Highlights

• China formally imposed export restrictions on seven key medium and heavy rare earth elements, signaling potential economic retaliation.
• The US shows initial progress in domestic rare earth production through facilities like Mountain Pass and MP Materials' magnet production.
• Despite some developments, the US remains strategically vulnerable without a comprehensive national rare earth strategy and full industrial independence.

Rare Earth Exchanges previously reported China’s tightening grip on global rare earth supply—and now, Beijing has made its next move. On April 4, China formally imposed sweeping export restrictions on seven key medium and heavy rare earth elements—including dysprosium, terbium, and scandium—affecting not only raw materials but also high-value finished products like magnets and oxides. The decision, framed as a national security measure, is widely interpreted as retaliation for President Trump’s April tariffs and underscores China’s continued willingness to weaponize its dominance in the rare earth sector.

Yet while China’s actions raise alarm bells in the global supply chain, the United States appears increasingly prepared, at least upstream.

According to the Legal Insurrection (opens in a new tab) blog, The Biden-era Defense Production Act remains in effect, and Mountain Pass in California is ramping up onshore refining. MP Materials’ Fort Worth facility has begun trial production of neodymium-iron-boron magnets—used in everything from EV motors to fighter jets—marking the first domestic output of its kind in decades.

Meanwhile, exploration in Wyoming and lithium extraction at California’s Salton Sea signal a growing national push to reclaim industrial independence. Rare Earth Exchanges continues to monitor this unfolding transformation as the race to decouple from China’s critical mineral grip accelerates.

While the article from Legal Insurrection correctly highlights the growing threat posed by China’s export controls on medium and heavy rare earth elements, it offers an overly optimistic and, at times, misleading portrayal of U.S. preparedness.

The claim that the U.S. is “increasingly prepared, at least upstream” ignores the reality that America still lacks commercial-scale separation facilities for heavy rare earths, has no domestic oxide-to-metal conversion capacity at scale, and remains years away from fully integrated magnet supply chains. Citing Biden-era Defense Production Act initiatives without acknowledging their limited scope—and omitting the risk that Trump-era tariffs may provoke further Chinese retaliation—further distorts the strategic picture.

Moreover, referencing lithium extraction and Wyoming exploration projects conflates distinct mineral categories and timelines while downplaying China’s dominance across the rare earth value chain, including vertical integration, patent control, and downstream finished product exports.

Most importantly, the article overlooks the glaring absence of a coordinated U.S. national rare earth strategy across the Departments of Energy, Defense, and Environmental Agencies. Despite some promising developments, the U.S. remains far from resilient, and without bold, unified industrial policy, China’s grip on the sector will only tighten.