Highlights

• China controls over 90% of global rare earth permanent magnet market, posing a national security risk.
• Alternative magnet technologies like iron nitride are promising but not yet commercially viable at industrial scale.
• The US needs aggressive reinvestment in rare earth mining, refining, and manufacturing to ensure technological and strategic independence.

In a well-meaning but overly optimistic opinion piece published in The Hill (opens in a new tab) on May 30, 2025, Reps. Betty McCollum (D-Minn.) and Brad Finstad (R-Minn.) argue that the United States can reduce its strategic dependence on Chinese rare earth permanent magnets by investing in alternative technologies, such as iron nitride and manganese-bismuth compounds. While this bipartisan call for urgency is welcome, Rare Earth Exchanges (REEx) cautions against the misleading implication that these emerging technologies offer a near-term substitute for the dominance of neodymium-iron-boron (NdFeB) rare-earth magnets. The technologies promoted — particularly Niron Magnetics’ iron nitride — are promising but remain at lab-to-pilot scale with no current ability to supply even 0.5% of U.S. industrial demand for electric vehicles, wind turbines, and advanced military systems.

The lawmakers correctly identify a critical threat: China controls over 90% of the global rare earth permanent magnet market, and its recent export restrictions on rare earth elements (REEs) and processed magnet alloys represent a national security risk. However, their emphasis on alternative magnet chemistries glosses over severe commercial, performance, and scale-up challenges. Iron nitride, while boasting high theoretical magnetization, is brittle, difficult to mass-produce, and not yet viable for high-heat or corrosion-sensitive environments — a critical requirement for defense platforms and automotive applications. Manganese-bismuth nanomagnets and other alternatives suffer from lower energy product ratings and lack global supply chains, making them a supplementary solution at best. No nation has yet achieved meaningful magnet independence without rare earths.

What’s missing from the McCollum–Finstad argument is an honest assessment of timelines, industrial readiness levels (IRLs), and the financial gap between pilot success and full commercial magnet production. The CHIPS Act analogy is inapt: semiconductors have 50 years of scalable infrastructure, while the U.S. hasn’t had a rare earth magnet factory in full operation since the early 2000s. Recycling is also mentioned only in passing, yet even there, despite strong potential, REE recovery rates remain low due to magnet miniaturization and lack of standardized collection.

REEx Take

Non-rare earth alternatives may complement the supply chain in the next decade. Still, for the foreseeable future, U.S. security demands aggressive reinvestment in mining, refining, and manufacturing of rare earths — especially NdPr — on American soil and through allied partnerships. Anything less is wishful thinking disguised as industrial strategy.