Highlights

• Study by Dr. Zahid Ullah finds Central Asia's mineral reserves aren't the bottleneck—China's monopoly over rare earth separation, refining, and processing is the real constraint on U.S. supply chain independence.
• Trump 2.0 policy focuses on strategic counterbalancing through C5+1 diplomacy and selective investment in Central Asia, not immediate displacement of China's processing dominance.
• For investors, Central Asia offers optional supply diversification, but without parallel non-China processing investment, exposure to Chinese processing choke points remains unchanged.

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A new peer-reviewed study (opens in a new tab) led by Dr. Zahid Ullah, a political scientist at Abdul Wali Khan University Mardan (Pakistan), with co-authors Ayub Khan and Shahzad Khan, examines how the return of President Donald Trump to office in 2025 (“Trump 2.0”) is reshaping U.S. engagement with Central Asia—particularly around rare earth elements and other critical minerals.

Published in the Journal for Current Sign, the paper argues that while Central Asia holds significant mineral and energy potential, China’s near-monopoly over rare earth processing remains the dominant structural constraint, shaping U.S. strategy more than mine-level resource availability itself.

Study Focus and Methods

The authors use a qualitative geopolitical and policy analysis grounded in secondary sources (academic literature, policy documents, media reports) and selected primary sources (official statements and summit outcomes). The study spans historical context—from post-Soviet independence to the present—then narrows in on Trump 2.0, the C5+1 diplomatic framework, and intensifying U.S.–China–Russia competition over energy, minerals, and connectivity corridors in Central Asia.

Key Findings: Resources Not the Bottleneck

A central conclusion is that Central Asia’s mineral endowment is not the primary problem for the United States. Kazakhstan and neighboring states possess substantial reserves of energy resources and strategic minerals, including rare earth-bearing systems. No, the real bottleneck lies downstream: China’s dominance of rare earth separation, refining, and processing, which allows Beijing to exert leverage even when raw materials originate elsewhere.

The study emphasizes that China’s influence in Central Asia flows less from geology and more from infrastructure and integration—pipelines, rail corridors, processing facilities, and Belt and Road–linked trade routes. This reinforces a familiar pattern in the rare earth supply chain: control of processing matters more than control of mines.

Implications for U.S. Policy and Investors

For the U.S., the paper suggests that the Trump 2.0 policy is likely to focus on counterbalancing China and Russia, not replacing them overnight. The C5+1 platform, bilateral deals, and encouragement of Western investment in mining and logistics are framed as tools to maintain strategic relevance, not to immediately dislodge China’s position.

From a rare earth supply chain perspective, this finding aligns with industry reality. Diversifying upstream supply in Central Asia may improve resilience, but without parallel investment in non-China processing and magnet manufacturing, exposure to Chinese choke points remains. For investors, the takeaway is sobering but practical: Central Asia represents optional supply, not an instant solution.

Where the Study Stretches—and Cautionary Zones

The authors are appropriately cautious in noting challenges: Central Asia’s proximity to China and Russia, political uncertainty, infrastructure gaps, and questions about long-term U.S. commitment following the Afghanistan withdrawal. However, some elements verge on policy optimism, particularly around the speed with which U.S. engagement could materially alter supply chain dynamics.

Notably, the study does not claim that the U.S. can break China’s rare earth processing dominance in the near term. Instead, it frames American efforts as risk mitigation and diversification, a distinction often lost in popular commentary.

What’s Controversial—and Why it Matters

The most controversial implication is implicit rather than explicit: great-power competition may stabilize China’s processing dominance rather than weaken it in the short to medium term. As the U.S. prioritizes security, diplomacy, and selective investment, China continues to entrench its midstream advantage through scale, experience, and state coordination.

Final REEx Reflection

This study reinforces a core Rare Earth Exchanges™ insight: the rare earth challenge is not about finding more rocks, but about building the industrial middle. Central Asia may play a role in future diversification, but China’s processing monopoly remains the gravitational center of the system. Any serious U.S. strategy—under Trump 2.0 or beyond—must grapple with that reality.

Citation: Ullah, Z., Khan, A., & Khan, S. (2025). US–Central Asia Relations Under Trump 2.0: Opportunities and Challenges. Journal for Current Sign.

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