Highlights
- China has banned exports of rare earth refining, alloying, and magnet-making equipment, effectively cutting off Western access to critical processing technologies.
- The move represents a strategic control over industrial capability, not just raw materials, highlighting the geopolitical significance of technological infrastructure.
- Lifton argues that without rebuilding domestic process engineering capabilities, Western critical mineral policies remain fundamentally weak and vulnerable.
Jack Lifton’s InvestorIntel column “China’s Latest Rare Earth Gambit: A Cold War on Technology” sounds the alarm on Beijing’s newest export control—this time, not on rare earths themselves, but on the machines that process them. Writing in Tracy Hughes InvestorNews (opens in a new tab), the expert points out in plain terms, China just banned the export of refining, alloying, and magnet-making equipment, effectively cutting off the West’s access to the tools that transform rare earth oxides into usable products.
The article’s core claim—that China’s restriction extends to metallization and magnet fabrication machinery—is grounded in verifiable policy. Beijing has indeed moved to restrict exports of rare earth–related processing technology. The argument that this represents a more consequential move than any past embargo is well-founded. By halting the flow of “process know-how,” China is asserting control not just over resources, but over industrial capability itself.
Truth in the Details, Drama in the Tone
Lifton, a veteran rare-earths analyst, brings firsthand credibility—he has toured facilities like Less Common Metals in the U.K. and understands the hardware bottleneck intimately. His recounting of Western dependence on Chinese-built spin casters and solvent extraction systems is accurate, and his historical references to U.S. and Japanese metallurgical decline ring true.
InvestorNews’ Hughes, whom supported REEx during its early launch phase, continues to provide valuable coverage of this sector.
A question REEx does raise, however, is whether the article leans toward alarmist rhetoric. Phrases such as “technology war,” “we import the means to make them,” and “China holds the cards” frame the issue in Cold War terms, risking the loss of industrial nuance. Lifton is right that this conflict can be seen through a geopolitical lens—but it’s equally true that the West must now embrace critical mineral/rare earth element industrial policy as a matter of survival. The notion that “free markets will sort it out” belongs to the sphere of textbooks. China’s export policy, while strategic and assertive, also reflects legitimate goals: protecting proprietary technology and achieving domestic self-sufficiency—objectives hardly unique to Beijing. And the sooner we all internalize that, the better we can plot a superior course in America and beyond.
Bias Between the Lines
The piece reflects a distinctly industrial nationalist bias: a conviction that Western independence from China is both imperative and achievable through government-led reindustrialization, and REEx notes that this perspective aligns with an emerging consensus favoring strategic reindustrialization.
The piece criticizes Wall Street for “misreading the market,” portraying investors as naive profiteers blind to structural weakness. That’s an arguable but interpretive stance.
More notably, Lifton’s framing assumes near-total Western incapacity—overlooking efforts by firms such as Energy Fuels, Lynas, and Noveon to localize refining and magnet fabrication with non-Chinese equipment.
His “China holds the manuals” metaphor underscores the drama but may oversimplify a more complex ecosystem in which Western and Japanese firms retain niche expertise in high-purity metallurgy. And while still in the early days, the “ex-China” market gains momentum. In fact, this is one reason why China made such a move the other day.
The Big Picture: A Machinery Gap, Not a Material One
Where Lifton shines is in diagnosing the real weak point: equipment design. He argues that without reestablishing domestic process engineering—spin casters, furnaces, solvent-extraction lines—the West’s critical mineral policies are hollow. That’s a legitimate warning. The call for a “DARPA for metallurgical engineering” is compelling, pragmatic, and timely.
Lifton’s expertise offers essential insight for anyone seeking to grasp the dimensions of the current crisis truly.
In essence, the story isn’t just about rare earths—it’s about industrial memory loss. The machines that shape modern technology are becoming geopolitical weapons, and rebuilding that capability will take more than tariffs or rhetoric. Visit Tracy Hughes’ InvestorNews (opens in a new tab).
Citation: Jack Lifton, “China’s Latest Rare Earth Gambit: A Cold War on Technology,” InvestorIntel, October 9, 2025.
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Through all this media hyperbole, the RE retail investor must watch for ROW RE prime movers coming through at all value chain stages (including recycling). The strongest wannabees (i.e., likely most lasting in stock market terms of investors) will have both major strategic and private financing, management with relevant knowledge/skill/contacts, no major workforce issues, offtakes for 5 plus years signed and a clear connectivity for their own supply needs.
Regardless of the issues theorized/debated above (all relevant and interesting topics) these will not stop a few handful of RE value chain wannbees emerging in the next 3 year alone and likely will (some have already) reward early investors using ongoing selective DD research including the REEx.
GLTA – REI