Highlights

• China controls 70% of global rare earth mining and 90% of refining capacity, creating a critical national security vulnerability.
• U.S. rare earth production remains dramatically behind China, with only 1,300 tons of neodymium oxide produced compared to China's 300,000 tons.
• Rebuilding rare earth independence requires sustained public-private partnerships, allied coordination, and strategic industrial policy beyond political cycles.

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President Donald Trump continues to face what remains an under-emphasized crisis in the rare earth supply chain monopoly of China, invoking emergency powers to confront that Asian nation’s tightening stranglehold on the global rare earth supply chain. At the center of this new confrontation is China’s April 2025 decision to impose export restrictions on seven critical heavy rare earth elements, materials essential to America’s defense, clean energy, and technology sectors. The move has already sent shockwaves through U.S. industry—and placed rare earths squarely back into the national spotlight.

In her comprehensive article (opens in a new tab), Chosun.Biz reporter Jeong Mi-ha delivers a sobering account of just how exposed the U.S. has become. China controls 70% of global rare earth mining and 90% of refining capacity. These aren’t abstract numbers—they translate into real production pain.

As Rare Earth Exchanges (REEx) has chronicled, Ford has already halted EV production in Chicago. Military suppliers report material shortages affecting the F-35 and other systems. And with heavy rare earths like dysprosium and terbium sourced almost exclusively from China and Myanmar, the vulnerabilities are both strategic and economic.

In the recent piece, Mi-ha correctly points out that U.S. efforts to rebuild its rare earth capacity—despite more than $439 million in Defense Department investments since 2020—are nowhere near scale. MP Materials, America’s flagship rare earth producer, yielded just 1,300 tons of neodymium oxide last year. China, by comparison, produced over 300,000 tons.

But while the article captures the urgency, it misses key dimensions of the evolving response. For one, it largely ignores the broader private-sector mobilization across the U.S. and allied nations. Companies like Energy Fuels, Phoenix Tailings, and Australia’s Lynas, as well as a flurry of MP Materials activity and other ongoing efforts, are actively building processing and separation facilities with U.S. government support—efforts critical to diversifying supply outside of China.

The article also sidesteps the inconvenient timeline. Most domestic heavy rare earth separation projects are not expected to be operational before 2026 or 2027. That means the U.S. will remain dangerously exposed for years, regardless of how dramatic the political rhetoric becomes.

Additionally, however, the narrative portrays this crisis as a Trump-led pivot, but that obscures the continuity in U.S. industrial strategy. The push to reshore rare earth capacity began under both the Trump and Biden administrations, and framing it as a personal showdown with Xi Jinping risks politicizing what should be a sustained bipartisan effort.

One other blind spot: recycling. Breakthroughs in rare earth magnet recycling—such as the UK-originated HyProMag technology, now expanding in the U.S.—could play a decisive role in future supply chain resilience. Yet these technologies go unmentioned, despite their potential to reduce reliance on newly mined Chinese material.

Jeong’s article lands where it should: with a clear warning that the U.S. remains years away from rare earth independence. But the path forward demands more than bold declarations and emergency powers. It requires permitting reform, deep capital commitments, coordinated efforts, and sustained public-private partnerships—an industrial policy that aligns the United States with a network of allies.

Investors should be asking hard questions: Which U.S. projects are truly shovel-ready? Will Trump’s renewed trade war undermine cooperation with partners like Canada and Australia? And does Washington have the political will to back industrial policy beyond a single election cycle?

The rare earth crisis isn’t just a supply chain story—it’s a test of American strategic resolve.

Rare Earth Exchanges will continue to monitor developments across government, industry, and global markets as this high-stakes story unfolds.