Highlights

• NdPr oxide prices above $110/kg validate U.S. defense-linked revenue floor mechanisms, but pricing sovereignty remains elusive as benchmarks stay China-indexed despite supply diversification efforts.
• Trump 2.0 accelerates vertical mine-to-magnet federal backing with projects like USA Rare Earth's $1.3B loan support and MP Materials leading onshore ecosystems toward 2027-2028 commissioning.
• Western rare earth processing capacity inflects post-2026 through Iluka's 2027 Eneabba refinery and expanding separation infrastructure, yet the decisive test is whether pricing and hedging tools mature before the next export-control shock.

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The ex-China rare earth sector remains in a transitional build phase. NdPr oxide prices holding above $110/kg validate the U.S. defense-linked revenue floor architecture, confirming that government-backed price protection mechanisms can serve as credible guardrails for non-China producers. With spot prices near $123/kg, taxpayer support is currently inactive, demonstrating that the public-private alignment model can function without immediate subsidy drawdown. However, price discovery remains tethered to China-indexed benchmarks, meaning supply diversification has not yet translated into pricing sovereignty. The REEx Structural Momentum Score™ holds at 5/10, reflecting stable but incomplete progress: demand remains strong (7), geopolitical pressure elevated (6), financing improving (5), while ex-China supply security (3) and processing growth (2) lag. No four-week movement above 0.3 confirms that structural change has not materially accelerated over the past month.

Policy momentum is clearly building under Trump 2.0, with vertical mine-to-magnet architectures gaining federal backing, export credit layering de-risking projects like Arafura, and U.S. magnet capacity proposals advancingtoward 2027–2028 commissioning timelines. Europe’sforthcoming Industrial Accelerator Act may further regionalize magnet demand, while China’s March 25 export-control briefing underscores that administrative leverage remains an active variable. Ex-China pricing assessments are expanding, and futures discussions are emerging, but liquidity remains thin and benchmark gravity still points to Beijing. The decisive question for 2026–2028 is whether Western processing, hedging, and capital infrastructure can mature before the next export-control shock forces reactive spending. Until separation scale and independent pricing benchmarks take hold, the West’s rare earth sovereignty remains strategic in intent—but transitional in execution.

Overall Sector Momentum: Neutral (Transitional Build Phase).

This week confirmed the government-as-backstop model is directionally the correct course. NdPr pricing above the floor validates revenue-protection structures for non-China producers; however, price discovery remains China-indexed—meaning sovereignty in supply still lacks sovereignty in pricing.

Key Structural Change:

NdPr prices holding above $110/kg reinforce policy-backed revenue floors as bankable guardrails. Under the U.S. defense agreement, the government captures a portion of upside above the floor, reinforcing the public-private revenue alignment model.

Risk Developing:

China retains indirect pricing control via benchmark dominance and administrative export tools (licensing, customs compliance, end-use scrutiny), creating potential for abrupt economic repricing. As Rare Earth Exchanges chronicles, China’s national industrial policy involves the leveraging of the rare earth element supply chain processing and magnet production, ultimately via research and development, industrial growth, and downstream.

Forward Catalysts:

• March 25: China export-controls industry briefing
• Late March/April: S. President Donald Trump and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent are planning to meet with Chinese officials in China around late March to early April 2026, with specific reports indicating a visit from March 31 to April 2, 2026, to address trade issues, including a $1 trillion trade surplus

REEx Structural Momentum Score™

Composite Score: 5 / 10 — Transitional

This measures structural trajectory, not price momentum.

Factor	Weight	This Week	Trend
Ex-China Supply Chain Security	20%	3	→
Financing Momentum	20%	5	↑
Processing Capacity Growth	20%	2	→
China Strategic Pressure	20%	6	↑
End-Market Demand Strength	20%	7	↑
Composite Score		4.6	→

Each category is scored on a 1–10 scale (10 = strongest/most positive condition for ex-China resilience; 1 = weakest).

0-3	Structural deterioration
4-6	Transitional
7-8	Supply chain build phase
9-10	Accelerated expansion

No four-week change ≥0.3; composite remains stable. While the Trump administration has clearly accelerated rare earth element and critical mineral supply chain industrial policy our current score means there has not been a meaningful shift in the overall system over the past month. If we look more long term this score will improve.

Structural Developments This Week

A. Policy & Geopolitics

1. U.S. Price Floor Architecture Validated

NdPr oxide prices (~$123/kg) now sit above the $110/kg floor embedded in the U.S. defense-linked contract with MP Materials.

Implications:

• Taxpayer price support is currently inactive.
• Revenue certainty for non-China producers strengthened.
• Policy-backed floor mechanisms are demonstrating bankability.

However, the reference index remains China ex-works NdPr (via Asian Metal and Shanghai Metal Market).

Structural Takeaway:

Without ex-China pricing benchmarks, Western producers remain economically tethered to Beijing’s pricing architecture. While a handful of companies are now touting that they are listing “pricing”. Most ex-China rare earth “prices” are derivative rather than true discovery-based market prices. A handful of firms now publish assessments based on reported transactions and bilateral contracts, but liquidity outside China remains thin and there is no deep, transparent, exchange-traded global market for NdPr, Dy, or Tb. Because China controls roughly 80–90% of global separation capacity and dominates magnet production, the majority of real transaction volume occurs within China, export flows are shaped by Chinese policy and quotas, and many Western contracts reference Chinese ex-works indices as their baseline. As a result, even prices quoted outside China are typically anchored to Chinese spot activity, cost structures, and export availability. Until meaningful ex-China separation, metallization, magnet production, and physical trading scale emerge, the West remains tethered to China’s pricing gravity—because in rare earths, price follows chemistry, and the chemistry still runs through China. But under Trump 2.0 the U.S. now makes meaningful moves to change this over time.

2. Emergence of Ex-China Pricing Infrastructure

Western commodity intelligence providers such as Benchmark Mineral Intelligence continue expanding ex-China price assessments. Discussions persist regarding rare earth futures exploration by CME Group and Intercontinental Exchange.

Why This Matters:

• Hedging reduces project financing risk.
• Transparent benchmarks lower cost of capital.
• Pricing independence precedes supply independence.

This is a foundational, second-order structural signal.

3. China Strategic Pressure Remains Elevated

As reported by Reuters (opens in a new tab) February 11,  March 25 export-controls industry briefing in Beijing will involve producers including:

• China Rare Earth Group
• China Northern Rare Earth

Focus areas include:

• Licensing procedures
• Customs oversight
• End-use scrutiny
• Administrative tightening

Investors should treat compliance friction asa durable variable in 2026, not a temporary disruption. This ongoingdynamic is part of the geopolitical evolution tethered to the Great Powers Era 2.0.

4. Europe: Industrial Accelerator Act

The European Commission is scheduled to publish draft “made in Europe” rules on February 26 (opens in a new tab).

Although not written explicitly as rare earth legislation, downstream implications are material:

• EV procurement localization
• Wind turbine manufacturing thresholds
• Strategic component sourcing

Magnet demand geography may increasingly align with European-accessible supply chains.

B. Project Financing & Supply Expansion

1. Arafura Rare Earths – Financing Momentum

Arafura Rare Earths reported: (opens in a new tab)

• A$571.3M cash (Dec 31, 2025)
• A$554.8M equity raised over half-year
• binding offtake coverage –a policy targeting approximately 80%

Export restrictions were cited as improving negotiating leverage for remaining volumes.

Debt structure supported by:

• Export Finance Australia
• Northern Australia Infrastructure Facility
• Export Development Canada
• Export-Import Bank of Korea
• EulerHermes guarantees (Allianz Trade)

Signal:

Layered public balance sheets continue to de-risk late-stage ex-China supply projects.

2. USA Rare Earth – Mine-to-Magnet Template

A U.S. Commerce/NIST Letter of Intent proposes:

• $277M direct funding
• $1.3B senior secured loan support
• $1.5B PIPE financing

Projects include:

• 10,000 tpa NdFeB magnet capacity (Oklahoma)
• Round Top commercial production target: 2028

Structural Takeaway:

Washington is underwriting vertically integrated magnet capacity—not just raw material extraction. MP Materials remains the number one onshore rare earth mine-to-magnet ecosystem to monitor.

3. Mkango – Capital Market Broadening

Mkango Resources submitted a confidential SEC F-4 registration statement (opens in a new tab) in connection with a proposed business combination and intended Nasdaq listing.

Assets include:

• Songwe Hill (Malawi)
• Pulawy separation plant (Poland)

Signal:

Midstream capital access remains difficult but is incrementally broadening.

C. Processing & Technology Progress

1. Iluka – Refinery Execution Reality

Iluka Resourcesreports:

• Eneabba refinery commissioning targeted for 2027
• 95% engineering completion
• Target capacity:
  • 5.5k tpa NdPr oxide
  • 750 tpa Dy/Tb oxide

Other key midstream players Rare Earth Exchanges monitors ex-China include ReElement Technologies (just secured $2 million from the Department of War—see below), Phoenix Tailing (recycling and refining just raised $40.2 million (opens in a new tab)), Energy Fuels, Saskatchewan Research Council in Canada, as well as Carester and Solvay in Europe.

Another recycling-to-refinery-to-magnet is Evolution Metals & Technologies (EM&T). An impressive group led by commodity bankers on a mission to accelerate the USA's rare earth supply chain resilience. 

Conclusion:

Meaningful separated oxide capacity outside China is coming, but largely post-2026. In 2027, we will start to see the production thanks to an aggressive U.S. policy under Trump administration 2.0, with 2028 a key year.

Overall processing Capacity Growth score remains low (2) due to time-phased commissioning.

2. U.S. DefenseSignal: ReElement

The U.S. Department of Defense awarded $2M to ReElement Technologies Corporation under an industrial base support framework.

Signal: Separation capability is being treated as strategic infrastructure, not purely commercial capacity. Rare Earth Exchanges plans a trip to ReElement in March.

3. DOE Rare Earth Demonstration Facility

The U.S. Department of Energy continues advancing a Rare Earth Elements Demonstration Facility pipeline (NOFO up to $134M).

This expands optionality in:

• Mine waste streams
• E-waste recovery* Non-traditional feedstocks

Forward Watchlist

• Feb 26: EU Industrial Accelerator Act draft
• March 25: China export-control briefing
• Emergence of ex-China NdPr pricing index
• Iluka equipment delivery milestones (H1 2026)
• Lynas Malaysian license horizon into March 2026
• Conversion of U.S. LOIs into definitive agreements
• January 1, 2027: U.S. military magnet sourcing deadline
• **DTEC MMT-**--startup secures Malaysian feedstock and is moving swiftly to source alternative value chains

Long-Term Thesis Tracker

Does this week change the 2030 ex-China supply outlook?

Incremental progress only.

Key realities:

• Separated oxide capacity inflects 2027+ (likely 2028 and beyond)
• Magnet manufacturing remains constrained outside China despite imminent Jan 2027 DFAR
• Policy architecture is improving, but not yet sufficient.
• Pricing sovereignty remains unresolved

The decisive variable remains:

Can Western pricing, financing, and hedging infrastructure mature before the next export-control shock forces reactive spending?