Highlights
- China issued its first wave of year-long rare earth export licenses, but GermanyโEurope's industrial engineโreceived none, signaling Beijing's use of licensing as geopolitical leverage.
- Germany's new conservative coalition is hardening its China stance while still dependent on Chinese markets, creating a fractured balancing act between rhetoric and economic reality.
- For investors, China's segmented licensing system signals accelerated diversification strategies and increased funding for non-Chinese rare earth projects in 2026 and beyond.
China has issued its first wave of โgeneral licensesโ for rare earth exportsโyear-long permits meant to unfreeze months of supply-chain paralysis. But Germany, Europeโs industrial engine and one of Chinaโs most important customers, did not make the cut cites AFP/Reuters. What looks like a diplomatic footnote is, in fact, a revealing data point in the shifting geometry of global rare earth power.
Table of Contents
A License List with Loud Silences
During his first official visit to China, German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul confirmed that no German companies received licenses from Beijingโs inaugural batch. He acknowledged โsignals,โ but admitted substantial work remains. The disruption caused by Chinaโs export controls since Aprilโcovering all 17 rare earth elementsโhas destabilized automakers, semiconductor players, and defense contractors across Europe.
This core fact aligns with supply-chain realities: no credible reporting has identified German entities among the first license recipients, and Beijingโs opaque criteria reinforce Chinaโs habit of using licensing regimes as geopolitical levers.
Where the article ventures into assumption is the implication that the new permits primarily benefit the United States. While U.S.โChina dรฉtente may have set the stage, nothing in Chinese trade notices confirms preferential treatment. Thatโs speculation, not evidence.
Berlinโs Fractured Balancing Act
Wadephulโs delegationโincluding VDAโs Hildegard Mรผllerโpressed China on semiconductor, rare earth, and commodity delays. Berlinโs message was clear: uncertainty must end. Yet the subtext is sharper. Germany is trying to rebalanceโtougher rhetoric on โunfair practices,โ creation of a parliamentary advisory committee on โsecurity-relevant trade,โ and alignment with Brussels on anti-dumping and anti-subsidy toolsโwhile still courting China as a top export market.
The narrative holds up: Germanyโs new conservative-led coalition has indeed hardened its China stance. But there is an unmistakable editorial flavor hereโAFP and Reuters reporting consistently nudges readers toward the idea that Europe is finally ready to say โenough.โ That might be true politically, but it remains aspirational economically.
Why Rare Earth Investors Should Not Miss This Moment
Chinaโs licensing structure is part trade tool, part geopolitical pressure valve. Germanyโs absence from the first tranche sends three clear market signals:
- Licenses are now a form of selective accessโand leverage.
- Europe has moved from anxious observer to active counter-balancer, evidenced by new EU trade measures and rare earth-specific de-risking frameworks.
- Expect more bilateral jockeying before the second license round, particularly as Chancellor Merz prepares a 2026 visit.
For investors, the bigger takeaway is systemic
Chinaโs rare earth system is no longer automatically global. It is becoming segmented, strategic, and conditional, and countries without privileged access will accelerate their diversification strategies, funding non-Chinese projects in 2026 and beyond.
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Daniel, any sources (official) saying Germany did not receive licenses?
Ok, found it:
https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/wadephul-daempft-hoffnungen-der-deutschen-industrie-auf-baldige-lizenzen-fuer-import-von-seltenen-er-102.html
During his trip to China, Wadephul told ZDF television that he had received signals in this regard, but that there was still a lot of work to be done. He emphasized that Germany and Europe needed access to Chinese raw materials, rare earths, and chips. To this end, he called for fair trade conditions during his trip to China. This was an absolute priority of his visit.
The CDU politician had already criticized China’s export restrictions on rare earths during a meeting with Trade Minister Wang Wentao in Beijing. Foreign companies currently have to apply for licenses for deliveries in China, which is costly and time-consuming. Wadephul also plans to meet with his counterpart Wang Yi in the capital.
This is precisely the scenario anticipated by TESIS, the Mineral Security Doctrine I published through the Spanish Ministry of Defense (IEEE):
https://www.defensa.gob.es/ceseden/-/ieee/la_nueva_geopolitica_del_siglo_xxi_2025_dieeeo102
TESIS Lesson #1 โ Access โ Security.
A country may โaccessโ minerals today but lose them tomorrow if it does not control value chains.
Germanyโs exclusion shows how fragile โaccess-basedโ strategies are when another nation holds structural dominance.
TESIS Lesson #2 โ Industrial power depends on mineral sovereignty.
Automotive, robotics, defense, wind power, and semiconductors โ all depend on rare-earth magnets.
Without secured supply, Europeโs technological base becomes strategically import-dependent.
TESIS Lesson #3 โ Strategic minerals must be treated as national security assets, not commodities.
China is doing exactly that.
The EU still treats many critical minerals as industrial inputs rather than as geopolitical instruments.
TESIS Lesson #4 โ Without intelligence, early warning and strategic reserves, your vulnerability is invisible.
This is the โMineral Icebergโ:
The real risks are hidden beneath the surface โ supply concentration, geopolitical leverage, refining dominance, and technological chokepoints.
Germanyโs exclusion demonstrates that the global scramble for material power has already entered a more assertive phase.
And Europe โstill without mineral sovereignty, without strategic reserves, and without midstream controlโ remains structurally exposed.
Rare earths are not the message.
The message is dependence.
โ Dr. Arnoldus M. van den Hurk
Critical Mineral Geopolitics | R4Mining | REMIO