Highlights
- Trump's National Security Strategy reflects resource realism: China's dominance in gallium and rare earth refining now limits U.S. military and tech options more than ideology.
- Gallium presents a unique strategic constraint—unlike rare earths, U.S. aluminum refining collapse leaves no viable substitute path for advanced semiconductors and weapons systems.
- For investors, the shift is clear: critical minerals are no longer mere inputs but strategic constraints that cap geopolitical ambition and reshape policy priorities.
An essay published December 22, 2025 by the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft argues (opens in a new tab) that the Trump administration’s new National Security Strategy is best read not as ideology, but as resource realism. Writing in Responsible Statecraft, economist James K. Galbraith contends that fossil fuels and critical minerals—especially rare earths and gallium—now quietly shape U.S. strategic choices, from accommodating Russia to softening confrontation with China.
Table of Contents
For investors, the implication is blunt
Supply-chain physics are beginning to outweigh alliance politics.
Frankly Rare Earth Exchanges™ has reported that while not nearly sufficient as measured by industrial policy, the Trump administration is the first in Washington, DC to take this matter seriously, as measured by clear action over the past several months.
Rare Earths and Gallium: The Hard Constraint
Galbraith’s core claim is that China’s dominance in rare earth refining and gallium supply now constrains U.S. military and technological options. He distinguishes between the two: rare earth processing monopolies could, with time and capital, erode; gallium is different. U.S. aluminum refining capacity collapsed decades ago, leaving China with overwhelming control of gallium—an input with no viable substitute in advanced semiconductors, radar, and weapons systems.
The factual base here is solid. Independent industry and government sources confirm China’s near-total control of gallium output and its commanding share of rare earth separation and magnet manufacturing. Where Galbraith goes further—arguing that the U.S. therefore cannot “confront China and prevail”—he moves from supply-chain analysis into strategic inference. It is plausible, but not testable.
Where the Argument Holds—and Where It Strains
What holds up:
- China’s refining chokehold is real and immediate.
- Gallium substitution at scale is not currently feasible.
- Western re-industrialization timelines lag defense and AI demand.
Where readers should pause:
- The essay assumes that material dependence naturally leads to détente. History suggests other responses: subsidies, stockpiles, coercive industrial policy, and strategic decoupling.
- Claims of Europe’s “deindustrialization” overreach. Europe is under stress; collapse is not a settled fact.
Why This Matters for Rare Earth Markets
The real signal is not Trump, China, or Russia. It is the implicit admission that critical minerals now cap geopolitical ambition. If this logic spreads in Washington, expect short-term tolerance of Chinese leverage alongside louder—but slower—efforts to rebuild mine-to-magnet capacity in the U.S. and allied states.
For investors, this reinforces a core REEx thesis: critical minerals are no longer just inputs. They are strategic constraints.
About the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Founded in 2019 and based in Washington, D.C., the Quincy Institute is a U.S. foreign-policy think tank advocating realism, restraint, and reduced reliance on military intervention. Named after President John Quincy Adams, it challenges interventionist orthodoxy across party lines and declines funding from foreign governments.
Source: James K. Galbraith, Responsible Statecraft, (opens in a new tab) Dec. 22, 2025.
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