Brazilian Rare Earths (ASX: BRE) says its Monte Alto deposit just posted grades more than twice MP Materials’ and almost three times Lynas’s — making it one of the highest-grade rare earth deposits ever measured. Founder, Managing Director & CEO Bernardo da Veiga returns to the show (his first appearance was Episode 17, back in the exploration days) to walk through BRE’s new scoping study: a deliberately split strategy that keeps mining simple and low-impact at Monte Alto while routing concentrate 200km to a downstream separation plant inside the Camaçari petrochemical complex, backed by a partnership with rare earth separator Carester. They cover the geology behind the grade, a uranium byproduct the scoping study hasn’t priced in yet, and why Bernardo — a non-geologist himself — thinks business people, not geologists, should run mining companies.
The Grade Story
Monte Alto’s grades came in more than twice MP Materials’ grade and almost three times Lynas’s published grade — among the highest-grade rare earth deposits ever measured. Higher grade means less rock moved and processed to produce the same amount of metal, which lowers both capex and environmental footprint. The deposit’s primary mineral, chevkinite, is unusually easy to process: billions of years of natural uranium radiation have already broken down the ore’s crystal structure, a step competing hard-rock deposits typically have to force artificially through high-temperature, high-acid “cracking.”
Mine Simple, Process at Scale: The Camaçari Strategy
BRE deliberately splits mining from processing. Mining stays small and simple at Monte Alto — a small pit and a water-free ore-sorting concentrator, with minimal community and land impact. The concentrate then ships roughly 200km to a downstream separation plant inside the Camaçari petrochemical complex, backed by a partnership with Carester, a French rare earth separator. Building inside an existing industrial complex means BRE can lean on infrastructure, labor, and reagent supply that’s already there, instead of duplicating it at a remote mine site.
The Upside the Scoping Study Didn’t Price In
The scoping study doesn’t price in everything. BRE expects to produce roughly a million pounds of uranium yellowcake as a co-product — sold to the Brazilian government at a cost-plus arrangement under current legislation once in production, but a meaningful bucket of unpriced upside if that changes. The company also sees potential value in scandium, niobium, tantalum, and titanium. Concentrate sales are targeted as early as 2030, with full downstream oxide production targeted for 2031.
Key Takeaways
- Monte Alto’s grade is nearly 3x Lynas’s published grade and more than 2x MP Materials’ — among the highest-grade rare earth deposits ever measured.
- Chevkinite ore, naturally broken down by billions of years of uranium radiation, lets BRE skip the expensive “cracking” step other hard-rock deposits require.
- Mining and processing are deliberately split: a small, low-impact mine at Monte Alto feeds a separation plant 200km away inside the Camaçari petrochemical complex, backed by a partnership with French separator Carester.
- An estimated 1 million lbs/year of uranium byproduct isn’t priced into the scoping study at all.
- Concentrate sales are targeted as early as 2030, full downstream by 2031.
- Da Veiga, a non-geologist with a background in econometrics and investment banking, argues business people — not geologists — should run mining companies.
FAQs
What makes Brazilian Rare Earths’ Monte Alto deposit “high-grade”?
Monte Alto’s scoping-study grades came in more than twice MP Materials’ and almost three times Lynas’s published grade — making it one of the highest-grade rare earth deposits measured anywhere. Higher grade means less rock has to be moved and processed to produce the same amount of metal, which lowers both capex and environmental footprint.
Why does Brazilian Rare Earths process ore 200km away from the mine?
BRE deliberately splits mining from processing. Mining stays small and simple at Monte Alto — a small pit and a water-free ore-sorting concentrator, with minimal community and land impact. The concentrate is then shipped to a downstream separation plant inside the Camaçari petrochemical complex, where existing infrastructure, labor, and reagent supply make building and running the plant far cheaper and simpler than doing it at the remote mine site.
What is chevkinite, and why does it make Monte Alto’s ore easier to process?
Chevkinite is the primary rare earth mineral at Monte Alto. Because the ore also carries a high concentration of uranium, billions of years of natural radiation have already broken down the ore’s crystal structure — a process that competing hard-rock deposits typically have to replicate artificially through high-temperature, high-acid “cracking.” That means BRE can skip the most expensive processing step entirely.
When will Brazilian Rare Earths start production?
Concentrate sales are targeted as early as 2030 (potentially sooner, depending on permitting), with full downstream oxide production targeted for 2031. A pilot plant is already being commissioned, with concentrate production expected within the month as of this recording.
Does Brazilian Rare Earths produce anything besides rare earths?
Yes — the scoping study doesn’t yet price in an expected ~1 million pounds per year of uranium byproduct, which under current Brazilian legislation would be sold to the government at a cost-plus arrangement once the company is in production. The company also sees potential upside from scandium, niobium, tantalum, and titanium.
Transcript
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Dustin Olsen (0:01)
Hi Bernardo, welcome to the show. How are you doing?
Bernardo da Veiga (0:04)
Thanks Dustin, and thanks for having us.
Dustin Olsen (0:07)
Absolutely. So Bernardo, this is your second time being on the podcast — the first time was in May 2025, episode seventeen, so very much in the beginning of the show. And a lot has happened, not only for us, but for you at Brazilian Rare Earths. That’s what we want to talk about today, because a year and a half ago you were probably primarily in the exploration phase — and now you’ve gone through a round of public scrutiny and have survived it. So we’re excited to talk about that today.
Bernardo da Veiga (0:44)
Excellent. Yeah, look, you’re absolutely right — I think BRE, Brazilian Rare Earths, has now firmly moved its projects — purely, I should say, because… We are quite unique in that we own an entire province and have many potential projects to develop. But we’ve certainly moved into the next phase now. We’ve issued our maiden scoping study — in North America I believe they’re called preliminary economic assessments — that shows some very robust economics. There are some nuanced things that are really important for people to appreciate. Certainly now the focus is on development for Monte Alto, our flagship asset. Having said that, we still remain focused on exploration, because we own a very large piece of land, stretching over some 160 kilometers, with many areas we think are highly prospective for further ultra-high-grade discoveries. Monte Alto’s grades have come out at more than twice MP Materials’ grade, almost three times Lynas’s published grade — the two highest-grade things out there — so this kind of blows it out of the water from a grades point of view. We think there’s bound to be many more of these deposits, and we’re actively drilling several other targets we’re very excited about. So Brazilian Rare Earths is going to be an exciting combination of development and exploration, because it can just keep getting better.
Daniel O’Connor (2:32)
Yeah.
Dustin Olsen (2:32)
Very exciting. So let’s talk about the Monte Alto project really quick — what does the highest-grade rare earth deposit in the world actually mean?
Bernardo da Veiga (2:47)
Well, there’s a saying in mining: grade is king. So — long live Monte Alto. Grade really speaks to economic viability. Mining is really about earth-moving — digging up rocks and dirt and processing that rock. The more contained metal in a given ton of rock, the more value can be extracted for a given cost, and that’s the main benefit of being high-grade. Take a typical ionic clay deposit, for example — much lower grade. We might have to process a hundred times or more the same volume to produce the same amount of metal, which has significant OPEX and CAPEX implications — your plant can be a lot smaller. It also has environmental implications, because your land disturbance is far smaller. Monte Alto is about one kilometer by one kilometer — a small footprint, whereas other deposits impact a much bigger area, more communities, more trucks, more dust, more noise. So being very high-grade has several advantages — not least that you move a lot less material to produce the same amount. That’s the major benefit in a nutshell.
Daniel O’Connor (4:25)
Dustin, if I may — just on the geology of Monte Alto, because we hear about a notable heavy rare earth element component, and terms like xenotime, monazite, ionic clay. What category — for the investor out there — what’s the geological formation that created this deposit?
Bernardo da Veiga (4:53)
So Monte Alto is a mixture of hard rock and weathered materials. Billions of years ago there was a late-stage magmatic melt, where magma flowed into this area — as it cooled, you got a bimodal rock formation. Most of the rock became a low-grade leucogranite that’s essentially barren, but you ended up with pockets of ultra-high-grade cumulate — the ore type we have. Over time that cumulate hard rock weathers into grainy, friable material, so at surface you’ve got weathered material that can be easily and cheaply mined, and below it a hard rock ore body with really high grades. The mineral type we have is quite novel — it’s called chevkinite. It had been known in academic literature for a while, but we’re the first company to discover it in economic quantities — very lucky, because with rare earths it’s all about the processing: can you extract the contained elements and other co-products economically? Now, our ore happens to have quite a high concentration of uranium, and that uranium has kept radiating out over billions of years, causing the degradation of the ore — so it’s already quite amenable to leaching, already broken down by prolonged exposure to radiation. Unlike many other hard rock rare earth deposits that need to go through “cracking” — you might hear that term in the rare earth space, cracking a monazite, for example, which just means a blunt-force approach: subjecting a very refractory mineral to extreme temperature, pressure and acid to break down its crystal structure into a leachable salt — we get to skip that stage altogether, because our material is readily leachable. We simply concentrate it up and put it through a mild plant: a low-temperature acid cure followed by a water leach. Not overly aggressive processes, and we’ve done extensive test work with our partner Carester, who are in my opinion the premier Western rare earth separation group.
Daniel O’Connor (8:08)
Yeah.
Bernardo da Veiga (8:08)
And all this has been studied extensively — we’re finding we don’t need that high intensity at the front end of our plant. We can operate under atmospheric pressure, relatively low temperatures — still over 100°C, I think we use around 180, but far lower than what others require. And what that means is the acid, reagent, and heat requirements are much less, which feeds through to lower OPEX. Sorry, Daniel, didn’t mean to cut you off.
Daniel O’Connor (8:40)
No, no, I’m sorry to interrupt — before we get into the scoping question, Dustin: just a comment. What’s fascinating, Bernardo, is how Mother Nature — the geological forces — pre-processed this for you to some extent, which is amazing. Dustin, please, on scoping.
Bernardo da Veiga (8:56)
Absolutely, absolutely.
Dustin Olsen (9:04)
Yeah — understanding what you’re working with is a great segue into the scoping study that was recently done. That study puts this at just shy of a billion-dollar build and just over a year payback. You’ve got heavy rare earths production locked in with Carester, like you said. So what does the actual operation look like — you’re mining at Monte Alto and processing 200km away in Camaçari?
Bernardo da Veiga (9:39)
Yeah, this is a very explicit and deliberate part of our strategy. Some 200 kilometers down the road from Monte Alto is one of the largest petrochemical complexes in the world. Our aim is to keep things very simple at the mine site — it’s farmland, with small communities around, and we want to keep the impact very small, generate jobs and community benefit without the other things mining can bring. High-grade deposits mean low footprint: a small pit at Monte Alto feeding a concentrating plant using ore sorting, which doesn’t even use water — very environmentally friendly, no reagents. That concentrate is itself a product — if we wanted to, we could sell it and generate cash flow through a very low initial capital requirement of roughly $90 million (unit not stated aloud on the recording — inferred from context; total scoping-study capex is roughly $1 billion), and there are plenty of historical examples of companies selling concentrate profitably. But our aim is to ultimately process that concentrate ourselves — putting our full downstream processing facility inside the Camaçari petrochemical complex. That has many benefits: existing infrastructure we get to leverage rather than duplicate, no need to build mining camps, airports, or power plants like a remote operation would. It’s an industrial site that produces acid, so our access to reagents and service providers is much higher, and reagents should be cheaper than trucking or importing them. We also have great labor availability close by, and building inside an existing industrial complex is far easier — and lower-impact — than doing it on farmland. So that’s the big picture: we own an entire province, and the scoping study shows Monte Alto by itself pays back its initial capital very quickly.
Bernardo da Veiga (12:26)
However, we have a long list of other deposits we’re developing. We’ve put out a mineral resource estimate on a deposit called Sulista already, and hope to upgrade it to the measured-and-indicated category by year’s end so we can include it in our production plans. Last time I checked we had over 50 targets along that belt already drilled into material over one percent grade — there are plenty of companies whose mine grades are one to two percent, so having that many prospective targets is wonderful. We hope to run a hub-and-spoke model: the hub at Camaçari, with mines along the belt feeding into the central processing hub. Once that capital is sunk and paid for, developing all the other mines becomes much easier, since they don’t have to clear that initial capital hurdle. That’s the overall plan, and we’ve just shown step one of it with the scoping study. Also worth noting — we’re a very new company; we discovered Monte Alto three years ago, so we’ve done a lot in a short period and continue to work at pace.
Bernardo da Veiga (14:02)
The resource the production profile in the scoping study is based on assays received by around February 22nd this year — meaning drilling was done even earlier, since there’s about a six-week gap between drilling and assays. We’ve kept drilling since, so it’s entirely possible — probable, even — that the resource gets significantly bigger, because it’s still “open”: as we drill we haven’t found all the edges yet, so even what’s in the scoping study now has significant upside. Another clear bucket of upside we did not include in the scoping study is the co-products. We expect to produce about a million pounds of uranium — yellow cake — as a co-product. There’s no value attributed to that in the scoping study, largely because current Brazilian legislation would have us sell it back to the government at a cost-plus arrangement — but if that changes (and there have been news articles suggesting it might), that becomes another significant bucket of value. We’re also looking at producing scandium, which could add significant value, plus potential niobium, tantalum, and even titanium. What I want people to take away is that the scoping study was our way of showing the market how good this thing looks now — I believe it will look significantly better as we define more resources and progress the technical studies to incorporate more of these co-products.
Daniel O’Connor (15:51)
Yeah, and before we move on, Dustin — one thing that’s struck us about BRE is the industrial vision, which is what’s needed across continents right now: reindustrialization, more dynamically sourced capability. It’s exciting to see this unfold — it’s a big vision, and you’re executing, and investors around North America need to understand that.
Bernardo da Veiga (16:30)
Yeah, we’ve been very fortunate to be well-backed by incredible investors early on, and they keep backing us. We like to say internally this is a marathon, not a sprint — we see other companies rushing into deals and acquisitions that, without naming names, I personally think will destroy value, whereas we believe we’re sitting on the best rare earth endowment on the planet, by far. We were very decisive early on — we acquired a lot of land, secured a good foothold on this province, and now we’re developing it the right way, without skipping steps, because the cream always rises to the top, and we believe we have the best project out there, bar none.
Daniel O’Connor (17:24)
Based on everything we’ve studied so far, we can’t argue with you on that. Dustin.
Dustin Olsen (17:33)
Bernardo, with the path seeming very clear — how soon do you think you’re going to get into production, and we can start benefiting from Brazilian rare earths?
Bernardo da Veiga (17:47)
I’ll take that in two steps, because producing concentrate is far simpler and cheaper. Because of this deliberate split strategy, mining and concentrate production happen at site — simple, straightforward, low impact — while the downstream operations happen at Camaçari, and because of that split, the two are being permitted separately. There’s a possibility of a gap between when the mine/concentration is permitted and when the downstream is permitted — and during that gap, there’s an opportunity to make money simply selling concentrate. I think concentrate sales could happen as early as 2030 per our presentation, possibly sooner — it all depends on permits. If permits came tomorrow, we could be in operation very quickly, because it’s a simple pit and a simple plant — upgrading high grade two or three times rather than fifty times, like others have to. That’s on concentration. On full downstream, our expectation is 2031 — again, faster permits could bring that forward. We tackled the uranium byproduct issue very early and have been commended for that by various Brazilian entities and authorities, so we’ve been proactive about efficient permitting — though it’s out of our control how long it takes. Having said that, I’ve been running mining companies in Brazil for some 16 years, and I’ve never seen things happen this fast for critical minerals. We obtained a trial mining license in record time, we have a fully permitted pilot plant being commissioned as we speak, and we should be making concentrate by month’s end. The government funded 60% of that pilot plant, with the second phase — taking concentrate through to oxides, extracting uranium, separating the co-products — starting construction now. So it’s possible this happens sooner, but what we’ve stated publicly is 2030 for concentrates, 2031 for oxides.
Daniel O’Connor (20:58)
And just to add — the current Brazilian administration appears very supportive of developing value-added industry, and the BRE vision dovetails completely with that. So it seems things are lined up.
Bernardo da Veiga (21:21)
Absolutely. We also believe in the strategy — the Brazilian government is doing an amazing job; they’ve been very receptive at all levels, with frequent engagement across government. I’ve been doing this a long time in Brazil, and this is the most goodwill I’ve seen toward a commodity from government — critical minerals. Brazil understands the critical minerals industry itself is relatively small — I’m sure Brazil exports more soy and iron ore in a week than critical minerals annually, in value terms — but it’s what critical minerals unlock: a local magnet industry enables a local robotics industry, drones, EVs. Brazil is a massive industrial country — one of the biggest airplane manufacturers in the world, for example. So I think having Brazil as a leader in critical minerals will unlock much more downstream value for Brazil, and I commend the government for what they’re doing — funding packages, a critical minerals bill with mechanisms to help things along. I’m very pleased with how things are going.
Daniel O’Connor (23:00)
And on that note — there’s a lot of US government and company investment happening, including in Brazil, and China does the same. It’s fascinating watching how many countries want to move up the value chain now. My personal opinion is this gives Brazilian Rare Earths a lot of leverage to build shareholder value, because you’re at the crossroads of all these groups, everyone needs optionality, and you’re executing at scale. No need to comment on governments specifically, but — suffice to say, BRE is a very attractive asset, right?
Bernardo da Veiga (24:03)
Yeah, I think BRE is an asset of geopolitical consequence — it could solve problems for a lot of countries and be a significant producer of many critical minerals. Today we talk about NdPr and DyTb, but yttrium has incredible applications, gadolinium [transcribed as “Galileanium” — best-guess correction, please confirm] has incredible applications, scandium has incredible applications, and we don’t know what the future brings — it wasn’t long ago that cerium was the main driver of value in rare earths, and now it’s not. Having a wide endowment, rich across every bucket, puts us in a great position. We’re well-funded, well-backed, and in the right jurisdiction to go it alone — we don’t need to export this material to a different jurisdiction for processing, because the mine location may not be the best place for downstream. Brazil is fantastic — we can do everything in-country. Others mine in Australia and ship to South Asia for processing, then on-sell — that adds significant cost. Being able to do everything by truck, just around the corner, is really powerful.
Dustin Olsen (25:44)
So Bernardo, thinking about your background — economics and finance, plus years of mining experience — how does your education and experience shape your view of what BRE is doing?
Bernardo da Veiga (25:48)
My background — I did a PhD in economics, really econometrics, which gave me a strong quantitative foundation. But right after, I went into investment banking — corporate finance — in Australia with UBS, doing a lot of metals and mining transactions. So I come at it from two angles: analytical, but also with a strong corporate background, thinking about how to add value both ways. Mining is really a simple inter-temporal constrained-optimization problem — you’ve got constraints, you’re optimizing an objective function like NPV or cash flow, over time. We apply that thinking to BRE — how we develop and sequence it — but the corporate finance background has really helped structure the company right: signing the right partnerships, having the right deals in place, de-risking it the right way, getting the market messaging right. Sometimes you need to know the language investors speak to communicate effectively. I’ve often heard the criticism non-technical CEOs get: “you’re not a geologist, you’re not a mining engineer — what business do you have running a mining company?” No — I’m running a company. I’m running a business. In fact I’d flip it: one of the biggest mistakes that were made in the mining industry for a long time is putting geologists to run mining companies. All they want to do is drill. That’s been my experience, at least. I think business people should run businesses the right way — which for me means making sure I have the very best team beneath me. We say we want to be the Real Madrid of mining — if I hear of an amazing professional who’s between jobs, we’ll grab them even without an immediate role, because tier-one people always make themselves valuable. That’s what we’re building at BRE. So I don’t think my background changed how I view the asset — we see it as amazing, and my fiduciary duty is to extract as much value for shareholders as I can, within the law and the environmental constraints we want to adhere to. That’s it.
Daniel O’Connor (28:50)
Well, Bernardo, I’d add — from getting to know you over past interviews — you also jumped into mining hands-on. Investment banking, finance, econometrics, but then you ran mines for a long time. No gray hair yet — probably from being out in the great outdoors — but it’s a very unique combination.
Bernardo da Veiga (29:28)
Yeah, absolutely — I’ve been running mining companies since about 2008–2009: exploration, development, production, exporting companies, mostly all in Brazil since 2011. So yes, I’ve developed a good background. I think what I’m good at is knowing what I’m not good at, and getting the right people to help along those lines — it’s been a winning formula for BRE. We’ve got a terrific team, and I couldn’t do it without them, because I recognize where I’m limited and need to supplement my shortcomings with excellent people.
Daniel O’Connor (30:23)
Another question — a lot of our investors are in North America, especially the US. Mining fell out of popularity from maybe the 70s/80s onward, and it’s becoming popular again, but there’s still a lot of education needed. We try to impart knowledge and simplify it — would you say investors need to educate themselves and become familiar with the topic as part of the process? Because we need more investment in the West.
Bernardo da Veiga (31:22)
No, absolutely. Our primary listing is the Australian Securities Exchange, a fantastic place for mining capital — Australian investors are among the most sophisticated in the world; fund managers really get into the nitty-gritty, often with in-house geologists, metallurgists, engineers. My experience in North America is it’s more thematic — people follow themes rather than getting into the weeds, though I think that’s changing. Mining’s had a bad rep for a long time — irresponsible mining, avoidable accidents — none of that helped. But I’d urge you to point to anything in the room right now that didn’t come from mining in some form, including the food you eat, which needs fertilizers that come from mining. Mining is key to almost every aspect of our lives — energy, coal, gas, oil, ore, fertilizers, all critical. So it’s important we do it responsibly and well, but the more investors understand it, the better. And frankly, valuing a mining project is easier than valuing a tech project — discrete, estimable cash flows and finite lives, versus trying to work out what a tech startup is worth.
Daniel O’Connor (33:27)
A hundred percent — and I come from life sciences myself, which is extremely risky and complex. Your thematic point is really interesting, and I could see that dynamic in the US — there’s a lot of capital there that needs to become more educated. The periodic table is absolutely critical for industries today. We’ll keep doing our part to educate people.
Bernardo da Veiga (33:58)
The main issue with broad-based thematic investment is it can lead to lesser companies getting investor attention too, because people who don’t know the space well just spread their money around hoping to do okay on average. As people become more sophisticated, they’ll identify the companies with the best chance of success and the ones that are undervalued, and capital becomes more selective — which is good, because it leads to less bubble-like behavior. Think of the dot-com bubble: if you knew which companies to pick, you did well; if you just sprayed money around, you didn’t. Mining’s the same — you need to dig deep and understand the real differences between companies. Without naming anyone, it sometimes astounds me what valuations certain projects get when the grades are too low, the logistics too hard, or the metallurgy unproven — yet with the right marketing you can get a lot done. As investors get more sophisticated, some of that goes away, and hopefully there’s less value destruction for investors.
Daniel O’Connor (35:45)
Yeah — it’s critical that retail investors become more educated and directed, because this is a matter of national security and resilience for global economies. We fully agree with you there.
Bernardo da Veiga (36:04)
Which is why what you guys are doing is so great — a platform with objective views, a database of projects people can compare apples-to-apples, forming their own view. I think you’re doing something really important for the market. Thank you.
Daniel O’Connor (36:30)
We appreciate it, and we appreciate your support and friendship — you’ve been very open, and you all genuinely want to do right by the industry and the economy, rather than speculative surges that don’t help anybody. Dustin, any final questions? This has been very productive.
Dustin Olsen (36:53)
This has been productive, touching on a lot of great things for investors trying to understand the industry and where to put their money. Speaking of which — probably our final question, on geopolitics: Brazil’s getting a lot of attention from both China and the US, and Brazil’s very aware it’s sitting on a great resource. From your perspective operating out of Brazil, how have things changed in recent years that might previously have been a roadblock?
Bernardo da Veiga (37:40)
What I’m seeing is things just happening faster — regulatory bodies analyzing documents faster, responses coming faster, things turning around quicker. The whole machine seems to be working more efficiently — that’s my overarching observation. In other commodities that are already saturated in Brazil, like iron ore, things are still slower, because an extra iron ore mine doesn’t move the needle for Brazil’s GDP or industrial position. But a critical minerals industry does — it means further industries get born from it, a real butterfly effect. That’s my major observation: the government is taking it seriously and doing what it can to help things along.
Dustin Olsen (38:56)
That’s great news — especially in mining, where we’ve heard from several guests on the show who’ve dedicated careers just to getting a mine into operation. So things moving faster, the wheels getting lubricated — that’s great news. Bernardo, thanks for being on the show, giving us an update, and sharing your perspective on the industry at large. This has been a great discussion.
Bernardo da Veiga (39:27)
Anytime, guys — reach out with any further questions. I’d also urge investors to reach out directly; we’re always happy to chat and educate the market. We like to say we’re an open book — we’re here if anybody wants to talk.
Dustin Olsen (39:44)
Perfect. On that note — is there anywhere specific you’d like people to go if they want to be more involved?
Bernardo da Veiga (39:51)
They can reach us through the website — BrazilianRareEarths.com. All our filings are there, so people can learn a lot about the company and reach out to follow up on anything specific.
Dustin Olsen (40:09)
Sounds perfect. Thanks again, Bernardo.
Bernardo da Veiga (40:12)
Thanks, guys — we appreciate your time.
