Highlights
- The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) has leveraged rare earth mineral control to become a de facto state power, generating over $200 million annually in exports.
- China and India are strategically maneuvering to secure rare earth resources in Myanmar, with significant geopolitical and economic implications.
- Rapid rare earth extraction in Kachin has led to environmental degradation and increased regional tensions.
- Mineral wealth in Kachin has turned into a complex diplomatic challenge.
In a sweeping geopolitical analysis titled “Rare Earths and Realpolitik (opens in a new tab)” (June 24, 2025), Amara Thiha of the East Asia Program explores how Myanmar’s ethnic insurgents are leveraging control of rare earth mineral assets to gain international recognition and shape regional diplomacy. Published by the Myanmar Project at the East Asia Program (opens in a new tab), the report outlines how rare earth extraction has reshaped power dynamics along the China-Myanmar frontier, with global implications.
These recent updates come by way of the Stimson Center (opens in a new tab), a nonprofit (opens in a new tab), nonpartisan think tank (opens in a new tab) that analyzes issues related to global peace. It is named after the American lawyer and politician Henry L. Stimson. Stimson analyzes issues such as nuclear proliferation, arms trafficking, water management, wildlife poaching, and responses to humanitarian crises. It also provides consulting for US and international institutions and publishes articles for the general public.
Updates
Since late 2024, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) has transformed from a regional insurgent group into a de facto state power by seizing control of Chipwi and Pangwa—critical nodes in the global supply chain of heavy rare earths, including dysprosium and terbium. The KIA now regulates exports to China, levies taxes on shipments, and functions as the governing authority in this strategically vital corridor. This seizure forced China to close its Yunnan border crossings, halting trade temporarily. However, by December, Beijing resumed engagement via discreet back-channel negotiations. Echoing its tolerance of the United Wa State Army’s control over tin exports, China now prioritizes access to rare earths over official diplomatic recognition, pragmatically working with the KIA to secure a stable supply of materials crucial to its clean energy and defense sectors.
But this access comes at a steep environmental cost. Since Myanmar’s 2021 coup, the number of rare earth extraction sites in Kachin has surged from around 130 to more than 370, often operating with minimal oversight. The result: deforestation, contaminated water supplies, and toxic runoff that has spread into neighboring northern Thailand. Local communities are increasingly vocal in their resistance, adding volatility to a region already shaped by political fragmentation and resource-fueled conflict.
India, recognizing both the strategic value and geopolitical stakes, has made moves to enter the game. In late 2024, Indian Rare Earths Ltd. dispatched representatives to Kachin to explore upstream partnerships. With limited domestic reserves of heavy rare earths and growing concerns over Chinese dominance, India views Kachin as both a commercial opportunity and a strategic counterweight. Yet, New Delhi lacks the logistical capacity, diplomatic channels, and historical precedent for negotiating with non-state armed groups on this scale, leaving its ambitions uncertain.
Meanwhile, the KIA’s rise as a resource broker has fundamentally altered its political leverage. Now generating over $200 million annually from rare earth exports, the group commands more economic power than some small nations. This influx of revenue and international engagement has transformed the KIA from a guerrilla force to a gatekeeper of global supply chains. But as the U.S.–China trade war intensifies—particularly under the Trump administration’s aggressive mineral strategy—Myanmar’s rare earth corridor has become an ageopolitical flashpoint. For Washington, it’s leverage. For Beijing, it’s a lifeline. For the region, it’s a dangerous pivot point where mineral wealth fuels instability and transactional diplomacy replaces long-term peacebuilding.
Final Thoughts
Thiha’s report is rich in on-the-ground reporting and diplomatic insight, but subtly presumes that China’s engagement is pragmatic and stabilizing, while the U.S.’s interest risks escalation. It carefully balances regional perspectives while raising implicit questions about international complicity in resource-backed conflict resolution.
Rare Earth Exchanges Bias Meter™ of East Asia Program article:
| Dimension | Assessment |
| Source Bias | Moderate (policy-focused, Western lens) |
| Fact Depth | High (original data, local interviews) |
| Geopolitical Framing | Balanced but China-pragmatic |
| Omissions | Minimal (broad context provided) |
| Overall Bias Rating: | Policy-Oriented, Regionally Balanced Analysis™ |
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