Highlights
- China’s rare earth market control and potential to manipulate global supply chains
- Semiconductor investments and technological leadership challenges in global tech standards
- Speculative potential of China’s role in setting future tech policy and governance norms
In Eurasia Review’s June 29 op-ed (opens in a new tab), Dr. Imran Khalid (opens in a new tab), a geostrategic analyst and columnist on international affairs, presents a comprehensive vision of China’s ambitions to become the global architect of tech governance, weaving together rare earth dominance, semiconductor expansion, and green tech diplomacy into a unified narrative arc. But how accurate—and how speculative—is this picture?
Fact Check: Rare Earths and Trade Tactics
The article correctly notes China’s overwhelming control of rare-earth permanent magnets, accounting for over 90% of the global supply. The reported 74% year-on-year drop in rare-earth magnet exports in May 2025 is also supported by Chinese customs data, underscoring Beijing’s tightening grip through licensing requirements. This is no bluff. China can squeeze global supply chains and has already signaled its willingness to do so.
Where Khalid stretches the frame is in suggesting that China’s dominance allows it to “dictate the size and color of the football.” While evocative, this metaphor overstates China’s power in standards-setting. Export dependence cuts both ways—Beijing still relies on Western markets for high-tech goods, investment, and trust.
Semiconductors and the “Big Fund”
The article accurately cites the $47.5 billion injection from China’s “Big Fund” and acknowledges China’s modest 16% global chip market share. But the suggestion that this makes China a near-peer in shaping semiconductor standards is premature. Market share and technological leadership remain with Taiwan (TSMC) and South Korea (Samsung). Even with accelerated AI chip investments, China still lags in cutting-edge fabrication nodes.
Bias and Strategic Romanticism
Khalid’s argument leans heavily on aspirational framing, suggesting that China might establish global norms on traceability, data governance, and green-tech conditionality. These ideas are more speculative policy prescriptions than current policy. No rare-earth traceability regime or AI IP commons exists—yet. The piece fails to mention Western countermeasures, such as Japan’s REE diversification, EU subsidy frameworks, or the U.S. CHIPS Act enforcement.
Conclusion
While the article offers a provocative roadmap of what could be, it conflates dominance in rare earths with global rulemaking authority. China may write a chapter in the tech rule book—but the book remains co-authored, contested, and far from finished.
Rare Earth Exchanges Bias & Accuracy Indicator™
| Category | Score | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Factual Accuracy | 8 | Export drop and market share data are well-supported |
| Speculative Content | 6 | Heavy reliance on “what if” future scenarios |
| Bias Detection | 5 | Pro-China framing lacks balance or opposing data |
| Investor Relevance | 9 | Raises valid points on REE supply shocks and policy leverage |
| Overall Clarity | 8 | Well-written but leans toward editorial enthusiasm |
REEx Reflection: Strong on context, light on counterbalance. Retail investors should note the facts, question the futurecasting.
For more retail investor discussion on the unfolding rare earth element supply chain visit the REEx Forum (opens in a new tab).
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