Highlights

• China controls over 90% of global rare earth processing and has recently imposed export restrictions on critical minerals.
• The House Select Committee on the CCP raises concerns about potential intellectual property theft through export licensing practices.
• The Minerals Security Partnership aims to reduce supply chain dependence on China through multilateral projects in over 30 countries.

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In a July 24 press release, Ranking Member Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL) of the House Select Committee on the CCP (opens in a new tab) escalated concerns over China’s dominance in critical mineral supply chains, accusing Beijing of weaponizing rare earth exports to extract U.S. intellectual property and economically coerce democracies. Citing April’s PRC export restrictions on samarium, terbium, gadolinium, and dysprosium, Krishnamoorthi sent letters to Commerce Under Secretary Jeffery Kessler and Secretary of State Marco Rubio urging tighter export controls and renewed U.S. leadership in the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP).

What Checks Out: The 90% Problem

Krishnamoorthi’s underlying concern is fact-based: China controls over 90% of global rare earth processing, and its April 2025 export restrictions rattled magnet and defense sectors globally. The PRC’s licensing practices often require end-use disclosures—some involving schematics or product specifications—raising valid fears of forced tech transfer.

The MSP’s multilateral strategy is also real: more than 30 projects have been launched since 2022, from Australia to Tanzania, with the aim of reducing supply chain dependence on China. These initiatives have enjoyed bipartisan support and are foundational to long-term de-risking.

Where the Lines Blur: Drama or Diplomacy?

The press release trades in loaded language—“held captive,” “steal U.S. secrets,” “playbook of tactics”—without detailing specific cases of IP theft linked to rare earth export licensing. While PRC industrial espionage is well-documented, equating licensing processes with outright theft demands more evidence.

Also absent was any discussion of domestic permitting bottlenecks or the slow rollout of U.S.-based rare earth projects. Calls for “urgency” ring hollow without matching reform on home soil.

Bottom Line: Accurate Alarm, Political Pitch

Krishnamoorthi’s warnings are grounded in geopolitical reality, but the framing leans hard on committee-stage theatrics over concrete legislative remedies. For investors, the takeaway is clear: China’s grip on rare earths is a known strategic risk, but real solutions require more than press releases—they necessitate domestic mining reform, harmonized trade policies, and sustained capital deployment.