Highlights

• Hallgarten's February 2026 Growth Minerals Review argues potash and phosphate are now strategic commodities shaped by government policy, trade deals, and stockpiling—not just agricultural demand—with U.S. regulators scrutinizing Mosaic and Nutrien while missing the real power: integrated supply chains including mines, processing, marketing consortia, shipping, and port access.
• Analyst Joshua Mayfield identifies Canpotex's end-to-end control—extraction, processing, transportation, and port throughput—as the quiet center of gravity, while China treats fertilizer as a security asset through NDRC actions, reserves management, and trade positioning that includes a Jan. 16, 2026, Beijing visit by Canada's PM Mark Carney tied to canola tariff reductions.
• For rare earth supply chains, the potash example reinforces a critical lesson: mines alone don't fix dependence—the strategic bottleneck is processing capacity, logistics, throughput, and coordination, meaning Western resilience requires funding the unglamorous midstream, not just headlines and hearings.

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In Hallgarten + Company’s February 2026 Growth Minerals Review (opens in a new tab), analyst Joshua Mayfield argues that potash and phosphate fertilizer markets have entered a new era: they are no longer “inputs” priced mainly by agronomy and weather, but strategic commodities shaped by government pressure, trade deals, and stockpiling behavior. In “Majors in the Political Firing Line,” Mayfield frames U.S.scrutiny of Mosaic and Nutrien—including USDA Deputy SecretaryStephen Vaden’s public “duopoly” allegations—as politically potent but structurally incomplete: the real power sits in integrated supply chains—mines, processing, marketing consortia, shipping capacity, and port access.

Rare Earth Exchanges™ recently led a podcast covering the topic of potash, classified as a critical mineral.

What the Report Examines

Mayfield threads together several forces driving fertilizer volatility and political escalation: (1) U.S. regulatory heat on incumbents, (2) Canada’s trade positioning while Washington threatens tariff pressure, (3) China’s push for agricultural security via policy and reserves, and (4) renewed investor attention to potash equities as near-term prices firm.

Methods and Approach

This is sector analysis, not a peer-reviewed academic study. Mayfield synthesizes policy statements, trade and pricing context, and company-level project developments—highlighting, for example, BHP’s Jansen Stage 1 cost increase to USD $8.4 billion as a live case of how “new entrants” face real execution risk.

Key Findings: Concentration Creates Leverage

1. The “duopoly” story is politically convenient—but the market is built on structural advantage.

Mayfield criticizes Vaden’s framing as ahistorical and simplistic, arguing that Canadian potash dominance is a decades-long reality, not a recent maneuver.

2. Canpotex is the quiet center of gravity.

A core argument is that Canpotex’s leverage is not just reserves—it’s end-to-end control: extraction scale, processing, transportation, and port throughput that new entrants struggle to match.

3. China is treating fertilizer like a security asset.

Mayfield points to China’s “No.1 central document” and associated NDRC actions aimed at fertilizer availability and price stability—securing raw materials, preserving preferential freight, tightening supervision, and managing reserves.

He also notes China’s import posture: 2025 potash imports valued at USD $4.03B, with Russia at USD $1.49B, and Russia’s export quotas running Dec. 31, 2025–May 31, 2026—a reminder that trade flows can tighten by decree.

Why REEx Readers Should Care: The Rare Earth Parallel

REEx’s lens is not “fertilizer drama.” It’s the playbook. When a supply chain is dominated by a small number of actors—and those actors control processing and logistics, not merely ore in the ground—then pricing, availability, and bargaining power become political tools. That logic is directly relevant to rare earths, where refining and conversion capacity (the “midstream”) is the strategic choke point in many Western supply-chain plans. The report’s potash example reinforces a lesson rare-earth policymakers keep relearning: mines alone don’t fix dependence—the bottleneck is usually processing + throughput + coordination.

Controversial Undercurrents

Mayfield highlights a politically charged triangle: Washington heckles incumbents while threatening tariffs on Canada; Canada seeks market access (including China); and China uses policy to harden food-security supply chains. He flags a Jan. 16, 2026, Beijing visit by Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney, and a joint statement tied to a “new strategic partnership,” including canola tariff reductions (to ~15% combined) by March 1, 2026, alongside debate over tariff relief for Chinese-made EVs in Canada.

Limitations and What the Report Does Not Prove

• This is analyst research, built on interpretation rather than controlled empirical testing.
• Several claims (e.g., where trade deals “really” point long-term) are inferences, not settled facts.
• The report includes standard disclosures, including that Hallgarten or associated persons own securities referenced (e.g., Brazil Potash and Millennial Potash).

Conclusion

Mayfield’s message lands beyond potash: strategic commodity markets are being reorganized by politics, not just prices. For REEx readers, the actionable takeaway is the same one haunting rare earth strategy: if the West wants resilience, it must fund and build the unglamorous middle—processing capacity, logistics, and scale—or it will keep mistaking headlines and hearings for supply-chain control.