Highlights

• The Trump administration is inviting industry interest in deep-sea mining for polymetallic nodules in Northern Mariana Islands and American Samoa.
• The goal is to secure critical minerals like nickel, cobalt, copper, and manganese for national security.
• BOEM's information-gathering phase is ongoing and does not yet constitute approval.
• Unresolved environmental concerns include sediment plumes, fisheries impacts, and ecosystem effects.
• There are active scientific debates surrounding these environmental concerns.
• Guam, Northern Marianas, and American Samoa are unified in opposition to the mining initiative.
• The territories are preparing legal challenges, which could introduce significant permitting and timeline risks.
• Despite the opposition, there is geopolitical urgency driving the initiative.

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The Trump administration is reviving plans to explore deep-sea mining in U.S. Pacific territories—specifically the Northern Mariana Islands and American Samoa—by inviting industry interest, speeding reviews, and expanding seabed mapping, arguing the move is needed to secure critical minerals for national security and advanced manufacturing. Reporting by Pacific Beat of ABC details (opens in a new tab) the process: an information request from the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (opens in a new tab) (BOEM), streamlined environmental steps by  National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (opens in a new tab) (NOAA), and new surveys. What’s clear is the intent; what’s not is consent, science, or timing. No leases have been granted yet—and opposition across Pacific territories is unified, raising legal and schedule risk.

The Case the Coverage Gets Right

The minerals targeted—polymetallic nodules containing nickel, cobalt, copper, and manganese—are genuinely strategic for batteries, defense platforms, and grid infrastructure. It’s also accurate, as reported (opens in a new tab) by ABC, that the U.S. is not a member of the UN-affiliated International Seabed Authority, meaning Washington is pursuing a domestic path rather than the ISA framework. Pacific territories host critical U.S. military assets, which explains the geopolitical urgency. The core premise—over-reliance on China for critical minerals is a vulnerability—is widely accepted across allied capitals.

Where the Brakes Matter

The Australian media narrative leans toward inevitability; the facts do not. BOEM emphasizes that this phase is information-gathering, not approval. Environmental uncertainties remain unresolved: sediment plumes, fisheries impacts, and contested findings (including claims about oxygen generation by nodules) are active scientific debates, not settled conclusions. Crucially, Guam, the Northern Marianas, and American Samoa are aligned in opposition and are preparing legal challenges, introducing real permitting and timeline risk.

Rare Earths: Adjacent, Not the Target

Deep-sea nodules are not rare-earth deposits. Their relevance to rare earth supply chains is indirect—these are battery metals, not neodymium, dysprosium, or terbium. The strategic parallel, however, is instructive: once again, policymakers are discovering that markets alone may not deliver resilient supply fast enough when security is at stake.

The Frame REEx has been pressed since 2024

Since late 2024, Rare Earth Exchanges™ has argued for coordinated allied industrial policy—price mechanisms, stockpiles, talent/workforce development, downstream subsidies, shared infrastructure—at a scale not seen since WWII. Whether for seabed minerals or rare earth refining (especially heavy rare earth separation), outcomes will hinge on execution: durable rules, public consent, and science-based guardrails. Security premiums may emerge—but only if policy earns legitimacy.

Source: Pacific Beat (ABC), Lucy Cooper & Doug Dingwall, January 31, 2026.