Highlights

• China-EU trade has grown exponentially from $2.4 billion in 1975 to $785.8 billion in 2024, highlighting deep economic interdependence.
• The EU pursues 'de-risking' rather than total decoupling, balancing economic needs with strategic geopolitical considerations.
• Critical mineral and supply chain diversification remain key strategic priorities for the EU, despite ongoing economic engagement with China.

China Daily’s framing of EU–China economic ties (opens in a new tab) — from $2.4 billion in 1975 to $785.8 billion in 2024 — is consistent with EU Commission and Chinese customs statistics. The identification of mutual dependencies also rings true: Europe does source significant quantities of batteries, rare earths, and intermediate goods from China, while China imports high-end machinery, green technology, and luxury goods from the EU. The observation that the EU is pursuing “de-risking” rather than wholesale decoupling is supported by Brussels’ official communications since 2023.

The Soft Power Spin

While much of the piece reads as sober analysis, investors should note it is published by a Chinese state-owned outlet. The narrative subtly recasts EU alignment with the U.S. as a loss of “autonomy,” without acknowledging why Brussels may see supply chain diversification as a strategic necessity after pandemic disruptions and geopolitical shocks. The description of EU actions as “geopolitically driven attempts to marginalize China” omits legitimate European concerns over market distortions, industrial overcapacity, and security of supply in critical minerals.

Speculation and Framing Gaps

The article’s assertion that EU policy is “increasingly torn” between economic need and strategic caution is broadly accurate, but it downplays the degree to which member state positions are also shaped by domestic politics and industrial lobbying. It correctly highlights internal divisions over EV tariffs, but treats Beijing’s pivot to bilateral member-state engagement as purely pragmatic — ignoring that this is also a long-standing Chinese strategy to dilute EU-wide consensus on contentious trade measures.

Rare Earth Angle

The mention of rare earths as part of Europe’s dependency is factual; the EU still imports most rare earth oxides and magnets from China. Missing from the analysis is the EU’s ongoing effort to localize refining and processing, expand recycling, and partner with Australia, Canada,  America, and African states — all directly relevant to any discussion of supply chain “re-balancing.”

Investor Takeaway

For rare earth and critical mineral investors, the key is to separate trade statistics from political positioning. The EU is unlikely to fully “de-risk” away from China in the near term, but supply chain diversification — including rare earths — will proceed. China Daily’s account captures the trade growth and mutual benefit narrative, but its omissions on EU strategic rationale and allied supply chain development make it an incomplete map for investment decisions. Treat it as one stakeholder’s perspective, not the whole terrain.