Highlights
- Non-Chinese rare earth contracts rely on long-term, bespoke agreements linking miners, refiners, and end-users in a market dominated by Chinese pricing benchmarks.
- Contracts include sophisticated risk mitigation strategies like:
- Force majeure clauses
- Pricing formulas tied to Chinese market indices
- Provisions for geopolitical uncertainties
- Western governments and industries are actively developing independent pricing mechanisms to reduce dependence on Chinese market dynamics and secure critical rare earth supply chains.
Rare earth element (REE) supply chains outside of China rely on carefully structured contracts to move material from mines to refiners and end-users. Because China dominates ~90% of rare earth production and processing, non-Chinese producers must navigate unique contractual arrangements. These typically include long-term offtake agreements at the mining stage and supply contracts for refined oxides/metals, all often indexed to Chinese market prices due to the lack of a transparent ex-China market, as Rare Earth Exchanges has reported. Below we detail the types of contracts involved at each stage (from mine to refiner to OEM), their key terms (volume commitments, pricing formulas, etc.), how light vs. heavy REEs are handled, and critical legal/trade clauses (force majeure, expropriation, geopolitical factors) that shape these agreements.
Supply Chain Stages and Contract Types
Non-Chinese REE projects typically engage in several contract types along the value chain:
| Contract Type | Summary |
| Mining Offtake Agreements | Between the mine operator and a buyer (often a processor, trading company, or strategic end-user) to purchase raw or semi-processed output (e.g. mineral concentrate or mixed RE carbonate). These contracts secure a market for the mine’s product, often facilitating project financing. |
| Tolling/Processing Agreements | In some cases, a miner without refining capacity may contract a processor (sometimes abroad) to refine the concentrate for a fee, although this is less common outside China due to limited independent processing facilities. |
| Refined Product Supply Contracts | For producers that do perform refining (e.g. separating rare earth oxides), long-term supply agreements are made with end-users such as magnet manufacturers, component OEMs, or trading agents. These ensure buyers for specific rare earth oxides/metals (NdPr oxide, Dy/Tb oxide, etc.) at agreed volumes and pricing terms. |
| Strategic Partnership or Financing Agreements | Often, offtake deals are tied with financing or equity—e.g. a purchaser provides upfront loans or invests in the mining project in exchange for guaranteed supply. This was seen with Japan’s backing of Lynas and is common to help new projects overcome high capital costs. |
Each stage’s contracts share a need for price references (in lieu of a formal exchange market) and clauses managing the significant geopolitical and market risks inherent to rare earths.
Mining Offtake Agreements (Mine to Refinery/Trader)
Mining offtake agreements are fundamental in REE projects outside China. They are typically long-term contracts (often 5–10+ years) in which the buyer commits to purchase a substantial portion (often 50–100%) of the mine’s production. For example, Peak Rare Earths’ Ngualla project in Tanzania signed a 7-year offtake with Shenghe Resources for 100% of its rare earth concentrate, with an obligation to also take at least 50% of any future mixed carbonate or separated oxides as cited in a financial disclosure (opens in a new tab). Such deals often include “take-or-pay” provisions, meaning the buyer must pay for the agreed volume whether or not they physically take delivery, giving the miner revenue certainty (opens in a new tab).
Key terms in offtake agreements typically include:
| Key Terms | Summary |
| Product and Volume | Precisely which products are covered (e.g. beneficiated concentrate vs. refined oxide) and the annual tonnages. Many deals cover all or a majority of output. In the Lynas–JARE agreement, the Japanese consortium secured ~8,500 tonnes/year of rare earth products (about 30% of Japan’s needs) for 10 years. |
| Pricing Formula | Rather than a fixed price, offtakes use a formula tied to market indices. Critically, almost all ex-China offtakes reference Chinese market prices, since no liquid independent market exists. Contracts often peg the price to a benchmark like Asian Metal’s published oxide prices, usually averaged over a recent period. For instance, Peak’s deal uses a “market-based pricing formula” based on the contained rare earth oxide value as quoted by AsianMetal, minus deductions for Chinese VAT, refining charges, and a margin. In practice, this means the buyer pays a percentage of the equivalent oxide value contained in the concentrate. The MP Materials–Shenghe offtake similarly defined Market Price for separated products as the Asian Metal price (spot or averaged) for that oxide, and for concentrate as a discounted percentage of that underlying oxide basket value. These discounts (or “net payables”) reflect processing costs and the buyer’s profit – for example, a concentrate might realize only ~50–60% of the gross metal value after deducting refining recovery losses, fees, and margins. |
| Payment Terms | To balance cash flow, many offtakes use provisional payments. A common structure is a Letter of Credit or advance payment for a high percentage (e.g. 80–90%) of the estimated shipment value upon loading, with final payment on confirmation of assays at destination. This ensures miners get paid promptly and reduces their credit risk. |
| Delivery Terms | Often CIF (freight and insurance) or FOB (loading on vessel) to a specific port. Peak’s offtake sells concentrate CIF into designated Chinese ports (reflecting that the concentrate will be refined in China). Delivery terms allocate costs and risk; CIF means the seller covers freight and insurance up to the port of discharge. |
| Duration & Renewal | Initial terms can range 2–7 years for smaller projects, up to 10+ years for strategic deals. Renewal options by mutual agreement are common. |
| Conditions Precedent | Offtake contracts for development-stage projects usually hinge on certain conditions. These may include financing completion, permits, or partner approvals. For example, Peak’s Shenghe contract required shareholder and Tanzanian Mining Commission approval, and would terminate if the project failed to reach final investment decision (FEED and financial close) in a set timewcsecure.weblink.com.au (opens in a new tab)wcsecure.weblink.com.au (opens in a new tab). Such clauses protect both parties against a project not coming to fruition or legal impediments |
| Prepayment/Finance | It’s common for offtakers to provide upfront capital. In Lynas’s case, Japan (through JOGMEC/Sojitz) extended a $250 million loan & equity package that enabled Lynas’s mine and plant construction, in exchange for the long-term supply to Japanese industries. Similarly, MP Materials received prepayment financing from Shenghe as part of its offtake (reflected as a “Prepaid Balance” in their contract). This intertwines offtake and financing agreements, aligning the buyer’s interest in the project’s success |
Examples
Australia’s Lynas Rare Earths initially signed an offtake/alliance with Japan (JARE/Sojitz) to secure supply for Japan’s market. MP Materials (USA) had an exclusive offtake with China’s Shenghe (2017–2023) to sell all its Mountain Pass concentrate to Shenghe’s separation facilities. That contract set prices via a formula tied to China’s market, with Shenghe receiving a discount on the oxide value. Another example in heavy rare earths: Northern Minerals (opens in a new tab) in Australia, which produces dysprosium/terbium-rich carbonate, signed a100% offtake with Germany’s Thyssenkrupp in 2019 after terminating a prior Chinese offtake.
This deal allowed Northern to supply either carbonate or (later) separated oxides, and notably had no price cap, giving full exposure to market upside (Dy/Tb prices). The flexibility to shift to separate products and collaborate on downstream processing reflects a strategic partnership approach in some offtakes.
Supply Agreements for Refined Rare Earth Products (Refiner to End-User)
Once rare earths are separated into high-purity oxides or metals, producers enter into supply contracts with end-users (magnet makers, alloy producers, or even OEMs). These contracts share similarities with mining offtakes (e.g., price indexing to the Chinese market) but are for finished products and often directly with industrial consumers seeking a secure supply.
Key features of refined supply contracts:
| Key Terms | Summary |
| Volume and Term | End-user contracts may cover a portion of the producer’s output, often on a multi-year basis (e.g. 3–5 year terms with options to extend). They can be smaller volumes tailored to the customer’s needs. For instance, Arafura Rare Earths (developing the Nolans project in Australia) has secured binding offtakes for NdPr oxide with several customers: e.g. Siemens Gamesa (opens in a new tab) (wind turbine manufacturer) for 5 years/520 tpa, and Hyundai (opens in a new tab) & Kia (opens in a new tab) (EV automakers) for a combined 1,500 tpa. In March 2025 Arafura also signed a 5-year deal with trader Traxys (opens in a new tab) for 100–300 tpa, aiming to reach ~80% of its 4,400 tpa capacity under long-term contract. These volumes demonstrate how contracts are structured to lock in the majority of future production with credible buyers before the mine/refinery even comes online – a requirement for project financing |
| Pricing | Like upstream offtakes, refined product agreements benchmark against Chinese prices. The Arafura-Traxys NdPr contract, for example, is explicitly “priced in terms of NdPr ex-works China prices,” meaning the reference is the prevailing China domestic price for NdPr oxide. Similarly, other consumers use prices from price reporting agencies* (e.g. Argus or Fastmarkets FOB China assessments) as the basis. The contract might specify an average price over the prior quarter or month for NdPr oxide FOB China, adjusted for delivery terms. Because these contracts are often confidential, exact formulas aren’t public, but industry sources note “everyone references the Chinese price in one form or another” for oxides. This holds true for both light REEs like neodymium/praseodymium and heavy REEs like dysprosium – both sets are tied to Chinese benchmarks due to the market’s center of gravity in China |
| Floor/Ceiling Clauses | Some refined supply contracts include price floors (to ensure the producer’s viability if prices crash) or ceilings (to give the buyer some price certainty). For example, the U.S. Department of Defense in 2025 took the extraordinary step of signing a 10-year contract with MP Materials that guarantees a price floor of $110/kg for NdPr oxide. This was nearly double the Chinese market price (~$60) at the time, effectively insulating MP from China-driven price dips and ensuring stable domestic supply for defense needs. Conversely, Northern Minerals’ contract with Thyssenkrupp intentionally had no ceiling, allowing both parties to benefit if heavy rare earth prices rose. |
| Index Adjustment and Premiums | Typically, contracts use an index minus/plus a slight adjustment. In recent developments, some Western buyers have shown willingness to pay a premium above the Chinese index for non-Chinese material as supply chain security is taken more seriously. A July 2025 report noted some automakers prepared to pay around $80/kg for NdPr oxide – roughly a 30% premium over the ~$62/kg Chinese price at that time. This reflects increasing value placed on supply security and could influence new contract terms (e.g. index + premium or fixed surcharges for certified non-Chinese origin). Indeed, one rare earth executive observed via Reuters that auto procurement departments, traditionally focused on cost-cutting, realized “they’re losing more by having to close a plant for a month than paying a premium to guarantee supplies”. Thus, we may see future contracts where non-Chinese producers command higher-than-China prices, especially if buyers require assurances of origin or compliance with sustainability/security criteria. |
| Example – Lynas | Lynas, the largest ex-China producer, sells a range of separated oxides (La, Ce, NdPr, etc.) primarily to customers in Japan, Europe, and the U.S. Lynas’s contracts are not fully public, but we know Lynas’s realized prices closely track Chinese market trends. In mid-2025, Lynas reported an average selling price of only A$60.2/kg (≈US$40/kg) for its mixed RE oxide product – a low figure because it’s weighted toward low-value cerium/lanthanum and because Chinese-indexed pricing has depressed values. Lynas’s long-term relationship with Japanese buyers (facilitated through JARE/Sojitz) suggests some contracts in Japan may include preferential terms, but still ultimately reference Chinese benchmark pricing while ensuring a stable supply for Japan’s tech and automotive industries. |
| Example – MP Materials & OEMs | Beyond its DoD deal, MP Materials has a notable supply agreement with General Motors. (opens in a new tab) In 2021, MP and GM signed a long-term supply deal for rare earth alloy and magnets to be produced at MP’s new U.S. factory, to feed GM’s EV production. This contract is part of GM’s strategy to secure an entire domestic magnet supply chain. While financial terms were undisclosed, it illustrates an OEM directly contracting for value-added rare earth products. GM’s deal required MP to build a Texas magnet plant (with capacity for ~500,000 EVs worth of magnets) and for MP to source REEs from its Mountain Pass mine in California. Such downstream agreements often focus on volumes and delivery of finished magnet assemblies or alloys, with pricing likely tied to cost-plus or formula-based on magnet content (which in turn depends on NdPr, Dy prices, etc.). The trend of automakers and wind turbine makers entering into rare earth supply contracts (or even investing in projects) is growing as part of risk mitigation. Arafura’s offtakes with Siemens and Hyundai/Kia, and reports of European automakers pursuing deals, underscore this shift to direct procurement of critical REEs outside China |
* Rare Earth Exchanges is developing an open platform for the entire supply chain ex-China.
According to REEx Chief Business Officer John Parkinson (opens in a new tab) “as part of the REEx mission to accelerate the ex-China rare earth element supply chain (and later critical minerals), we’ll be working to make all of this data highly transparent. We want an open marketplace minimizing opacity, even a pre-spot market. We anticipate this will be disruptive.” So why in some ways take on such well-established industry players?
Parkinson notes, “Because it’s a new world and our team has a powerful combination of financial, technological, and industry acumen, making us uniquely positioned to be a major value-added disruptor.”
Light vs. Heavy Rare Earth Contracts
Both light rare earth elements (LREE, e.g., neodymium, praseodymium, cerium, lanthanum) and heavy rare earth elements (HREE, e.g., dysprosium, terbium, europium) follow similar contracting principles, but there are a few nuances we explore in the table below.
| Key Terms | Summary |
| LREE (e.g. NdPr) Contracts | These dominate volumes for magnet production. Mines like Mt Weld (Lynas) or Nolans (Arafura) produce mostly LREE. Contracts for NdPr tend to be larger in volume and involve major magnet/auto industry players. Pricing is indexed to NdPr oxide market (China) as discussed. Given the larger market and more producers (including China’s giant Baotou), prices are somewhat less volatile than HREE, but still subject to Chinese policy swings. Contracts often focus on securing a reliable volume at predictable pricing, as NdPr is the workhorse of the permanent magnet industry. |
| HREE (e.g. Dy/Tb) Contracts | These elements are required in smaller quantities (for high-temperature magnets, phosphors, etc.), but are geologically scarcer. Outside China, very few mines produce significant HREE; one example is Northern Minerals (Browns Range) for Dy/Tb. Contracts for HREE products often involve specialized traders or end-users who need these critical additives. Myanmar rebel groups top the REEx HREE Rankings. The contract structures are broadly similar – long-term offtake or supply agreements indexed to Chinese prices for Dy, Tb oxides – but volumes are much lower (few tonnes per year). The pricing can be extremely high per kg, and thus contracts may be more flexible or shorter-term to adjust to price volatility. Northern’s initial offtake was with a Chinese buyer, but it shifted to Thyssenkrupp, which obtained exclusive marketing rights to the heavy RE carbonate including dysprosium. This suggests the contract allowed Thyssenkrupp to act as an intermediary to distribute Dy/Tb to end users (e.g. European magnet alloy producers). Any heavy REE contract will also reference Chinese benchmarks (e.g. Asian Metal’s dysprosium oxide price), as China is virtually the only source of price discovery (Chinese output and stockpiles largely set the price). Additionally, because heavies are often co-produced with lights, some contracts bundle them or give the offtaker rights to the full spectrum of elements. For instance, Peak’s Shenghe deal aimed for not just NdPr-rich concentrate but also any intermediate or final oxides of all REEs. In summary, LREE vs HREE contracts mostly differ in scale and buyers, not in fundamental structure: both rely on bespoke negotiated terms and Chinese-indexed pricing. Both types include clauses for flexibility – e.g. a miner might reserve the right to divert a small percentage of output to spot sales if prices spike, or an offtaker might only take a minimum of certain byproduct elements that are less in demand. |
Despite some differences, both LREE and HREE supply agreements outside China are constrained by the fact that there is no truly independent “ex-China” price formation yet. This is why initiatives like the nascent REEx platform are being developed – to provide next levels of transparent price benchmarks that could eventually be used in contracts instead of Chinese domestic prices and, for that matter, expensive consulting services. Until such benchmarks gain traction, however, both light and heavy rare earth contracts will remain linked to Chinese market indicators.
Pricing Schemes and Chinese Market Linkage
Opaque Pricing & Chinese Benchmark
Rare earth contracts have historically lacked transparent pricing mechanisms. Unlike common metals, there’s no public exchange (no LME contract for rare earths). Instead, Chinese domestic prices (from platforms like Asian Metal (opens in a new tab) or Shanghai Metals Market (opens in a new tab)) serve as the de facto world price reference, as we have cited. rareearthexchanges.com. These prices are opaque and state-influenced – Chinese authorities can and do intervene to raise or lower rare earth prices to meet strategic goals. For example, in 2022, China curbed surging prices by ordering “guidance to rationality,” causing prices to plummet. Because non-Chinese suppliers use these benchmarks in contracts, such moves directly drag down revenues for ex-China producers. Lynas’s experience of falling sales prices in 2023–24 (amid Chinese oversupply) exemplifies this.
Typical Pricing Clauses
A common contract formula might read: “Price = [Index] ± [adjustments]”. The index is often the monthly average FOB China price for a given oxide (or an FOB export price derived from Chinese domestic quotes minus VAT). Adjustments could be a discount for intermediate products or a small premium for specific qualities or non-Chinese origin. For concentrates, the formula sums the contribution of each contained RE oxide at its market price, multiplied by an agreed recovery factor, minus costs. The Peak–Shenghe offtake formula explicitly ties to AsianMetal oxide prices minus deductions for VAT, fees, and refining recovery losses.
The MP–Shenghe contract similarly pegs to Asian Metal, and if needed, another “widely accepted market index” – reflecting that if Chinese price info became unavailable, they’d mutually agree on an alternate index (we have mentioned some of them, while we intend on disrupting and making it far easier). This also highlights that there’s no established“ex-China” index yet – it must be mutually agreed upon if not Chinese. Some contracts also specify an averaging period (to smooth volatility); others might use the price at shipment month. All of this is privately negotiated.
Risk Mitigation – Floors and Ceilings
As mentioned, floors guarantee a minimum price. The Pentagon–MP deal ($110/kg NdPr floor) is a prominent example where the government acts as a backstop. Ceilings (price caps) are rarer but could appear in contracts with consumers who cannot tolerate runaway input costs – they might agree to share upside benefits or limit the price if, say, NdPr shoots above a certain threshold, possibly in exchange for a higher floor or a longer term. In general, most non-Chinese producers have been price-takers under Chinese benchmarks, which has stifled investment (many new projects are uneconomic at prevailing Chinese prices around $50–60/kg NdPr).
This is why Western governments and industry are pushing for mechanisms to decouple pricing. Efforts include strategic stockpiling (Japan has stockpiled oxides to buffer supply shocks), price support contracts (like DoD’s), and developing independent price discovery. REEx’s emerging index and price platform is one such initiative aiming to facilitate, and in fact accelerate, a transparent market outside China. Until these take hold, however, the reality is that everyone, at least mostly, references the Chinese price in their contracts, and volatility or distortions in China’s market directly translate into non-China contract prices.
It’s worth noting that in 2025, China imposed export permit controls on certain rare earth magnet alloys as a geopolitical move. This caused supply uncertainty and, in the short term, raised the price Western buyers would agree to (as noted, ~30% premiums emerged for non-Chinese NdPr). Such geopolitical events can suddenly alter pricing norms, and contracts may need renegotiation or contain clauses to revisit price terms if the market fundamentally changes (some contracts allow periodic price review if both parties agree).
Legal and Geopolitical Clauses in REE Contracts
Rare earth contracts outside China include robust legal clauses to manage the significant geopolitical and regulatory risks. In the table below, we include some key general terms. Of course, far more goes into these contracts, and competent general counsel should always be involved in these deals.
| Key Terms | Summary |
| Force Majeure | Standard in mining and supply contracts, force majeure clauses excuse non-performance due to extraordinary events beyond a party’s control. In rare earth agreements, force majeure explicitly covers events like government acts, changes in law, war, blockade, natural disasters, or export/import restrictions. For example, MP Materials’ offtake defined Force Majeure to include “acts of Governmental Authorities or any taking or confiscation… of any facilities which directly affect a party’s ability to perform”. Thus, if a government expropriated a mine or banned exports, the seller could invoke force majeure. Similarly, if a country imposes an embargo or quota that prevents the buyer from importing, that may be force majeure for the buyer. These clauses usually require prompt notice and are temporary (suspending obligations for the duration of the event); if the force majeure continues beyond a certain time, either party might have a right to terminate. Given the history of sudden export bans (e.g. China’s rare earth embargo on Japan in 2010) and policy shifts, such clauses are vital. |
| Regulatory Approvals & Compliance | Contracts often include conditions or warranties about compliance with laws. For instance, export licenses – a U.S. seller must ensure it can get an export license (if required) to ship concentrate or oxide to the buyer. MP’s agreement obliged the buyer to assist in obtaining any U.S. export clearances. Deals can be subject to government approvals: e.g., the Peak–Shenghe contract was contingent on Tanzanian government and board approvals. In the U.S., any substantial offtake involving a foreign (especially Chinese) entity might trigger a CFIUS review (Committee on Foreign Investment in the US) for national security. The MP–Shenghe arrangement indeed drew scrutiny in Washington, and the contract acknowledges disclosures to CFIUS. Ensuring all regulatory green lights (foreign investment approvals, antitrust, export permits) is often a precondition to contract effectiveness. |
| Sanctions, Trade Controls, and Export Regulations | In volatile jurisdictions, the risk of resource nationalism or punitive royalty/tax changes looms. Offtake agreements might not directly prevent a government from expropriating a mine, but they often have termination or suspension provisions if the mining license is lost or if a change in law makes the project unviable. Force majeure definitions sometimes list “any change in applicable law or government order that prevents performance” as an event of force majeure. This would cover scenarios like a sudden export ban on unprocessed ore (several countries have implemented such bans on other minerals). Both parties need the flexibility to exit or renegotiate if, say, Indonesia were to ban rare earth exports or if a host country revokes the company’s permit. In practice, miners also mitigate this by engaging the host government as a stakeholder (e.g. many African projects have government ownership stakes, as with Peak’s 16% Tanzanian government free-carry). If expropriation or excessive tax is imposed, it might trigger a contract renegotiation clause or be treated under force majeure (depending on wording). Lenders and offtakers often require political risk insurance or guarantees in such jurisdictions, though that’s outside the contract proper, it’s part of the broader contracting process. |
| Political Risk – Expropriation and Changes in Law | Rare earth contracts include compliance clauses to follow international trade laws. A typical clause forbids sales to any sanctioned persons or embargoed countries. Given the strategic nature of REEs, parties must abide by U.S. EAR/export rules, EU regulations, etc. For example, a U.S. supplier wouldn’t ship to a buyer that plans to re-export to North Korea or Iran. Contracts may require the buyer to represent that they are not on any banned-party list and will not divert materials contrary to export laws. If future sanctions target certain Chinese entities (or vice versa, China sanctioning Western entities), contracts have to navigate these restrictions – often by including termination rights if the transaction becomes illegal due to sanctions |
| Termination and Default Clauses | Rare earth contracts specify what constitutes a default (e.g. missed payments, failure to deliver/take product outside of force majeure) and the remedies. They typically allow the non-defaulting party to terminate if a breach isn’t cured within a period. For example, Peak’s offtake could be terminated if an event of default (like failure to pay or deliver) isn’t remedied in 30 days. Additionally, if project financing isn’t secured by a deadline, development-stage offtakes often terminate automatically (as no project means no product to sell). |
| Governing Law & Dispute Resolution | Given the international nature, contracts choose a governing law (often English law or New York law for its predictability in commerce) and include arbitration clauses (e.g. ICC or LCIA arbitration) to handle disputes. This ensures any conflicts are resolved in a neutral forum rather than, say, local courts that might be biased. |
| Force Majeure in Practice | A real-world illustration was the COVID-19 pandemic, which disrupted transport and supply chains. A rare earth supplier could invoke force majeure if lockdowns prevented shipping. Similarly, China’s export quota or tariff changes in 2018–2019 (during the trade war) could have triggered renegotiation of pricing or sourcing in some contracts. The new Chinese export permit restrictions (April 2025) on magnet alloys represent a geopolitical control that doesn’t directly ban oxide exports but tightens the downstream flow. While existing contracts for oxide supply might not have foreseen this, it’s likely future contracts will incorporate clauses addressing such scenarios (e.g. if a government curtails exports of derivatives, parties will meet to adjust obligations accordingly). |
| Environmental and ESG clauses | As a side note, modern contracts may also include compliance with environmental regulations and sustainability reporting, especially because rare earth production can generate radioactive waste (as with Lynas in Malaysia). While not geopolitical, failing environmental compliance can lead to permit suspension (which becomes a force majeure event). Contracts may require the seller to maintain all permits and operate within environmental laws, breach of which could be a default. |
Summary of Legal Protections
In essence, rare earth supply contracts are heavily influenced by geopolitical risk. They incorporate robust protections for unforeseen political events, align with international trade laws, and often have government involvement (either explicitly as a party or implicitly via needed approvals or funding). The recent U.S. DoD contract with MP is an example where a government entity is directly a counterparty, including conditions that ensure domestic supply for national security. Japanese state-backed JOGMEC’s role in Lynas’s contract is another, where a government corporation provided funding and, in return, Japan got secure access – essentially embedding policy goals into a commercial contract. All these measures underscore that in the rare earth sector, contracts are not just business instruments but also tools of policy and strategy, balancing market forces with national interests.
Conclusion
The contracting process in the rare earth supply chain outside China is characterized by long-term, bespoke agreements that bind together miners, refiners, and end-users in an attempt to create stable supply chains in a volatile, opaque market. From mining offtake contracts guaranteeing volumes and financing, to refined product supply deals ensuring manufacturers have critical materials, these agreements share common threads: pricing linked to Chinese benchmarks (at least in the majority of cases), privately negotiated terms on volume and duration, and an array of clauses to manage risks from price swings to political intervention. Both light and heavy rare earth contracts follow this pattern, although heavy REE deals remain niche and similarly tethered to Chinese prices due to a lack of alternatives.
Importantly, because there is no established “ex-China” market price, contract prices have until now effectively imported China’s market dynamics – keeping non-Chinese producers’ margins slim. However, as seen in recent developments, Western governments and industries are actively reshaping this landscape by introducing price floors, seeking premiums for non-Chinese supply, and developing independent pricing indices. Contracts are beginning to reflect these changes, slowly loosening the grip of the “China price” on all terms. In parallel, rigorous legal safeguards in contracts protect against the very real geopolitical and compliance risks (from export bans to sanctions) that can disrupt the rare earth trade.
In summary, contracting in the rare earth supply chain outside China is a complex dance of securing supply, referencing China-driven prices, and hedging against myriad risks. Successful rare earth projects nearly always hinge on solid offtake agreements – they are the linchpin that connects the mine to the global market. With new policies and market interventions emerging, we can expect these contracts to evolve, perhaps incorporating more innovative pricing (e.g., index diversification or profit-sharing) and stronger government partnership components. Until an open ex-China market matures, though, the Chinese price linkage and careful contractual risk management will remain defining features of rare earth supply agreements outside of China.
Sources:
- Rare Earth Exchanges – Multiple articles, interviews and private surveys plus see “Emergence of an Ex-China Rare Earth Pricing Index”, July 29, 2025. (Industry analysis of pricing and contracts)rareearthexchanges.comrareearthexchanges.comrareearthexchanges.com
- Argus Media – “Arafura secures new NdPr oxide offtake deal”, Mar 20, 2025. (Details on Arafura offtake volumes and pricing)argusmedia.com (opens in a new tab)argusmedia.com (opens in a new tab)
- ASX Announcement (Peak Rare Earths) – “Peak and Shenghe Binding Offtake Agreement”, Aug 9, 2023. (Key terms of concentrate offtake: take-or-pay, pricing formula, etc.)wcsecure.weblink.com.au (opens in a new tab)wcsecure.weblink.com.au (opens in a new tab)
- Columbia SIPA Center on Global Energy Policy – “MP Materials Deal Marks a Significant Shift in US Rare Earths Policy”, Jul 11, 2025. (Notes on DoD–MP Materials contract: offtake and price floor)energypolicy.columbia.edu (opens in a new tab)
- Reuters – “Rare earth magnet users jolted into paying premium prices for ex-China supply”, Jul 1, 2025. (Reports automakers paying premiums and supply chain responses to Chinese export curbs)reuters.com (opens in a new tab)reuters.com (opens in a new tab)
- MP Materials–Shenghe Offtake Contract (Justia repository, May 2020 Amended Agreement). (Examples of contractual definitions: pricing tied to Asian Metal, compliance clauses, force majeure)contracts.justia.com (opens in a new tab)contracts.justia.com (opens in a new tab)contracts.justia.com (opens in a new tab)
- JOGMEC News Release – “Sojitz/JOGMEC Agreement with Lynas to secure supply to Japanese market”, Mar 30, 2011. (Example of financing+offtake structure for Lynas)jogmec.go.jp (opens in a new tab)
- Northern Minerals ASX Release – “Offtake Agreement with Thyssenkrupp”, Aug 12, 2019. (Heavy rare earth offtake terms)asx.com.au
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