China’s Strategic Mineral Reporting Order, Reflective of A Power Move in Global Resource Control?

Highlights

• Chinese government mandates detailed reporting of over 40 types of minerals from overseas mining companies.
• Policy represents a geopolitical strategy to strengthen leverage over global supply chains and critical mineral markets.
• U.S. remains heavily dependent on China for critical mineral imports, with over 50% sourced from Chinese suppliers.

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Last month, the Chinese government ordered its overseas mining companies to report detailed data on their reserves, expanding regulatory oversight as competition with the United States intensified. The Ministry of Commerce’s mandate now requires firms to declare over 40 types of minerals, up from 32, including rare earths, titanium ore, zircon, and tantalum ore. This decision follows China’s October ban (opens in a new tab) on antimony exports, reinforcing its control over critical materials vital for global manufacturing, green energy, and defense industries.

China’s Tightening Controls

As reported in the South China Morning Post (opens in a new tab), the directive certainly represents a geopolitical maneuver aimed at strengthening China’s leverage over global supply chains. With Washington imposing restrictions on advanced semiconductor exports, China has responded by tightening control over minerals essential to high-tech production.

The recent piece from the media not directly controlled by the state suggests that Beijing views critical mineral dominance as a bargaining tool against anticipated tariff escalations from the newly inaugurated Trump administration.  Rare Earth Exchanges has reported that rare earth and critical mineral monopolization represent a key strategy in a three-phased program of economic growth and power.

Given that the U.S. relies on China for over 50% of its critical mineral imports—and more than 90% of rare earths—this policy could significantly impact American industry.

Deeper Drill Down

The South China Morning Post piece makes several assumptions without deeper scrutiny. It assumes that China’s increased oversight of its miners is purely a reaction to U.S. trade tensions rather than part of a long-term strategy for resource independence and control. It also presents Beijing’s dominance as an immediate crisis for the U.S. without addressing how Washington might counteract it—whether through domestic mining projects, Western alliances, or trade agreements with resource-rich nations.

Additionally, there is an implicit bias in framing China’s control as an aggressive tool while not critically examining how Western nations have failed to secure their own supply chains despite years of warning signs.

Does the U.S. have a viable plan to reduce reliance on China for critical minerals, or is it merely reacting to Beijing’s moves without a coherent counterstrategy?

Importantly, key questions remain unanswered. Will China use its reporting requirement to restrict overseas exports further, tightening its grip on global rare earth markets? How will this policy affect Chinese investments in Belt and Road Initiative nations, which are major suppliers of these minerals? Remember, China’s economic crisis (overproduction) is real, and no amount of communist control, management, or engineered management will be able to overcome such contradictory forces over time.

Finally, crucially, is the West prepared to reduce its dependency on China’s rare earth supply chain before Beijing decides to further limit access? The likely answer is no.

 Regardless, the answers to these questions will shape the next phase of global resource competition.