Highlights

• New University of Texas study maps 2024 production flows for six critical battery metals.
• Study reveals China controls most critical midstream processing stages despite geographically diverse mining operations.
• Herfindahl-Hirschman Index analysis shows lithium, nickel, cobalt, and manganese supply chains heavily funnel toward Chinese refinement hubs.
• Chinese control of midstream stages creates significant geopolitical vulnerabilities.
• Study concludes that supply-chain independence requires parallel investment in processing infrastructure.
• Investment is needed not just in new mines, as China's advantage lies in controlling where raw materials become usable products.

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A focus on a key critical mineral and the processing challenge.  A new open-access study published in Commodities, January 2026, by Ramsha Akhter, Sisira Reddy Palli, Mithilesh Walanjuwani, and senior author Erick C. Jones Jr. of the University of Texas at Arlington (opens in a new tab) offers one of the clearest, data-driven snapshots yet of who controls the world’s lithium-ion battery metals—andwhere the real vulnerabilities lie. Drawing on U.S. Geological Surveydata, company filings, and Bloomberg datasets, the researchers map 2024 production flows for six critical materials—lithium, cobalt, nickel, manganese, copper, and aluminum—from mine to primary processing. Their central finding is stark and highly relevant for investors and policymakers alike: while mining is often geographically diverse, processing is not—and China dominates the most critical midstream stages.

How the Study Was Done

Rather than modeling the future, the authors focus on what is happening now. They reconciled national production statistics with company-level disclosures to build a harmonized dataset showing which corporations mine which metals, in which countries, and where that material is sent for initial processing. To quantify concentration, they used the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (opens in a new tab) (HHI), a standard economic tool that measures how competitive—or monopolized—a market really is. This approach allows apples-to-apples comparisons across metals and across countries.

What the Maps Reveal

The results overturn a common misconception. Copper and aluminum look relatively healthy: mining and processing are spread across many countries and companies, making these supply chains more resilient.

But the picture darkens quickly for battery-critical metals.

• Lithium and nickel show moderate diversity at the mine level, but a sharp funneling toward Chinese processing hubs for conversion into battery-grade chemicals.
• Cobalt and manganese are far more concentrated, with cobalt extraction overwhelmingly tied to theDemocratic Republic of the Congo and processing heavily concentrated inChina.
• In several cases, national HHIs approach monopoly levels, meaning one country or one firm effectively controls supply.

The practical takeaway: Much like rare earth elements, even if new mines open outside China, much of the world still sends its ore to China to be refined. That gives Beijing—and a small group of vertically integrated firms—outsized leverage over prices, availability, and downstream industries such as EVs, grid storage, and defense electronics.

Why This Matters for Rare Earths and Battery Supply Chains

Although the paper focuses on battery metals rather than rare earth elements per se, the lesson translates directly. China’s advantage is not just geology—it is processing infrastructure, industrial clustering, and corporate integration. The same dynamic that governs lithium hydroxide, nickel sulfate, and cobalt chemicals also governs rare earth separation and magnet production. Control the midstream, and you control the system.

For the U.S. and its allies, this means supply-chain risk does not disappear simply by approving new mines. Without parallel investment in refining, chemical processing, and precursor manufacturing, upstream diversification offers only limited protection.

Implications—and the Hard Choices Ahead

The authors suggest a practical policy typology. For already diverse metals like copper and aluminum, the goal should be reinforcement and efficiency. For lithium and nickel, the priority is redistributing processing capacity away from a single dominant hub. For highly concentrated materials like cobalt and manganese, recycling, substitution, and strategic stockpiles may be more realistic than trying to out-mine incumbents.

Limitations and Controversies

The study is transparent about its constraints. Some company data are incomplete, USGS figures can lag, and country allocations rely on evidence-weighted assumptions rather than full mine-by-mine disclosure. Still, because market concentration is driven by the largest players, these limitations are unlikely to change the core conclusion. The controversial implication—that Western industrial policy has underestimated the power of the midstream—may be uncomfortable, but it is difficult to refute.

Bottom Line

This paper delivers a clear message for a lay reader: China’s dominance in critical minerals is less about owning every mine and more about controlling where raw materials becomeusable products. Until that changes, claims of supply-chain independenceremain more aspirational than real.

Citation: Akhter, R.; Palli, S.R.; Walanjuwani, M.; Jones, E.C. Jr. Mapping the Supply Chain of Lithium-Ion Battery Metals from Mine to Primary Processing by Country and Corporation. Commodities, 2026, 5(1), 2. https://doi.org/10.3390/commodities5010002 (opens in a new tab)