasing critical mineral agreements 'orders of magnitude larger' than the $1.25B Reko Diq copper loan, no rare earth-specific projects have been disclosed.
• Investors are left with directional signals but no confirmed deals.
• Media framing emphasizes 'energy dominance' while overlooking the core strategic challenge: China controls over 90% of NdFeB magnet capacity and 95% of heavy rare earth separation.
• Current EXIM projects do not address these bottlenecks.

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So a superpower wallet opens—but where does the money really flow? The Financial Times and Mining.com reports landed with the weight of a seismic policy shift: EXIM will deploy $100 billion to secure U.S. and allied supply chains for critical minerals, LNG, and nuclear energy.

For rare earth and critical mineral investors, this is the largest single financing signal Washington has made in years—larger than DPA rounds, larger than DFC commitments, and larger than any previous EXIM posture. FT cites chair John Jovanovic (opens in a new tab) framing the plan as a response to Western “over-reliance on Chinese and Russian supplies,” a sentiment the market understands all too well.

But the early slate of projects—Egypt, Pakistan, Europe—skews heavily toward energy and copper, not rare earths. This is where investors must read past the headlines. Copper at Reko Diq is strategically important, but it does not reduce the West’s dependency on China’s magnet supply chain. Nor do LNG offtake guarantees.

The Real Prize: Where Are the Rare Earth Deals?

Jovanovic teases that EXIM is finalizing critical mineral agreements “orders of magnitude larger” than the $1.25B Reko Diq loan. Mining.com echoes this without offering specifics. This is accurate reporting—he did say it—but it is strategically vague. Without named projects, locations, or jurisdictions, investors should treat this portion as directional, not confirmed.

From a supply-chain perspective, the notable signal is EXIM’s explicit willingness to participate in allied critical mineral pacts—most importantly with Australia. That could imply support for magnet-grade rare earth refining, U.S.-allied midstream expansions, or even upstream diversification in Africa and Central Asia. But as of the article’s publication, no rare earth–specific project has been disclosed.

Bias Watch: Energy Dominance Framing, Limited Mineral Rigor

Both FT and Reuters lean into the “Trump energy dominance” narrative. That framing is politically relevant but shifts attention away from the deeper strategic challenge: China controls 90%+ of NdFeB magnet capacity and 95% of heavy rare earth separation. The articles treat all “critical materials” as interchangeable rather than dissecting rare earth bottlenecks individually—a common mainstream blind spot.

Mining.com, for its part, accurately ties the announcement to broader global LNG and nuclear conversations but similarly brushes past the rare-earth-specific supply chain dynamics investors care about.

Source: Financial Times, Mining.com, Reuters (Nov. 23–24, 2025).

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