Ex-Molycorp CEO Warns: “It’s a Long, Hard Process” to Break China’s Rare Earth Grip

Highlights

• Mark Smith predicts the U.S. is years away from meaningfully reducing China’s control over rare earth element production.
• NioCorp’s Nebraska project aims to produce both light and heavy rare earths, but production is not expected to begin until 2029.
• Western rare earth projects face significant challenges, including litigation, delays, and lack of processing infrastructure.

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In a sobering assessment from one of the industry’s veterans, former Molycorp CEO Mark Smith (opens in a new tab) says the West is still years away from meaningfully reducing China’s dominance over rare earth elements (REEs). Smith, now leading NioCorp Developments (opens in a new tab), warned that despite rising urgency and political momentum, the U.S. lacks processing capacity for critical REEs like terbium, dysprosium, and samarium—materials now under Chinese export control.

Smith, who ran Molycorp during the last rare earth crisis in 2010, blamed that company’s eventual bankruptcy on a lack of U.S. government support and China’s ability to crash prices at will. Today, he’s applying those lessons at NioCorp’s Nebraska project, which holds permits and plans to produce both light and heavy rare earths alongside niobium, titanium, and scandium. Even with “zero permitting risk,” Smith estimates production won’t begin until 2029.

As reported by James Mayger and Martin Ritchie at Mining.com (opens in a new tab), the executive overseeing rare earth elements emphasized that other Western projects are mired in litigation and delays. Yet, demand is surging. “Every time we go to Washington, all we hear is ‘heavy rare earths,’” he noted. While MP Materials and Lynas Rare Earths have helped deter broader Chinese controls on neodymium and praseodymium, no Western firm yet produces the heavier, heat-tolerant REEs vital for advanced magnet technologies.

Smith urged policymakers to follow Japan’s model—backing companies like Lynas early—and warned that dismantling China’s negotiating leverage will require sustained investment, domestic refining, and patience: “We have the resources. Now we need the infrastructure. But it won’t happen fast.”