Intergovernmental Critical Minerals Task Force Act Legislation Reintroduced in US Congress for 2025

Highlights

  • Sen. Peters’ bill proposes an intergovernmental task force to assess and mitigate national security risks associated with critical mineral supply chains.
  • The legislation seeks to diversify mineral sourcing, support domestic production, and collaborate with allied nations to reduce dependence on countries like China.
  • Previous administrations failed to develop a comprehensive strategy for critical mineral independence, leaving the U.S. vulnerable to foreign supply chain disruptions.

On March 3, Sen. Gary Peters (D-MI) reintroduced a bill to create a Critical Minerals Task Force which would pivot our critical mineral supply chain away from possible adversaries. While the text of this new SB823 (opens in a new tab) is not yet available, it is expected to track SB1871 (opens in a new tab) from the last congressional session. The Intergovernmental Critical Minerals Task Force Act is a legislative measure aimed at reducing the United States’ reliance on foreign nations, particularly China, for critical minerals and rare earth metals. These minerals are essential components in various industries, including transportation, renewable energy, military defense, and technology. The bill establishes a coordinated approach among federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial governments to address supply chain vulnerabilities and strengthen domestic production capabilities.

Diversification and working with allied countries

The bill would mandate the creation of an intergovernmental task force dedicated to assessing and mitigating the national security risks associated with the country’s dependence on foreign suppliers for critical minerals. This task force will evaluate the extent of U.S. reliance on China and other adversarial nations, develop recommendations to secure and diversify domestic supply chains, support cooperation between different levels of government and private sector stakeholders to enhance mineral sourcing and processing capabilities within the U.S., and facilitate international partnerships to strengthen supply chain resilience among allied nations.

Task force members and duties

The task force would be composed of representatives from key federal agencies, including the Departments of Defense, Energy, Interior, Commerce, State, and Labor, among others. It will work closely with state, local, tribal, and territorial governments, private industry stakeholders, including mining and technology companies, as well as academic institutions and nonprofit organizations with expertise in critical mineral research and development. Their duties include identifying alternative sources of critical minerals domestically and internationally, evaluating policy changes that could encourage responsible mining, processing, and recycling of these materials within the U.S., strengthening workforce development programs to support a skilled labor force in critical mineral industries, and providing regular reports to Congress on findings and policy recommendations to ensure transparency and accountability.

Identify regulatory barriers

The bill emphasizes the importance of global partnerships with allied nations to create more secure supply chains. It directs collaboration with groups such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, NATO countries, and other strategic allies to develop and implement advanced mining and processing technologies. In addition to the task force, the bill requires the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to conduct a comprehensive study of federal and state regulations affecting the domestic supply chain for critical minerals. This study aims to identify regulatory barriers and opportunities for improving production and processing capabilities within the U.S.

Policy Paralysis in the Face of National Security Risks?

The Intergovernmental Critical Minerals Task Force Act seeks to fortify America’s mineral supply chain by reducing dependence on adversaries like China, coordinating government and private efforts, and fostering alliances with trusted global partners. Yet, during the first Trump administration, conflicting forces within its policies actively undermined these goals. While Trump’s rhetoric championed American self-sufficiency, his administration’s actions at least in some cases created regulatory instability, alienated allies, and failed to invest in the critical infrastructure necessary to make mineral independence a reality.

Deregulation Without a Plan

Trump aggressively pursued deregulation to jumpstart domestic mining, rolling back environmental reviews under NEPA (National Environmental Policy Act) and accelerating mining permits under the Mining Law of 1872. In theory, this should have made it easier to extract rare earth elements (REEs) domestically.

However, the administration failed to pair these policies with a long-term industrial strategy, the type of strategy Rare Earth Exchanges has called for.

Investors, wary of shifting political landscapes and the lack of government-backed infrastructure, hesitated to commit the billions necessary to develop a full supply chain. Deregulation without strategic planning became a hollow gesture, leaving the U.S. in the same position—mining but still shipping raw materials to China for processing.

Does “America First” Tariffs Undermined Ally Cooperation?

The bill envisions global partnerships, especially with nations like Australia, Canada, and Japan, to secure supply chains outside of China’s control. But Trump’s protectionist trade policies undercut this goal. Of course, in his newest administration, immediate tariffs on Canada and Mexico (although delayed in part) raise the instability index.

During his first tenure, his tariffs on Canadian aluminum and European metals strained critical alliances, creating friction with the countries best positioned to collaborate on rare earth production.

While the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) included provisions to facilitate mineral trade, the broader economic tensions caused by erratic trade wars slowed diplomatic cooperation on critical minerals. The latest tariffs involving fentanyl, while the mission to reduce the scourge is good, is this approach the optimal pathway?

Decoupling from China Without Infrastructure

Trump’s administration loudly declared its intent to reduce reliance on China for rare earths, yet the reality told a different story. Despite heavy rhetoric about decoupling, no significant investment was made in domestic refining and magnet production—the two critical gaps that prevent the U.S. from achieving mineral independence. This meant that even as rare earths were being mined domestically—such as at Mountain Pass, California—they were, for the most part, still being shipped to China for processing (although this is supposed to be phased out in another year).  The result? An illusion of independence while reinforcing America’s reliance on Beijing.

A Bureaucratic Maze Instead of a Coordinated Strategy

The Critical Minerals Task Force Act envisions a unified, interagency approach to mineral security. But under Biden and Trump, U.S. agencies operated in silos, each with disjointed rare earth strategies. The Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Energy (DoE), and Department of the Interior (DOI) all pursued separate, uncoordinated initiatives, leading to inefficiencies. Unlike China’s centralized, long-term industrial planning, the U.S. had no Critical Minerals Czar, no singular strategy, and no sustained policy momentum—crippling any meaningful progress in mineral self-sufficiency.

Trade Negotiations with China vs. Anti-China Rhetoric

Perhaps the greatest contradiction in the case of President Trump was his dual approach to China. On one hand, he threatened Chinese tech giants like Huawei and pushed for decoupling. On the other, his Phase One Trade Deal (opens in a new tab) (2020) secured Chinese agricultural purchases but ignored rare earth security entirely!

This glaring omission meant that while Trump waged public battles against Chinese influence, the U.S. remained wholly dependent on China for rare earth refining and magnet production—the two most vital links in the supply chain. Instead of reducing reliance, Trump’s erratic trade strategy during the first term further cemented Beijing’s control. Again, nothing improved under Biden.

Both Dems and Republicans–Rhetoric Without Results

The Critical Minerals Task Force Act is an attempt to fix America’s mineral vulnerabilities, but the Trump administration’s inconsistent and contradictory policies, at least in the first term, impeded progress. In all fairness, Biden didn’t fare any better.  Now we are back to Trump part two. Critical minerals and rare earths are mentioned, mostly in the context of acquisitive strategy to gain land and deposits—of course, readers of Rare Earth Exchanges understand that won’t help the cause.

Without a national industrial strategy, a coordinated federal approach, or infrastructure investment, during Trump’s part one, America remained just as reliant on China for rare earths as before—despite all the tough talk. More of the same essentially with Biden, then some more tough talk with Trump and some mention of the topic, but we’ll have to see what Trump part two does on the front of critical minerals and rare earths. As we have suggested, the U.S. now faces an urgent choice involving either the development of a serious industrial policy or the risk of permanent dependence on foreign adversaries. Another option cited earlier on Rare Earth Exchanges is employing the Art of the Deal with China, buying time for a resilience strategy.

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