Is POTUS to Introduce Critical Minerals Czar, Military Base Refining Facilities?

Highlights

• President Trump reportedly plans to establish a Critical Minerals Czar through an executive order.
• There is a proposal to build refining facilities on Pentagon military bases.
• The U.S. faces significant challenges in rare earth production, including:
  • High costs
  • Complex separation processes
  • Lack of domestic supply chains
• Strategic efforts aim to reduce reliance on China.
• China currently controls 30 of 50 strategically critical minerals identified by the Department of the Interior.

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Has the Trump Administration been reading Rare Earth Exchanges?  Since our founding in October 2024, this media platform has called out for a critical minerals czar in the United States. Now in a major push to secure U.S. access to critical minerals, President Donald Trump is reportedly planning an executive order to build refining facilities on Pentagon military bases and appoint a Critical Minerals Czar to coordinate domestic production efforts. This move, first reported by Reuters (opens in a new tab), underscores a growing urgency to reduce reliance on China, which dominates the global refining market for key materials essential for defense, technology, and energy industries.

The proposal to use military bases for refining operations could help bypass local resistance to industrial facilities and streamline permitting challenges. However, such initiatives would take years to implement, and policy specifics remain unclear. Trump has also pushed for U.S. access to international stockpiles, including negotiating for Ukraine’s critical minerals and previously expressing interest in acquiring Greenland due to its rare earth reserves. The administration continues to explore ways to expand U.S. supply chains, with officials optimistic that an agreement with Ukraine could be finalized soon.

The U.S. government has long recognized the national security risks associated with dependence on foreign critical minerals, particularly from China.

The Department of the Interior has identified 50 minerals as strategically critical, with China controlling 30 of them, creating a potential vulnerability if Beijing imposes export restrictions in response to geopolitical tensions. The Trump administration’s previous executive orders in 2017 and 2020 laid the groundwork for these latest efforts, while former President Joe Biden also sought to expand domestic supply chains as part of his green energy initiatives.

If the reports are accurate, the creation of a Critical Minerals Czar would mark a significant step toward centralizing and accelerating policy efforts in this sector—an idea long advocated by Rare Earth Exchanges and industry experts. The question now is how quickly these policies can be implemented and whether they will be enough to close the gap with China’s dominance in critical minerals refining and supply chains.

Challenges?

The Trump administration’s plan to bolster domestic critical mineral production and refining is ambitious, but it may be underestimating several major challenges related to rare earth separation, refinement, and production:

1. The Complexity and Cost of Rare Earth Separation & Refinement

Unlike traditional mining, rare earth elements (REEs) are not found in concentrated deposits and must be extracted from ores through a series of highly specialized and chemically intensive processes. Separation and purification involve solvent extraction, ion exchange, and hydro-metallurgical processes, which are:

• Technically demanding – requiring deep expertise in chemistry and materials science.
• Capital-intensive – estimated costs for building a single full-scale rare earth refining plant range from $1 billion to $5 billion.
• Time-consuming – a refining facility can take 5-10 years to become operational.

Despite China’s near-monopoly on rare earth refining, the U.S. has no large-scale separation facilities capable of handling the full spectrum of light and heavy rare earth domestically.

2. The Absence of Domestic Downstream Supply Chains

Even if the U.S. increases raw material extraction, there is no integrated domestic supply chain to convert mined rare earths into high-value magnets, alloys, and finished products. The key missing links include:

• Metal refining and conversion facilities – U.S. companies currently rely on China to turn rare earth oxides into metals.
• Magnet manufacturing – Nearly 100% of neodymium-iron-boron (NdFeB) magnets, which power everything from fighter jets to EV motors, are made in China and Japan.

Note the USA does have MP Materials and a few other ventures and some magnet production, but the effort will be massive.

3. Regulatory and Environmental Hurdles

Unlike China, which benefits from state-controlled industry, the U.S. has strict environmental and regulatory frameworks that can slow or block new refining projects.

• Permitting issues – U.S. mining projects often take 10-20 years to navigate environmental approvals and litigation.
• Hazardous waste disposal – Rare earth processing generates radioactive byproducts (thorium and uranium), requiring strict regulatory oversight.
• Local opposition (NIMBY concerns) – Communities frequently resist mining and refining projects due to environmental risks.

Note the use of Pentagon/Department of Defense facilities may help bypass some or much of the regulatory activity.

4. Dependence on Foreign Know-How and Equipment

China has spent decades perfecting rare earth separation and magnet manufacturing, often using proprietary, closely guarded techniques. The U.S. faces a skills gap and lacks:

• Trained specialists in rare earth processing (engineers, metallurgists, chemists).
• Access to key technologies – much of the equipment needed for REE refining is manufactured in China or Japan.

The U.S. will need to rapidly acquire the necessary talent, at least part of which is likely from Asia.

5. Geopolitical Risks and Market Realities

Even with a Critical Minerals Czar and Pentagon-backed refining plans, the U.S. must contend with global supply chain dependencies:

• China could retaliate with export restrictions, as it has done before (e.g., the 2010 rare earth embargo on Japan).
• Rare earth prices are volatile, making private investment risky without long-term government subsidies.
• Alternative suppliers (Australia, Canada, and Africa) already have partnerships with China, limiting U.S. access.

The USA must be careful with how it executes, likely requiring some kind of intermediate-stage agreement with China, as we have recommended. Trump is skilled at this type of negotiation.

Final Thoughts

The USA will need more than just executive orders. A Critical Minerals Czar is a good step in the right direction.

While the Trump administration’s approach could jumpstart domestic refining, it is likely underestimating the scale, time, and investment required to break dependence on China. To succeed, the U.S. will need:

• Massive public-private investment in refining and magnet production.
• Fast-tracked permitting and regulatory reforms without sacrificing environmental protections.
• Strategic partnerships with allies like Australia, Japan, and Canada for technology sharing and supply chain collaboration.
  

  Long-term government commitments to support pricing stability and de-risk private sector investments.

  
  

Simplybuilding refining facilities on military bases is not a magicbullet—it’s only the beginning of a decades-long process to rebuild U.S. rare earth independence.