Highlights
- China controls over 90% of global rare earth refining and 92% of permanent magnet supply, creating a critical strategic advantage.
- Executive orders focused on mining are insufficient without massive investments in midstream processing and manufacturing infrastructure.
- The U.S. remains dependent on China for rare earth technologies due to a lack of an integrated industrial policy and a comprehensive supply chain strategy.
Despite a flurry of Executive Orders from the Trump White House aimed at reasserting American sovereignty over critical minerals and rare earth elements (REEs), the reality is this: none of these measures are sufficient to materially shift the balance of power in the short to intermediate term. The administration has floated high-profile deals—from a Ukrainian mining corridor to the acquisition of Greenland, and even rhetorical overtures toward Canada as a “51st state.” Yet these moves all fixate on one part of the problem: upstream supply. That’s not where China’s grip lies today.
The Real Choke Point: China’s Midstream and Downstream Monopoly
The global rare earth crisis is not primarily about mining—it is about processing, separation, metallization, and manufacturing. China controls over 90% of global rare earth refining and more than 92% of the permanent magnet supply. That means even if the U.S. were to secure more raw feedstock tomorrow from Ukraine, Greenland, or Alberta, it would still lack the infrastructure and technology to turn that material into high-value components needed for F-35s, EV motors, drones, wind turbines, and semiconductors.
Executive Orders that facilitate mining permits or encourage U.S. Geological Survey mapping do nothing to address this bottleneck unless accompanied by massive investments and industrial policy to build a domestic midstream and magnet manufacturing base—something the private sector alone cannot and will not finance at scale.
The Illusion of Market Forces vs. China’s State-Controlled Juggernaut
The Trump administration continues to invoke the power of “free markets” and U.S. entrepreneurial spirit, along with a more proactive, business-friendly government. This is certainly a start. However, against China’s vertically integrated, state-controlled REE system—characterized by heavy subsidies, strategic direction, and aggressive consolidation—the U.S. is not competing on a level playing field. Beijing’s Two China Rare Earth Bases program is already underway, anchoring the next generation of REE-enabled technologies in Jiangxi and Inner Mongolia. These zones integrate research, refining, and high-end product assembly into closed-loop industrial clusters—a blueprint the U.S. has yet even to begin emulating. In fact, the U.S. is years behind in such an endeavor, given its basic attempts to establish a sustainable supply chain.
No Magnets, No Market
Without federal funding and coordination across the supply chain—from oxide to alloy to finished magnet—the U.S. will remain dependent on China for the next few years for functional end products, regardless of how much raw material it sources. Unlike lithium or copper, rare earth demand is driven by specific downstream applications. Access to upstream deposits is meaningless if those materials can’t be refined or turned into magnets.
Conclusion – Executive Orders Are Symbolic—Not Structural
Trump’s executive actions may signal political urgency, but they fall drastically short of enabling the industrial-scale intervention required to match China’s dominance. REEx suggests that without the following, we continue to face a steep uphill trek:
- Massive direct investment in midstream refining and separation facilities,
- Federal guarantees or offtake agreements to de-risk magnet manufacturing,
- A full-spectrum industrial policy that integrates R&D, workforce development, and defense procurement into one cohesive strategy,
The U.S. will remain a second-tier power in the rare earth economy—exposed, reactive, and constrained by the very monopoly it claims to challenge.
Rare Earth Exchanges will continue to track the gap between political rhetoric and industrial capability.
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