The Flawed Assumptions of the “Trump-Monroe Doctrine” for Minerals

Highlights

• Adam Muellerweiss’ article argues for securing mineral resources like Greenland’s antimony to counter China’s mineral dominance.
• The article fails to address the critical need for U.S. midstream and downstream processing capabilities in critical mineral supply chains.
• A comprehensive solution requires massive investment in refining, end-to-end manufacturing, and strategic trade policies to reduce dependence on China.

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Adam Muellerweiss’ recent article in Real Clear Policy (opens in a new tab) presents a compelling case for securing mineral resources in the Western Hemisphere, particularly Greenland, as a means of countering China’s dominance in critical minerals. While the article correctly highlights China’s aggressive control of the supply chain, the dangers of supply disruptions, and the importance of closed-loop recycling, it fundamentally fails to address the deeper and more urgent issue: securing land with resources alone will not solve America’s critical mineral vulnerabilities. Without the necessary midstream and upstream capabilities—processing, refining, and manufacturing—the United States will remain dependent on China regardless of how many mineral deposits it controls. This glaring omission renders the article’s proposed solution incomplete at best and dangerously misleading at worst.

What Muellerweiss Gets Right

Muellerweiss is correct in identifying that critical minerals, such as antimony, cobalt, lithium, and rare earths, are indispensable to modern economies and national security. His concerns over China’s ability to manipulate supply and pricing through monopolistic control are well-founded, as Beijing has repeatedly used export restrictions as a geopolitical weapon. The December 3 antimony export ban, as cited, is a prime example of China flexing its dominance. Additionally, he is right to emphasize the value of America’s closed-loop battery recycling system, which preserves strategic materials and reduces dependence on virgin raw materials.

His argument that China is using predatory economic tactics—such as debt-trap diplomacy and state-subsidized price dumping—to dominate global supply chains is also well-supported by history. China’s rare earth embargo on Japan in 2010 and its repeated use of market manipulation in commodities such as steel and solar panels underscore how Beijing systematically wipes out competition before tightening its grip on supply.

Where the Article Fails–Securing Land Does Not Build a Supply Chain

The article’s biggest flaw is its naive assumption that securing raw material sources—such as Greenland or even Ukraine—will be a game-changer for the U.S. The reality is far more complex. Critical minerals, once extracted, must go through multiple refining and processing stages before they are usable in high-tech applications. China controls the mining and the entire midstream and downstream refining, processing, and component manufacturing industries. Without significant investment in these stages, simply owning mineral deposits will do little to change America’s dependency.

The Midstream Processing Gap

Muellerweiss does not address the midstream bottleneck—the refining and separation processes that turn raw ore into usable materials for batteries, semiconductors, and defense applications. The U.S. can almost not refine rare earth elements, lithium, or other critical minerals at scale. While companies like MP Materials and Energy Fuels have begun efforts, they remain small compared to China’s industrial behemoths.

China refines more than 85% of the world’s rare earths, regardless of where they are mined. Even if the U.S. gained control over Greenland’s resources, those raw materials would still need to be shipped to China for processing unless America builds the refining infrastructure—a step Muellerweiss ignores entirely.

The Manufacturing Shortage

Even if the U.S. were to solve the midstream refining gap, it still faces a downstream manufacturing crisis. China doesn’t just refine minerals—it integrates them into battery cells, permanent magnets, and other high-tech components. The U.S. lacks domestic manufacturing capacity for many of these essential products. Unless the country develops a vertically integrated supply chain—like China’s—simply owning mineral deposits does little to change the strategic reality.

Long-Term Challenges

Muellerweiss also overstates how quickly the U.S. could turn Greenland’s minerals into a viable supply source. Opening a new mine, securing permits, building refining capacity, and establishing supply chains takes a decade or more. The U.S.’s permitting process for new mines can last seven to ten years, while processing and factory investments require billions in capital. This means that even if the U.S. secured Greenland’s antimony today, it would still rely on China to process it in the foreseeable future.

China’s Countermoves and the Real Geopolitical Threat

The article naively assumes that China will stand idle while the U.S. attempts to build an independent supply chain. In reality, Beijing has proven highly adept at preemptive moves to secure its dominance:

1. Price Undercutting – China could flood the market with cheap processed materials, making it unprofitable for U.S. companies to invest in midstream refining.
2. Strategic Acquisitions – Chinese firms could attempt to buy up Greenland mining interests, securing control before the U.S. even gets started.
3. Export Restrictions – China could further restrict exports of refined materials, driving up costs and delaying Western supply chain efforts.
4. Infrastructure Diplomacy – China has already secured partnerships in Latin America and Africa to ensure that minerals extracted in those regions still flow through Chinese processors.

Muellerweiss does not address any of these real geopolitical risks, making his argument feel simplistic and incomplete.

A Realistic Path Forward

If the U.S. is serious about breaking free from Chinese mineral dependence, it must do more than just secure land with resources. The real solution requires a three-pronged approach:

1. Massive Investment in Processing & Refining

• The U.S. must build large-scale refining and separation facilities, particularly for rare earths, lithium, and antimony.
• Government subsidies and tax incentives must be provided to offset the disadvantages of the cost compared to China.

2. End-to-End Supply Chain Development

• The U.S. needs not just mines but full-spectrum manufacturing capabilities, including permanent magnet production, battery fabrication, and semiconductor material processing.
• Public-private partnerships should focus on vertical integration, ensuring raw materials are turned into finished products within the U.S.

3. Policy & Trade Strategy

• The U.S. must strategically support allies in developing refining capacity in friendly nations like Canada and Australia.
• Trade restrictions should be selectively used to penalize China’s market manipulation without disrupting Western supply chains.

A Misguided View That Misses the Bigger Picture

Muellerweiss’ article presents an appealing but simplistic argument for securing minerals as a national security priority. While his concerns about China’s dominance are valid, his failure to address America’s lack of processing infrastructure and manufacturing capacity exposes a fundamental misunderstanding of the problem. Simply securing Greenland’s antimony—or any other raw material—does nothing to change U.S. dependency unless massive investments are made in midstream and downstream capabilities.

A modern-day “Monroe Doctrine” for minerals cannot rely on outdated 19th-century thinking about territorial control. The real war for mineral independence is not fought in Greenland’s icy tundra—it is fought in the refineries, factories, and trade policies that shape global supply chains. Without a holistic approach, the U.S. will remain in the same vulnerable position, no matter how much mineral-rich land it controls.