Highlights
- China and Indonesia continue to dominate critical minerals processing, with market concentration worsening between 2020-2024.
- The West lacks a unified industrial strategy for critical minerals, with investment and policy efforts fragmented and ineffective.
- Despite warnings from the IEA, no coordinated approach has successfully offset China’s strategic control of global mineral supply chains.
In “Monsters of Rock: The West is talking the talk on critical metals, but it ain’t walking the walk”
Veteran mining journalist Josh Chiat delivers a blunt message in his latest Stockhead column (opens in a new tab): Western rhetoric on critical minerals is outpacing reality, while China and Indonesia continue to entrench their dominance over the global supply chain.
Despite years of warnings from the International Energy Agency (IEA) and a wave of executive orders, market data show that the world’s most essential minerals for clean energy and national security remain in the hands of a few players—with China controlling processing a significant majority of minerals tracked.
What does the Chiat report say?
- Concentration is worsening–Between 2020 and 2024, the market share of the top three refining nations rose from 82% to 86%. For rare earths, refining control remains above 90%, largely held by China.
- Export controls now blanket 55% of global strategic minerals tracked by the IEA, raising the risk of price volatility and supply shocks.
- As Rare Earth Exchanges (REEx) continuously reports, market dynamics alone will not solve the problem. The IEA’s 2025 Global Critical Minerals Outlook warns that “major risk areas” persist—refining bottlenecks, price volatility, and geopolitical chokepoints remain unaddressed.
- Lithium prices have cratered in the near term (from $80,000/t in 2022 to ~$8,350/t in May 2025), yet Rio Tinto continues to double down, positioning itself for long-term dominance in a market expected to grow at 10% CAGR through 2040.
REEx Take: Where the West Stumbles
Chiat’s reporting is both urgent and justified, but some assumptions merit further interrogation.
First, the IEA warnings are nothing new, but certainly, the ongoing policy failure becomes key.
The IEA has sounded this alarm for nearly five years, yet no coordinated industrial strategy from the U.S. or EU has successfully offset China’s dominance. The U.S. Inflation Reduction Act sparked investor enthusiasm but remains bogged down by permitting backlogs, fragmented midstream capabilities, and supply-side nationalism.
While the IEA points to long-term diversification by 2040, its own data show that by then, rare earth mining and refining will still be dominated by China, Australia, and Myanmar—hardly a diversification triumph. We’re not reclaiming control—we’re treading water.
Second China and Indonesia continue to play offense, not defense in this contact sport.
Chiat correctly emphasizes China’s centrality, but the framing is still overly reactive. Beijing and Jakarta are not merely exploiting Western inaction—they are proactively capturing market share by doing the following:
- Flooding markets with low-cost cobalt, nickel, and REEs
- Locking in global refining and smelting capacity
- Establishing supply chain choke points via export controls and strategic stockpiling
The IEA’s fear that a lithium or REE supply shock could raise global battery prices by 40-50% isn’t theoretical—it’s strategic leverage already being wielded.
Is Rio Tinto more an outlier than a trend? The journalist lauds Rio Tinto’s contrarian investments in lithium, scandium, and gallium—even amid falling prices. While it’s true that bold energy transition plays have defined CEO Jakob Stausholm’s tenure, Rio’s approach remains an anomaly among many Western majors, many of which are still clinging to iron ore, coal, and short-cycle copper plays.
Rio’s bold diversification remains relatively rare among top-tier Western miners, many of whom maintain conservative portfolios. But some other majors are active like Albemarle (US), Pilbara Minerals (AU), and Glencore (CH).
Rio’s bets in Argentina and Chile—via deals with Codelco and ENAMI—reflect long-term positioning but are also contingent on state cooperation, infrastructure capacity, and commodity price recovery. The West’s private sector alone cannot outmatch Beijing’s state-coordinated approach.
The Real Deal Equals Western Paralysis
Chiat’s core thesis—that the West is “talking the talk” but not “walking the walk”—is accurate. But the problem runs deeper suggests REEx:
- There is no unified Western industrial strategy for critical minerals. National security concerns are siloed from financial investment frameworks, and permitting reform is politically gridlocked. REEx continues its call for rare earth and critical mineral supply chain industrial policy in the USA and among allies.
- Risk-averse capital markets remain allergic to long-term upstream investments, especially in frontier regions like the DRC or Southeast Asia.
- Ethical sourcing commitments, while important, are often used as excuses to delay engagement in high-risk, high-need jurisdictions. Meanwhile, China tolerates complexity—and reaps control.
A Dangerous Illusion of Progress
Stockhead’s analysis reveals a troubling reality: the West’s diversification efforts are mostly cyclical, not structural. Instead of building resilient, redundant mineral supply chains, policymakers are relying on market corrections and private actors to do what only coordinated policy can achieve.
Without:
- Massive public-private investment in refining and magnet manufacturing and recycling
- Permitting reform
- Strategic stockpiles (sustainable levels)
- Mutual defense-aligned sourcing pacts (e.g., Five Eyes, AUKUS)
Will the West continue to pay what is more lip service to mineral independence while outsourcing the future of clean energy, defense, and AI to Beijing?
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