Highlights

• Chinese customs data reveals a stark divergence in heavy rare earths.
• Dysprosium exports collapsed 80% to just 3,501 kg in October.
• Terbium surged to 12,200 kg—the highest monthly total in 2025.
• The U.S. received 6,000 kg of terbium in October, its largest monthly intake in a decade, but virtually no dysprosium.
• This suggests that China is using selective export licensing as a strategic tool rather than imposing blanket restrictions.
• For investors, the key takeaway is that heavy rare earths now operate as fragmented micro-markets.
• Access, timing, and bilateral relationships matter more than aggregate supply, driving persistent volatility and valuation gaps.

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Dysprosium Falls, Terbium Surges: What China’s October Export Data Signals for Rare Earth Investors

New Chinese customs data for October 2025 reveal a sharp divergence within the heavy rare earth market: dysprosium exports collapsed, while terbium shipments surged—particularly to the United States. A recent market assessment from TRADIUM (opens in a new tab), a German specialty metals trader, highlights these shifts as evidence of how China’s export controls are reshaping access, pricing power, and geopolitical leverage across the global magnet supply chain.

For investors, the data reinforce a critical reality: rare earths do not move as a single market. Individual elements—especially dysprosium (Dy) and terbium (Tb)—are responding very differently to export licensing, bilateral relationships, and strategic policy decisions.

What the Data Show: A Split Heavy Rare Earth Market

Dysprosium: Exports Collapse

According to Chinese customs data cited by TRADIUM, only 3,501 kilograms of dysprosium were exported in October 2025—a decline of more than 80% month-on-month. Shipments were narrowly concentrated among a small group of buyers:

• South Korea: 2,701 kg
• Estonia: 500 kg
• Japan: 300 kg

The near-elimination of exports to other destinations underscores how access to dysprosium is being actively rationed, consistent with trade restrictions introduced in April 2025.

Dysprosium constraints are especially significant because the element is a critical heavy rare earth additive used to preserve magnetic strength at high temperatures. In the United States, dysprosium is primarily used in neodymium-iron-boron (NdFeB) permanent magnets deployed in defense systems (precision-guided munitions, radar, actuators, missile fin controls), aerospace components, electric vehicle traction motors, wind turbine generators, and advanced robotics. Without dysprosium, high-performance magnets can lose coercivity and fail under thermal stress, making it difficult to meet military and safety specifications.

Because the U.S. has no domestic dysprosium mining or refining at scale, constraints on Chinese exports translate directly into national security risk, higher costs, and forced redesigns for manufacturers—reinforcing dysprosium’s status as one of the most strategically sensitive rare earth elements in the American supply chain.

Terbium: A Surprising Surge—Especially to the U.S.

In sharp contrast, terbium exports rose to 12,200 kilograms in October, nearly three times September levels and the highest monthly total recorded in 2025. The destination mix is notable:

• United States: 6,000 kg (largest monthly U.S. intake in roughly a decade)
• Japan: 5,200 kg
• Estonia: 1,000 kg

TRADIUM correctly characterizes this pattern as anomalous. The United States has not recently received meaningful volumes of other restricted critical materials—such as gallium, germanium, dysprosium, or praseodymium—making this terbium inflow particularly striking.

A plausible explanation is selective, state-managed export licensing rather than broad market liberalization. Terbium, while strategically important, is typically required in smaller absolute quantities and can sometimes be substituted more flexibly than dysprosium. China may therefore view controlled terbium exports as a lower-risk concession, allowing fulfillment of pre-existing contracts or limited strategic shipments while maintaining tighter controls on more sensitive materials.

Other contributing factors may include one-time contract settlements, delayed license approvals clearing in a single month, U.S. strategic stockpiling ahead of 2027 defense sourcing restrictions, or shipment routing through trusted intermediaries. Importantly, year-to-date terbium exports remain approximately 20% below 2024 levels, suggesting October’s surge reflects timing and discretion, not a structural easing of controls.

Permanent Magnets: Stabilizing, but Still Constrained

TRADIUM also notes that rare earth permanent magnet exports, while lower in October than September, remain above October 2024 levels.

This points to a partial normalization following sharp declines earlier in 2025, which were driven by licensing delays and opaque authorization procedures. Because customs codes do not clearly indicate whether exported magnets contain restricted rare earths, approvals have slowed—even when the finished product itself is technically permitted. For downstream manufacturers, the implication is clear: magnets are available, but unpredictably so, reinforcing the strategic value of long-term offtake agreements and non-Chinese supply chain investments.

Who Is TRADIUM

TRADIUM GmbH, founded in 1999 and headquartered in Germany, is a long-established physical trader and distributor of minor metals and rare earths, supplying industrial customers across Europe, the United States, and Asia. Its strengths include:

• Close monitoring of customs data and physical trade flows
• Direct exposure to spot and contract markets
• Practical insight into logistics, licensing, and compliance bottlenecks

Potential Sources of Bias

• Trading Perspective Bias: TRADIUM’s analysis emphasizes availability, shipment volumes, and near-term disruptions—factors most relevant to a physical trader—potentially underweighting long-term strategic stockpiling or state-directed industrial planning.
• EU-Centric Lens: As a European intermediary, TRADIUM’s framing may implicitly reflect EU and allied access concerns regarding constrained materials.
• Data Without Intent: Customs data show what moved, not why. Inferring geopolitical intent from a single month’s data risks over-interpretation without corroborating policy signals from Beijing or Washington.

That said, TRADIUM’s reported volume data are credible and align with broader market intelligence tracked by Rare Earth Exchanges™.

Investor Takeaways

• Heavy rare earths are fragmenting into micro-markets. Dysprosium and terbium are not interchangeable from a trade or policy standpoint.
• China’s export controls are selective, not absolute. October’s terbium surge reflects licensing discretion, not blanket bans.
• Security premiums remain justified. Overall availability outside China remains constrained despite episodic export spikes.
• Downstream exposure matters. Magnet, alloy, and defense-linked companies will experience these dynamics very differently from upstream miners.

Final Thoughts

TRADIUM’s October snapshot captures a rare but instructive moment in which terbium flowed while dysprosium all but disappeared. For investors, the lesson is clear: the rare earth market is no longer about volume alone—it is about who gets access, when, and under what conditions. Those asymmetries are likely to continue driving volatility, valuation gaps, and strategic opportunity as the market moves into 2026.

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