Highlights

• China's new export controls on rare earth magnets and alloys are compared to the 1973 oil embargo, though the analogy oversimplifies a complex supply chain dependency that won't cause overnight economic collapse.
• While China controls 80% of rare earth processing, the crisis narrative overlooks significant U.S. rebuilding efforts, including Department of Defense investments, Department of Energy-funded magnet programs, and new refining projects across North America.
• The real opportunity lies in midstream capabilities—separation, magnet alloys, and recycling—where strategic positioning and innovation will determine market winners in the race to industrial resilience.

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A recent analysis portrays China’s new rare earth export restrictions as the modern equivalent of the 1973 oil embargo, casting the U.S. as dangerously dependent on Beijing for critical minerals. While the analogy is compelling, the situation is more complex: rare earths aren’t consumed like oil, can be recycled, and disruptions would cause strain but not catastrophe. The report accurately captures the scope of China’s controls and the decades-long Western reliance that created this vulnerability, yet it overlooks the growing momentum of U.S. and allied efforts to rebuild refining, magnet, and recycling capacity. The real story isn’t an unfolding energy crisis—it’s a high-stakes race to industrial resilience.

David Blackmon’s Forbes feature, “_America Confronts Its Next Great Energy Crisis: Rare Earth Minerals (opens in a new tab)_,” frames China’s October 9 export restrictions as the twenty-first century’s version of the 1973 oil embargo. His comparison is vivid: rare earths as the new crude oil, Beijing as OPEC, and Washington as the startled importer. Yet while the analogy draws readers in, the reality is more layered and less apocalyptic.

Where the Reporting Rings True

Blackmon correctly underscores the strategic scope of China’s latest export curbs. The new rules—phased in from November 8 to December 1—extend to rare-earth-derived magnets, chips, and alloys, directly impacting defense and EV manufacturing. He accurately notes that China controls roughly two-thirds of global rare earth mining and more than 80 percent of processing, per USGS and IEA data.

He also rightly reminds readers that the current vulnerability is decades in the making. Western governments outsourced heavy industry for environmental convenience, and only now are rediscovering its national-security costs.

Where the Rhetoric Runs Hot

Calling the current standoff “America’s next great energy crisis” edges toward hyperbole. The analogy to the Arab oil embargo oversimplifies a far more complex, technology-based dependency. Rare earths are not consumed like oil; they are embedded in durable goods and can be recycled. Supply disruption would sting—but it wouldn’t halt economies overnight.

The article also glosses over recent U.S. industrial policy gains—DoD equity in MP Materials, DOE-funded magnet programs, and new projects in Texas, Alaska, and Wyoming. Omission of these counterpoints leaves the impression that Washington is asleep at the switch when, in fact, the rebuild is already underway.

The Hidden Narrative: Fear Sells

Blackmon’s piece leans into the crisis narrative that drives clicks and policy urgency but risks reinforcing fatalism. By presenting China’s control as total and U.S. options as limited, it ignores the innovation wave in recycling, substitution, and domestic refining now accelerating across North America and Europe.

For investors, the useful takeaway is not panic but positioning: the midstream—separation, magnet alloys, and recycling—remains the highest-leverage point in the supply chain. Those who understand that scale and innovation (and Rare Earth Exchanges suggests a more carefully thought-through industrial policy), not panic, will determine winners.

Citation: David Blackmon, “America Confronts Its Next Great Energy Crisis: Rare Earth Minerals,” Forbes, Oct 15 2025.

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