Highlights
- U.S. and Japan aim to reduce reliance on China for essential minerals such as lithium, cobalt, and copper.
- Trilateral partnerships involve collaboration with Latin American countries.
- Potential collaboration areas include:
- Investment in mineral processing
- EV battery production
- Addressing labor and environmental concerns
- Success depends on:
- Matching China’s financial commitment
- Aligning with Latin American nations’ economic development priorities
What is the potential for U.S.-Japan collaboration in securing critical mineral supply chains, particularly by engaging with Latin American nations?
The core premise is that as geopolitical tensions rise, the U.S. and Japan must work together to reduce dependency on China for essential minerals like lithium, cobalt, and copper—key components in electric vehicle (EV) battery production. Neeraja Kulkarni, writing in New Security Beat, (opens in a new tab) writes trilateral partnerships with mineral-rich nations such as Argentina, Chile, and Bolivia could serve as a viable strategy for securing alternative sources while fostering regional economic development.
Supporting Data?
Kulkarni supports this argument with data on China’s dominance in the critical mineral sector, controlling approximately 70% of rare earth processing and over half of Chilean copper imports. She highlights how recent U.S. policies, such as the Inflation Reduction Act and Trump’s National Energy Emergency order, signal a commitment to reducing Chinese influence over mineral supply chains. Similarly, Japan’s Battery Industry Strategy and Economic Security Promotion Act outline proactive measures to secure resources and maintain economic competitiveness. The U.S.-Japan Critical Minerals Agreement (CMA) further demonstrates existing efforts to align policies on EV battery production, recycling, and fair labor practices.
Devil in the Assumptions
However, the article makes several key assumptions. It assumes that Latin America would readily embrace U.S. and Japanese investment as an alternative to China, despite China’s existing industrial development efforts, such as processing facilities and battery manufacturing in the region. It also assumes that Latin American nations have the infrastructure and regulatory stability to quickly scale up processing and refining operations, though historical challenges—such as weak enforcement of labor laws and environmental concerns—suggest otherwise. Additionally, the article frames U.S. and Japanese interests as primarily economic and strategic without fully addressing whether these partnerships align with the priorities of Latin American governments and communities.
Assumptions can also derive from our biases. In this piece, the author portrays “friend-shoring” as an inherently superior alternative to China’s current involvement in Latin America. While diversifying supply chains is a sound objective, the article does not deeply examine whether U.S. and Japanese companies would be willing to match the level of financial commitment and infrastructure investment that China has already made.
Furthermore, it presents a relatively optimistic view of Latin America’s ability to transition from raw material extraction to midstream processing and refining, a step that has long been a barrier to self-sufficiency in the region.
Possibility…But…
Kulkarni presents a compelling case for trilateral cooperation, but challenges remain. While the U.S. and Japan can offer investment and regulatory oversight, Latin American nations will ultimately determine how they wish to structure their critical mineral industries. Without direct investment in refining and value-added production, simply securing raw materials does not solve the broader problem of China’s near-monopoly on processing.
For any partnership to succeed, the U.S. and Japan must address labor rights, environmental sustainability, and long-term economic stability for Latin American nations rather than simply using the region as an alternative mineral source.
Daniel
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