Highlights

• Academic review by Batman University researchers reveals China's near-monopoly over critical metals processing—not just mining—creates dangerous vulnerabilities in the global clean energy transition.
• Recycling and substitution can only reduce primary demand by ~10% by 2040.
• Diversified processing capacity outside China remains essential for at least the next two decades to meet net-zero goals.
• Clean energy technologies require lithium, cobalt, nickel, and rare earth magnets.
• Demand trajectories suggest shortages as early as the 2030s without coordinated industrial policy action.

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New academic review (opens in a new tab) highlights structural risks in rare earth and battery metal supply chains

A comprehensive review led by Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nilüfer Kürsünoğlu, with Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sait Kürsünoğlu, both of Batman University’s Department of Petroleum and Natural Gas Engineering (Türkiye), delivers a clear message: the clean-energy transition is inseparable from critical metals—and the world remains dangerously dependent on China’s near-monopoly over key stages of rare earth element (REE) processing and refining.

Prof. Dr. Nilüfer Kürsünoğlu---rare earths inseparable from clean energy transition

Presented at the 8th Bilsel International Efes Scientific Researches and Innovation Congress (İzmir, November 2025), the study synthesizes data from the IEA, IRENA, USGS, and peer-reviewed literature to assess how lithium, cobalt, nickel, and rare earths underpin electric vehicles, wind turbines, batteries, and grid infrastructure—while exposing deep vulnerabilities in global supply chains. The authors conclude that recycling and substitution will help, but primary mining and—critically—non-Chinese processing capacity will remain essential for at least the next two decades.

Study Methods: A Policy-Focused Systems Review

Rather than presenting new experimental data, the paper performs an integrative review. It compiles international agency datasets, industry assessments, and academic studies to map:

• Where critical metals are used in clean-energy technologies;
• Where supply risks arise, including geological constraints and geopolitical concentration, and
• Which mitigation strategies—recycling, circular-economy models, substitution, and policy reforms—offer realistic relief?

This approach is designed for policymakers and non-specialists, translating complex material flows into clear, decision-relevant supply-risk insights.

Key Findings: Clean Energy Is a Metals Economy

The study reinforces a simple but often underappreciated reality: clean energy is materials-intensive.

Rare earth magnets—particularly neodymium-iron-boron (NdFeB) magnets often doped with dysprosium—remain indispensable for high-performance electric motors and direct-drive wind turbines. While alternatives exist, they typically involve lower efficiency and higher system-level tradeoffs.

Lithium-ion batteries depend on lithium, nickel, cobalt, manganese, and graphite. Efforts to reduce cobalt do not eliminate risk; instead, they often shift demand pressure to nickel and lithium.

Demand trajectories suggest that, if current trends continue, dozens of critical minerals could face supply shortages as early as the 2030s, threatening deployment timelines and cost stability.

The Central Vulnerability: China’s Processing Dominance

While mining often draws public attention, the authors emphasize a more decisive choke point: processing and refining. A small number of countries control most global refining capacity, with China dominant across rare earth separation, magnet manufacturing, and several battery-material value chains—often controlling the majority of global capacity at these stages.

This concentration amplifies risk. Export controls, trade disputes, or domestic prioritization policies can trigger global price shocks and supply disruptions, even when raw materials are mined elsewhere.

Long project lead times—often more than ten years from discovery to production—mean diversification cannot happen quickly. For rare earths in particular, the study underscores that geology alone does not confer security. Without separation plants, metallurgical expertise, and downstream magnet manufacturing, non-Chinese producers remain structurally dependent.

Recycling and the Circular Economy: Helpful but Insufficient

The review gives measured support to recycling and circular-economy strategies.

Recycling could reduce primary demand for some metals by up to ~10% by 2040, according to IEA scenarios. E-waste recycling rates now approach 50% in Europe and North America, offering a foundation for so-called “urban mining.”

However, the authors are explicit about limits:

• Many clean-energy technologies have not yet reached end-of-life at scale, delaying feedstock availability.
• Rare earth magnet and lithium-battery recycling remains technically complex, energy-intensive, and costly.
• Fragmented collection systems and lack of standardized designs slow progress.

Bottom line: recycling is necessary, but it cannot replace new mining and new processing capacity over the next 20 years.

Implications: Industrial Policy, Not Just Climate Policy

For governments and investors, the implications are stark.

Processing—not mining—will decide who controls the clean-energy economy. Supply diversification requires refining and separation facilities outside China, supported by permitting reform, capital incentives, and public-private partnerships.

Substitution research—such as lower-dysprosium magnets or lithium-iron-phosphate (LFP) batteries—can reduce exposure, but often with performance and density tradeoffs. The study implicitly challenges the assumption that markets alone will resolve these constraints quickly enough to meet net-zero timelines.

Limitations and Controversial Points

As a review, the paper does not model project-level economics or provide country-specific forecasts. It also relies on agency projections that may evolve with technology breakthroughs or policy shifts. Critics may argue the analysis understates future substitution potential or overemphasizes China’s role relative to emerging capacity in allied countries—particularly if industrial policy accelerates faster than historical precedent suggests. Still, the authors’ caution reflects current, not hypothetical, industrial realities.

Conclusion: A Narrow Window to Act

The Kürsünoğlu-led review concludes that the energy transition’s success hinges not just on turbines and batteries, but on how strategically the world manages critical metals. Recycling, substitution, and efficiency gains matter—but diversified primary supply and non-Chinese processing capacity are unavoidable in the near- to medium-term. Without coordinated action, clean-energy ambitions risk colliding with hard materials constraints.

Citation: Kürsünoğlu, N., & Kürsünoğlu, S. (2025). The Role of Critical Metals in Clean Energy Technologies: Policy Insights, Recycling Techniques, and Supply Risk. Proceedings of the 8th Bilsel International Efes Scientific Researches and Innovation Congress, İzmir, Türkiye.

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