Highlights

• U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer confirmed America's 80% rare earth import reliance on China ahead of the mid-May Trump-Xi summit, signaling pragmatic diplomacy over confrontation despite ongoing trade tensions.
• China controls refining for 19 of 20 critical minerals tracked by the IEA, with ~70% market share, creating structural interdependence that neither tariffs nor rhetoric can quickly break.
• Washington is shifting from talking points to design solutions—including trade boards, plurilateral mineral arrangements, and price-floor protections—while companies like USA Rare Earth hedge by securing European separation capacity.

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A rare earth shock doesn’t arrive like an oil embargo. It slips in through the back door: a delayed magnet shipment, a stalled motor line, a defense contractor calling procurement. In this industry, the real power lives in the midstream—separation, refining, and the licenses that decide who gets what, when.

On Tuesday, April 7, United States Trade Representative Jamieson Greer (opens in a new tab) called the United States–China trade relationship “stable” and said Donald Trump will aim to preserve that stability in a mid-May meeting with Xi Jinping. Cited by _Reuters (opens in a new tab)_’ David Lawder and Doina Chiacu, he was blunt about the motive: Washington wants to “continue to get rare earths from the Chinese,” and hopes technical talks can resolve issues—including minerals routed through third countries—before leaders sit down.

Jamieson Greer, US Trade Representative

The Dependency America Can’t Tariff Away

Greer’s candor is also an admission. The U.S. Geological Survey estimates (opens in a new tab) U.S. net import reliance for rare-earth compounds and metals at 80% in 2024, and lists China as supplying about 70% of U.S. imports (average 2020–2023). USGS adds the uncomfortable detail that “significant amounts” arrive embedded in finished goods—magnets already inside what America buys.

Rare earths are only the most visible example. USGS data (opens in a new tab) also show that from 2020–2023 the U.S. imported at least 29 mineral commodities from China—a reminder that critical-mineral exposure is broad, not boutique. 

Interdependence is the Reality, not a Slogan

This is a relationship neither side can fully sever. The Office of the United States Trade Representative estimates U.S. goods trade with China still totaled about $414.7 billion in 2025 (opens in a new tab)—smaller than peak years, but still enormous. 

The structural trap that keeps pulling policymakers back to the same negotiating table: China is the dominant refiner for 19 of the 20 minerals the International Energy Agency (IEA) tracks (opens in a new tab), with an average market share of around 70%. 

And the leverage is not theoretical. China exported about 58,000 tonnes of rare-earth magnets in 2024, and, as _Rare Earth Exchanges_™ has cautioned, licensing delays or denials can threaten revenues and competitiveness across global industrial value chains. 

Triggering and Managing Tensions

President Trump helped set today’s temperature when tariffs escalated into a U.S.-China trade war in his 1.0 term beginning in 2018.  Beijing, in turn, has sharpened the playbook that turns dominance in processing—and increasingly in processing technology—into geopolitical pressure. Analysts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Grace Baskaran) and the Council on Foreign Relations have warned (opens in a new tab) that tightening Chinese controls around rare earths can reverberate rapidly into U.S. defense and industrial supply chains. 

Greer’s pragmatic answer—boards to manage trade lanes, plurilateral mineral arrangements, even price-floor concepts to protect non-Chinese production from predatory pricing—signals Washington is finally treating supply concentration as a design problem, not a talking point.  The Trump 2.0 administration has done more than any previous administration in recent history to address the current supply chain crisis. 

Final Note

Rare Earth Exchanges supports a pragmatic thaw—yes, even under Trump—because we frankly don’t have a choice: America still needs Chinese-origin inputs while it builds alternatives, and China still needs major end-markets. The test is whether May’s summit turns “stability” into a runway.

That is why companies are hedging, too. USA Rare Earth’s term sheet for a roughly 12.5% stake in Carester in Lacq, France, is explicitly structured to secure oxide offtake and separation know-how while U.S. capacity catches up. 

In rare earths, speeches aren’t steel. Capability is.