Highlights

• China dominates 70% of rare earth mining and 90% of processing, creating a structural vulnerability that stockpiles alone cannot fix—the U.S. must rebuild specialized separation and refining capacity.
• Faster permitting helps but misses the core issue: without domestic midstream processing, U.S. ore still flows through Chinese-controlled refining circuits.
• Project Vault, permitting reform, and production subsidies form a coherent strategy only if executed together—midstream investment, not mining alone, determines supply chain independence.

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An opinion piece (opens in a new tab) in Deseret News by Mihir Torsekar of the Coalition for a Prosperous America (opens in a new tab) argues that China’s dominance in rare earth mining and processing constitutes a national crisis. He supports Project Vault, a proposed U.S. critical minerals stockpile, and calls for faster permitting and long-term incentives to rebuild refining capacity. The core issue for investors: is this alarm justified—and are the proposed solutions structurally sound?

The Numbers: Mostly Right, Context Required

Torsekar claims China controls roughly 70% of global rare earth mining and 90% of processing. Directionally, that is accurate. China dominates separation, refining, and metallization—particularly through large-scale solvent extraction. The U.S. remains heavily dependent on Chinese midstream capacity.

His analogy to the 1970s Strategic Petroleum Reserve is rhetorically powerful but imperfect. Oil is fungible and high-volume. Rare earth elements are chemically complex, low-volume, and require specialized processing. A stockpile buffers disruption. It does not rebuild separation plants.

The Permitting Bottleneck: Real but Simplified

The claim that U.S. mines take “29 years” to permit reflects widely cited averages, though methodologies vary. The broader point stands: permitting timelines are long and unpredictable.

However, faster mine approvals alone do not fix rare earth vulnerability. Without domestic cracking, separation, and metallization, upstream ore still flows into Chinese-controlled processing circuits. Torsekar acknowledges this—but underestimates the capital intensity and technical difficulty of rebuilding midstream chemistry.

Where the Argument Leans

The piece frames China’s position as an “iron grip,” stronger than OPEC’s oil leverage. That comparison oversimplifies market structure. Rare earth markets are smaller, less liquid, and more vertically integrated. China’s dominance is real—but it is structural, not purely coercive. Plus, the Trump administration is taking significant steps to start addressing the challenges. Although Rare Earth Exchanges™ has gone on the record that more industrial policy is necessary, not less.

The call for production credits, defense off-takes, and anti-dumping safeguards aligns with industrial policy trends. What is missing is cost realism: Among other material factors, Western refining will not compete on price without sustained subsidy or price-floor mechanisms.

What’s Notable for Investors

The most important insight is this: the U.S. is not resource-poor. It is processing-constrained. Mining reform alone will not rebalance supply chains. Midstream investment is the real battlefield.

Project Vault, permitting reform (SPEED Act), Trump 2.0 executive orders, 232 action, and subsidy reform start to form a coherent strategy—if executed together. Separately, they are partial measures.

Crisis language may attract headlines. Chemistry, capital, and contracts will determine outcomes.

Source: Mihir Torsekar, “China’s stranglehold on critical minerals is now a national crisis,” February 16, 2026.