Highlights

• The Atlantic Council argues against shutting down the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), proposing a 'MCC 2.0' model to secure critical minerals and support U.S. strategic interests.
• The proposed strategy would help the U.S. counter China's dominance in critical mineral processing, particularly in Africa, through flexible grant capital and infrastructure development.
• By reimagining the MCC's approach, the U.S. can create meaningful partnerships that support national security, economic competitiveness, and developmental needs of partner countries.

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The Atlantic Council, (opens in a new tab) a key American think tank based in Washington, D.C., has long been a leading voice in shaping international policy aligned with the principles of Atlanticism. Founded in 1961, the Council’s influence has extended across sixteen regional centers and programs, spanning global economic prosperity and international security. With its ties to the Atlantic Treaty Association, the organization acts as both a convening force and an analytical engine in the ongoing evolution of Western alliances and U.S. foreign policy strategy. In keeping with this mission, the Atlantic Council’s latest issue brief (opens in a new tab) by Aubrey Hruby, published on April 24, 2025, makes a compelling case for the continued and reimagined use of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (opens in a new tab) (MCC) in the global race for critical minerals.

Importantly, the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), according to POLITICO, (opens in a new tab) is moving to shut the group down, however.

Urgencies to Consider

In today’s geopolitical landscape, where access to critical minerals like cobalt and copper has become a matter of national security, the United States faces an urgent need to reevaluate and refine its economic diplomacy tools. Hruby’s article argues that the Trump administration is at risk of making a grave strategic error by considering the shutdown of the MCC, a development agency created in 2004 under the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003. While newer and flashier institutions, such as the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and the U.S. Export-Import Bank (Eximbank), have dominated headlines, the MCC offers a unique advantage: flexible, large-scale grant capital that can be deployed immediately to support U.S. strategic interests—no new legislation is required.

At its core, the MCC was designed as a bold, results-driven approach to foreign aid, modeled in part after the post-World War II Marshall Plan. Rather than doling out aid indiscriminately, the MCC structures its support around five-year compacts with eligible countries that demonstrate a commitment to democratic governance, sound economic policy, and human development. These compacts, which average about $350 million, often focus on critical infrastructure, education, and regulatory reform. Unlike loans or commercial investments, MCC grants are untied and purely developmental, making them a powerful tool in settings where private capital is hesitant to tread.

Dog-Eat-Dog Critical Mineral World

Today, however, the world is not merely looking for aid—it’s competing fiercely over the raw materials that will power the green transition and future technological development. China currently dominates the upstream and midstream processing of many critical minerals, particularly in Africa. The MCC’s ability to fund early-stage mining infrastructure, support policy and regulatory reform, and build workforce capacity offers an unrivaled opportunity for the United States to secure a foothold in these value chains.

A Proposed Solution

Hruby outlines a visionary alternative to dissolution: the creation of “MCC 2.0.” This updated model would preserve the agency’s grant-making power while tailoring its mission to directly support U.S. commercial and strategic interests—especially in critical minerals. The MCC has the legal flexibility to adapt quickly. Eligibility requirements can be adjusted, compacts can be expedited, and grants can go directly to a wide range of actors, including local governments, NGOs, and private firms. Importantly, MCC funding can cover things that other agencies can’t—like legal counsel for partner governments or feasibility studies for complex mining projects.

One proposed model under this MCC 2.0 framework envisions joint ventures between the United States and partner countries like the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The MCC would provide early equity capital and work with local partners to secure and develop exploration licenses. Once assets are de-risked, private investors could be brought into scale operations. Ownership could be structured to include the DFC or a U.S.-based trust, and compact funds could be reserved for critical infrastructure, like roads, power, and transport, that makes mining operations viable. In Zambia and the DRC, where energy shortages hamper mining potential, this infrastructure investment would be game-changing.

By giving U.S. companies an edge—through preferential treatment in procurement and robust support in navigating local markets—this model would serve dual purposes: meeting the developmental needs of partner nations while securing American access to resources that are foundational to national security and economic competitiveness.

Hruby also notes that the MCC has been granted expanded authority in recent years, including the ability to enter regional compacts and support upper-middle-income countries. Yet much of this potential remains untapped. Only one regional compact has been signed to date. There is a real urgency here, not just for strategic reasons but also because the world is moving fast. Africa, where more than 80 percent of MCC compacts have historically been concentrated, has massive infrastructure needs, estimated at over $130 billion annually. African nations are eager for partners who can move quickly and offer more than debt.

Considerations

This isn’t just about minerals. It’s about reasserting a model of U.S. leadership that blends strategic foresight with meaningful partnership. The MCC, when used correctly, represents that model. It’s a tool uniquely suited to act at the intersection of foreign aid and national interest, offering America a way to counter China’s deep economic entrenchment across the Global South—not through coercion, but through cooperation and capacity building.

In the final stretch of the administration’s first hundred days, the path forward should be clear. Rather than shutting down the MCC or prematurely folding it into the DFC, the Trump administration should swiftly nominate a new CEO and activate the agency through an interim leadership team. The opportunity to act is immediate. The DRC, Zambia, and Tanzania all represent viable starting points for MCC 2.0-style engagements.

Suppose the United States is serious about reshaping global supply chains in its favor and ensuring long-term access to the resources that will power its economy and defense. In that case, it cannot afford to let the MCC wither in obscurity. Instead, it should be revived, reimagined, and placed at the center of a renewed U.S. foreign policy toolkit—one that matches the scale and urgency of the moment.