Highlights

• U.S. foreign policy is increasingly driven by securing critical minerals access through initiatives like the Minerals Security Partnership, making rare earths a national security priority rather than just a trade issue.
• While the analysis correctly identifies mineral diplomacy as a geopolitical driver, it relies heavily on unproven analogies—such as comparing Venezuela to Iraq—that add speculation without solid evidence.
• Countries excluded from mineral alliances risk strategic irrelevance; the rare earth supply chain is being restructured through diplomacy and infrastructure, not free markets, requiring coherent policy and domestic capacity.

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A recent Economic Times editorial argues that U.S. foreign policy—from Ukraine and Kazakhstan to Venezuela and Pakistan—is increasingly shaped by one overriding objective: securing access to critical minerals. On its face, that thesis is broadly correct. Rare earth elements and related critical minerals have moved from obscure industrial inputs to instruments of geopolitical leverage, particularly after China tightened export controls in response to U.S. tariffs.

The editorial is strongest where it acknowledges reality.

The United States is actively assembling mineral alliances—through initiatives such as the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) and newer groupings like Pax Silica—to reduce dependence on China-dominated supply chains. This is not conjecture. U.S. policymakers, alongside allies including Australia, Canada, Japan, and parts of Europe, have repeatedly stated that rare earths are now a national security issue, not merely a trade concern.

Where Analysis Drifts Toward Rhetoric

The article’s analogy-heavy framing—likening Venezuela to Iraq and narcotics to weapons of mass destruction—adds drama but also introduces speculative stretch. While Venezuela does possess meaningful mineral resources, there is limited evidence that U.S. naval pressure is driven primarily by rare earth access rather than energy security, sanctions enforcement, and regional stability concerns. The mineral argument is plausible, but it remains unproven.

A similar overreach appears in the treatment of China’s International Economic and Trade Cooperation Initiative on Green Mining and Minerals, portrayed as a cohesive counter-bloc to the West. While consistent with China’s industrial diplomacy, the initiative remains loosely defined and unevenly executed. Presenting it as a fully operational rival supply-chain alliance risks overstating its current impact.

The Real Signal for the Rare Earth Supply Chain

What is notable—and accurate—is the editorial’s underlying warning: countries left outside mineral alliances risk strategic irrelevance. India’s absence from several key groupings reflects a broader challenge shared by much of the West—slow permitting, fragmented policy, and limited downstream integration.

For investors and policymakers, the lesson is not about emulating U.S. power projection. It is about recognizing that rare earth supply chains are being rewired through diplomacy, capital, and infrastructure—not markets alone. China understands this. The U.S. is relearning it. India, and many Western economies, are still catching up.

REEx Take

The editorial correctly identifies critical minerals as a driver of geopolitics but leans heavily on analogy and inference. The strategic conclusion nonetheless stands: without a coherent rare earth policy, nations become price takers in a controlled market. The solution is not rhetoric—but mines, processing plants, magnets, and alliances that actually function.

Source: The Economic Times (opens in a new tab), ET Editorial, December 18, 2025.

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