Highlights

• China controls Africa's critical minerals supply chain through early-stage financing, construction, logistics infrastructure, and downstream processing capacity, capturing value while African nations export raw materials.
• The DRC, Zimbabwe, Guinea, and Zambia are China's strategic anchors, securing cobalt, lithium, copper, and bauxite through integrated investments from mine to port to refinery.
• The West cannot compete on mines alone; winning requires matching China's financing scale, building domestic processing capacity, and delivering faster project execution with credible ESG standards.

---

Africa is a resource superpower in the making—rich in lithium, cobalt, graphite, manganese, nickel, and rare earth elements (REEs) used in EVs, wind turbines, electronics, and defense systems. China’s advantage is not just “mines.” It is control of the chain: early access, financing, construction, offtake, and (most importantly) processing capacity—often outside Africa. The result is a supply system where many African countries export raw or semi-processed material and import higher-value products back at a premium.

Africa controls a disproportionate share of the world’s critical mineral endowment

Making the continent central to global supply chains for clean energy, advanced manufacturing, and modern electronics. Estimates commonly suggest that roughly 30% of global critical mineral reserves are located in Africa. The Democratic Republic of Congo alone accounts for more than 70% of known cobalt reserves, while the continent also hosts major concentrations of manganese, platinum-group metals, and chromium, alongside rapidly expanding lithium discoveries.

These mineral concentrations position Africa as a keystone supplier for the energy transition, electric vehicles, battery storage, hydrogen technologies, and high-performance electronics. In addition, Africa is estimated to hold approximately 15% of global rare earth element resources, further strengthening its strategic importance as demand accelerates for magnets, electronics, and defense-related technologies.

Taken together, Africa’s resource base gives it outsized influence over the future of critical mineral supply—provided extraction, processing, and governance challenges can be effectively addressed.

China’s playbook, end-to-end

1. Get in early (exploration + stakes + offtake):

China often enters at the exploration or “late exploration / early feasibility” stage—buying stakes in juniors, negotiating joint ventures, and securing offtake rights (sometimes with ROFR clauses). These arrangements can lock in future supply long before production.

2. Bring the money and the builders (banks + EPC):

Chinese policy banks and state-linked firms can finance projects others can’t—then deliver construction via Chinese engineering and procurement contractors. This compresses timelines and reduces dependence on Western capital markets.  Note Chinese firms are used to the so called “gratitude” payments early on—the ones Western firms traditionally avoid.

3. Control the exit route (ports + rail + logistics):

Mines are only as valuable as their export routes. China often pairs mining with logistics—railways, roads, ports, power—so the product reliably flows into Chinese trade networks.

4. Win the choke point (processing):

Processing and refining are where pricing power lives. One U.S. government framing cited in the book notes heavy U.S. import dependence and vulnerability in critical minerals supply chains, including rare earths. Even when African governments demand local beneficiation, Chinese firms may build partial processing (e.g., concentrate → intermediate chemical) while keeping the highest-value steps tied to China.

5. Outcompete on risk tolerance:

China can operate in harder places (political instability, fragile institutions), and is often more flexible on deal terms. That can be attractive for cash-strapped governments—but it also raises ESG and governance controversy.

Where China’s biggest bets are (by country)

1. Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): cobalt + copper, now lithium

Why it’s strategic: DRC is the epicenter of cobalt and a top-tier copper producer—both essential for batteries and electrification.

China’s position: Deeply entrenched across industrial mines and trading channels.

Key names & projects (high level):

• CMOC Group Ltd (opens in a new tab) – Tenke Fungurume (opens in a new tab) (copper-cobalt)
• Zijin Mining – major copper exposure via Kamoa-Kakula stake (opens in a new tab) (with Ivanhoe)
• Multiple Chinese-backed mid-tier operators and traders feeding China’s cobalt/copper refining base

What to watch: Price leverage (flooding supply), renegotiation pressure from Kinshasa, and growing scrutiny over value capture.

2. Zambia: copper belt leverage, selective processing

Why it’s strategic: Zambia anchors the copper belt; copper is the backbone metal for grids, EVs, and electrification.

China’s position: Significant but more contested than DRC (Western miners remain active).

Key names & assets:

• CNMC – Chambishi mining/smelting footprint
• JCHX – Lubambe stake acquisition (opens in a new tab) (turnaround play)

ESG flashpoints: Historical labor controversies in Chinese-linked operations in Zambia have fueled union suspicion and periodic political backlash.

3. Zimbabwe: hard-rock lithium buildout (plus chrome/nickel)

Why it’s strategic: Zimbabwe became a key hard-rock lithium pipeline for China.

China’s position: Dominant in lithium mining investment.

Key names & moves:

• Huayou (opens in a new tab) – Arcadia/Prospect Lithium Zimbabwe; scaling intermediate processing
• Sinomine (opens in a new tab) – Bikita, plus refinery plans—see link. (opens in a new tab)
• Chengxin Lithium Group / Yahua Group / Tsingshan Holding Group – broader lithium positioning

Policy pressure: Zimbabwe and peers are tightening rules to push local processing—forcing some in-country conversion plants while still leaving high-value refining and cathode supply chains centered in Asia.

4. Guinea: bauxite (and Simandou iron logistics)

Why it’s strategic: Bauxite is critical for aluminum supply; Simandou matters for iron ore and logistics control.

China’s position: Very strong in bauxite export flows; heavy role in infrastructure buildout (rail/port).

Key names:

• SMB-Winning (consortium) – bauxite export engine
• Chalco – bauxite stakes
• Simandou consortium arrangements tie future export flows to Chinese-linked infrastructure

Controversy: Guinea illustrates the classic “export bulk raw material” trap—high volumes, limited domestic refining.

5. Mali: lithium in a high-risk jurisdiction

Why it’s strategic: New lithium supply front.

China’s position: Strong partner financing and offtake, despite political volatility.

Key names:

• Ganfeng – Goulamina lithium partnership (the Goulamina lithium project in Mali is one of the world's largest spodumene hard-rock lithium deposits and represents the 4th largest spodumene resource globally)
• Hainan Mining (opens in a new tab) – Bougouni financing link (via Kodal)

Watch: Security instability + sanctions risk + governancechange, all of which can disrupt timelines.

6. Tanzania: graphite + rare earths (Ngualla)

Why it’s strategic: Graphite is a battery anode staple; Ngualla is a notable REE development story. Note Shenghe Resources (China) now controls via Peak Rare Earth acquisition.

China’s position: Strong influence via offtake and equity stakes.

Key names:

• Shenghe – Ngualla rare earth project stake/offtake trajectory
• Chinese-linked interest across graphite projects

Strategic note: This is the pattern: secure future REE concentrate outside China, then route into processing dominance.

7. Madagascar: graphite + clay-hosted REEs

Why it’s strategic: High-quality graphite; a notable ionic clay rare earth prospect.

China’s position: Material in graphite; REE ambitions have faced local friction.

ESG sensitivity: Ionic clay REEs can involve damaging leaching methods—raising environmental opposition risks. Several companies are prospecting for rare earths in Madagascar, notably Energy Fuels Inc. (developing the large Vara Mada project) and Harena Metals, which focuses on the Ampasindava project for heavy rare earths, aiming for low-impact heap leaching and supporting U.S. supply chains. Other players include those previously involved with the Ampasindava area, like Tantalus Rare Earths (German) and potentially entities linked to Singapore's ISR Capital, though focus is now shifting towards these newer, well-funded efforts. 

8. Namibia: lithium policy pushback + China’s uranium footprint

Why it’s strategic: Critical minerals plus uranium.

China’s position: Strong in uranium (energy security); mixed in lithium due to export-ban enforcement and local pushback.

Flashpoint: Export of unprocessed ore controversies and licensing disputes show African governments can constrain Chinese operators when political will aligns.

Chinese companies heavily invest in Namibia's uranium sector, primarily China General Nuclear Power Group (opens in a new tab) (CGN), which owns the massive Husab mine (via Swakop Uranium) and has stakes in Rössing Uranium, while China Uranium Corporation (CNUC) (opens in a new tab) also explores uranium; for lithium, Xinfeng Investments (opens in a new tab) (a Tangshan Xinfeng subsidiary) operates processing plants and mines, though faced export challenges. 

9. Mozambique: graphite supply and “disruption risk”

Why it’s strategic: One of the world’s biggest graphite sources (and a strategic input for anode supply).

China’s position: Often indirect—through being the dominant buyer and financier of downstream chains.

ESG/political risk: Civil unrest and security issues can halt supply, reminding markets that “resource-rich” doesn’t mean “reliably shippable.”

Mozambique is emerging as a potential REE hub, driven by promising discoveries like Altona Rare Earths' Monte Muambe project (opens in a new tab) (Tete Province) and MRG Metals' (opens in a new tab) finds in Sofala, with exploration revealing significant REE-bearing minerals and potential for byproduct gallium, positioning the country to contribute to global supply alongside graphite and heavy mineral sands. Key ventures involve advanced exploration, resource definition, and developing local processing, with companies like Altona moving toward pre-feasibility studies and government interest in regional processing facilities, highlighting Mozambique's growing critical minerals sector. 

10. Nigeria + Ghana: early-stage critical minerals and illicit mining tension

Nigeria: Lithium/coltan potential with heavy informal trading dynamics.

Ghana: Bauxite ambitions collide with environmental and political resistance; illegal mining (“galamsey”) has created severe ecological damage and public anger—often linked in public discourse to foreign (including Chinese) actors.

Nigeria possesses significant REE potential, with large untapped deposits like monazite, but its REE mining is underdeveloped, characterized by informal small-scale operations and a lack of large-scale mines, hindered by poor data and funding. Rare Earth Exchanges has been developing relationships with local traders—intermediaries between the small mines and markets. The government is now aggressively pursuing development through major initiatives, including a new regional $400M processing plant, aiming to transform the sector, add value locally, and become a global player, addressing historical underinvestment and illegal mining issues.  Rare Earth Exchanges has some significant questions about the processing plant.

Note a mention for an important REE mine for the USA under construction in Angola—sponsored by Pensana Plc traded via the London exchange. The company plans on benefiting from the Lobito Corridor project.  The Lobito Corridor is a major African infrastructure project centered on a railway and port connecting the Atlantic coast of Angola (Port of Lobito) to the mineral-rich Copperbelt regions of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Zambia, serving as a crucial trade route for critical minerals like cobalt and copper, and agricultural goods, supported by the EU, US, and African Development Bank to boost regional integration and global trade. 

Lobito Corridor

Why China is so hard to beat (for the U.S. and the West)

• Financing scale + patience: China can fund projectsthrough downturns and treat supply security as strategic, not purelycommercial.  Gratitude payments are readily available.
• Build + operate capability: Chinese firms show up with EPC, workforce, equipment, and sometimes the logistics plan.
• Processing dominance: The West can “win a mine” and still lose the war if the product must be processed through Chinese-controlled capacity.
• Offtake discipline: China locks in volume early, leaving rivals competing for leftovers—or paying higher prices later.
• Political flexibility: Fewer governance conditions can make deals easier to sign—though this can create backlash when contracts look opaque or extractive.

ESG disruptions: where projects can break

ESG issues are not “side stories”—they are operational risk:

• Environment: river pollution, tailings mismanagement, forest encroachment, unsafe chemical handling, dust impacts near bauxite corridors.
• Labor: wage disputes, safety incidents, community tensions, weak grievance mechanisms.
• Governance: opaque contracting, allegations of bribery, and nationalist backlash when value-add stays offshore.

Bottom line: the West often tries to compete on “higher standards,” but that can slow projects and raise costs—while China competes on speed, financing, and integration. The winning model in Africa likely blends both: credible ESG + bankable execution + real downstream capacity.

Country-by-country snapshot table (condensed)

Country	Key critical minerals / REEs	Activity level	Any refining/processing in-country?	Key China-linked companies/structures	China presence
DRC	Cobalt, copper, lithium	High (production)	Limited (mostly export of intermediates)	CMOC, Zijin, multiple traders/operators	Very high
Zambia	Copper (+ cobalt byproduct)	High	Smelting exists; cobalt refining limited/variable	CNMC, JCHX, others	High
Zimbabwe	Lithium, chrome, nickel	High (rapid buildout)	Growing intermediate lithium processing	Huayou, Sinomine, Tsingshan, Chengxin	High
Guinea	Bauxite; iron logistics	High (bulk export)	Minimal alumina; heavy logistics build	SMB-Winning, Chalco; Simandou-linked consortia	Very high
Mali	Lithium	Medium (ramping)	Mostly concentrate export	Ganfeng, Hainan-linked financing	High (emerging)
Tanzania	Graphite, REEs	Medium–high (pipeline)	Some planned (graphite); REE processing often offshore	Shenghe + offtake/ownership ties	Moderate–high
Madagascar	Graphite, clay REEs	Medium	Graphite concentrate; REE plans contested	Chinese graphite operators; REE interest via deals	Moderate
Namibia	Lithium, uranium	Medium	Uranium processing; lithium restrictions	CNNC/CGN (uranium); mixed lithium actors	Moderate
Mozambique	Graphite	High (supply)	Concentrate export; refining offshore	China as buyer/investor influence	Moderate
Nigeria	Lithium, coltan	Low–medium (early)	Limited	Traders + early exploration linkages	Low (potential)
South Africa	PGMs, manganese; REE projects	High (mining)	Strong metals refining; REEs early	Stakes in select mines/metals	Moderate

Final Point

China’s Africa advantage is best understood as a system, not a set of mines. It is early access + financing + construction + logistics + offtake + processing dominance. The U.S. and allies can compete—but only if they pair capital and ESG credibility with real downstream capacity (processing, separation, magnet supply chains) and faster project execution. Otherwise, Africa will keep exporting raw value while China captures the margin.