Highlights

• China maintains decisive control over the global rare earth supply chain through processing and refining dominance.
• China selectively manages exports to the U.S. while keeping global flows relatively high, particularly for permanent magnets to Europe and Asia.
• Silverado Policy Accelerator analysis shows that U.S.-bound exports of critical rare earths like yttrium, dysprosium, and terbium remain well below historical norms despite temporary diplomatic easing.
• The analysis reveals China's ability to fine-tune supply by destination.
• The study confirms that rare earth security is fundamentally a midstream processing problem—not a mining issue.
• Western nations remain exposed to policy risk until they build credible, non-Chinese separation, refining, and magnet manufacturing capacity at scale.

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A new analysis (opens in a new tab) from the Silverado Policy Accelerator (opens in a new tab), drawing on global trade data through December 2025, underscores a persistent and strategically important reality: China continues to exercise decisive control over the global rare earth supply chain—not by cutting off all exports, but by selectively managing processing and downstream products.

The Silverado dashboard shows that while China’s global exports of rare earth compounds and permanent magnets remain relatively high, shipments of export-controlled rare earth elements to the United States remain well below historical norms, particularly for yttrium, dysprosium, and terbium.

Limited rebounds in late 2025—most notably for lutetium oxide, used in medical devices—do little to alter the broader picture: China’s near-monopoly over commercial-scale rare earth separation and refining capacity gives it the ability to fine-tune supply, destination, and leverage.

Study Overview and Methods

The Silverado Policy Accelerator’s study aggregates monthly trade data from the Global Trade Tracker database, focusing on rare-earth compounds, metals, and rare-earth permanent magnets. Importantly, the authors separate products by tariff lines that are fully covered, partially covered, or not covered by China’s April 2025 export control regime. This distinction allows a clearer view of how policy, rather than geology or demand alone, shapes trade flows. The dashboard tracks exports by product type (oxides, metals, magnets) and by destination, including the United States, the European Union, and Asian markets.

Key Findings: A Managed Flow, Not a Ban

The data reveal several patterns that matter for policymakers, manufacturers, and investors alike:

• U.S.-bound exports remain constrained. Even after a temporary diplomatic easing in late 2025, China’s exports of export-controlled rare earth compounds and metals to the United States stayed at the low end of historical levels. Yttrium—once a major export to the U.S.—was nearly absent for much of the year.
• Selective rebounds mask structural control. Exports of lutetium oxide resumed in November and December after a months-long pause, largely because the U.S. is China’s largest customer for this niche medical input. However, dysprosium and terbium oxides—critical for high-performance magnets—remained limited.
• Magnets still flow globally, but not evenly. China’s global exports of rare earth permanent magnets stayed relatively high, with Europe remaining the largest destination. Exports to the United States continued, but again at the low end of historical ranges.
• Asia benefits disproportionately. Across multiple products, Asia absorbed the bulk of China’s export-controlled rare earth shipments, reflecting both regional supply chains and Beijing’s ability to prioritize destinations.

What This Says About the “Monopoly” Question

For lay readers, it is tempting to think of monopoly power as an on-off switch: exports either flow or they do not. The Silverado study shows something subtler—and more powerful. China does not need to halt exports to exert leverage. By controlling the processing and separation stage, it can decide which products move, where they go, and under what licensing conditions. Mining outside China does not automatically solve this problem, because most rare earth ores still must pass through Chinese or China-derived processing know-how to become usable materials.

Implications for the United States and Allies

The findings reinforce a hard lesson: rare earth security is a midstream problem. Western governments have invested heavily in mining projects, but far less in separation, refining, and magnet manufacturing. As long as China dominates these steps, export controls can be calibrated to apply pressure without triggering global shortages that would hurt China’s own industries. For defense, clean energy, and medical technology sectors, this means ongoing exposure to policy risk—even when global supply volumes appear “normal.”

Limitations and Points of Debate

The authors are careful to note several limitations. Trade data capture declared exports, not informal stockpiling, rerouting through third countries, or downstream substitution. Some rare earths classified outside China’s rare earth tariff schedule are excluded, potentially understating total flows. In addition, short-term diplomatic pauses—such as the late-2025 suspension of certain restrictions—can temporarily distort trends without changing the underlying structure.

A more controversial question is how intentional this strategy is. Critics argue that some fluctuations reflect administrative bottlenecks rather than deliberate coercion. Others counter that administrative discretion is itself the policy tool because it enables calibrated pressure without the escalation risks of formal embargoes, allowing China to signal restraint or pressure without formal escalation.

Conclusion

The Silverado dashboard makes one point unmistakably clear: China’s dominance of rare earth processing, not mining, remains the central vulnerability in the global supply chain. Exports continue, but on China’s terms—selective, destination-specific, and reversible. For the United States and its partners, the implication is stark. Supply security will not come from new mines alone, but from building credible, non-Chinese processing and magnet capacity at scale. Until that happens, the rare earth “monopoly” will persist—not as a blockade, but as a finely tuned instrument of industrial statecraft.

About the Authors

Silverado Policy Accelerator is a bipartisan, non-profit geopolitical think tank focused on turning innovative ideas into actionable policy solutions for major U.S. strategic challenges, particularly in 

National Security, Trade & Industrial Security, Energy & Resource Security (RENSec), and Cybersecurity & AI. They use a unique "venture-style" approach, combining traditional research with a startup-like model (Cultivating, Incubating, Accelerating) to foster tangible outcomes and strengthen American global leadership and competitiveness. 

Citation: Silverado Policy Accelerator. China’s Global Exports of Rare Earth Elements and Rare Earth Permanent Magnets (through December 2025). January 23, 2026.