Highlights

• China's strategic leverage over semiconductors stems from its control of rare earth processing, refining, and magnet production—not just mining—making midstream capabilities the real geopolitical choke point.
• India possesses significant rare earth resources but remains dependent on Chinese derivatives due to limited industrial capacity, regulatory constraints, and an underdeveloped downstream processing infrastructure.
• Allied partnerships like iCET can diversify supply chains only when paired with credible domestic industrial policy, institutional reform, and investment in processing, alloys, and recycling capabilities.

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Researchers Ratnadeep Maitra, Department of International Relations and Governance Studies, Shiv Nadar University, Delhi-NCR, and Tapas Das, Kandi RajCollege, University of Kalyani, India argue in a January 2026 UNISCIJournal analysis that rare earth elements have shifted from “just minerals” into instruments of national security and geo-economic power—and that China’s near-monopoly over rare earth processing and refining, more than its mining output, is the real choke point shaping semiconductor and advanced-technology supply chains. Their core message for lay readers: countries can have rare earths in the ground and still be dependent—because the “power” lives in the refineries, separation chemistry, magnet-making, and know-how.

Overview

This is a strategic policy analysis, not a lab experiment. The authors use two well-known international-relations frameworks—“complex interdependence” (Keohane & Nye) and “multi-dimensional security” (Buzan)—to interpret how supply chains became security assets after COVID-era disruptions and amid U.S.–China technology rivalry. They then apply that lens to semiconductors and critical minerals, positioning rare earths as a prime example of “weaponizable” dependency.

Key Findings

1. Processing is the monopoly that matters. The paper emphasizes that China’s leverage stems from control of midstream and downstream nodes—separation, refining, and magnet production—allowing export restrictions to function as a strategic tool.
2. India’s bottleneck is not geology—it’s industrialcapacity. Despite significant resource potential (notably coastal mineral sands), India is described as constrained by limited private participation, environmental and waste-management complexity, and thin downstream capabilities—leading to continued dependence on Chinese rare-earth derivatives.
3. Allied frameworks help, but don’t substitute for domestic buildout. The authors argue initiatives like the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET) and broader partnerships can diversify supply only if paired with credible domestic institutional reform and industrial sequencing.

Implications for markets and policy

For investors, the paper reinforces a hard truth: rare earth resilience is an industrial policy project, not a mining project. India’s opportunity—like America’s—is to move from upstream extraction to processing, alloys, magnets, and recycling, where margins and leverage are higher.

Limitations and controversies

Because the article is theory-forward, it does not provide new production data, cost curves, or project-level feasibility. Some readers may view its “weaponization” framing as geopolitically loaded; others will argue it understates the practical barriers (capital, permitting, waste) to replicating China’s decades-long processing base quickly. Those debates are real—and they are precisely where policy can drift into rhetoric.

Citation: Maitra, R., & Das, T. (2026). India and the Rare Earth Conundrum: Navigating Security, Geoeconomics and Global Supply Chains. UNISCI Journal 70–71. DOI: 10.31439/UNISCI-256.