• Uzbekistan signed a February 2026 MoU with the United States to cooperate on critical minerals supply chains, with DFC proposing a joint investment framework and holding company structure for potential mining and processing projects.
• The agreement emphasizes midstream processing capacity, not just extraction, which is critical for diversifying away from China's dominance in separation, refining, and magnet production of rare earth elements.
• No specific deposits, feasibility studies, or capitalization terms have been disclosed yet—this remains a political and financing framework rather than an operational supply event, with real viability dependent on infrastructure, offtake contracts, and metallurgical execution.

In simple terms, Uzbekistan signed agreements with the United States to cooperate on critical minerals, including rare earth elements, and to potentially finance mining and processing projects. This is not a mine opening. It is a framework—political alignment plus financing structures—that could lead to a handful of real projects if studies, infrastructure, and offtake contracts line up.

The February 2026 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), signed by Uzbekistan’s Foreign Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov and U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau, aligns both governments on supply chain security across mining and processing. The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) followed with “heads of terms” for a joint investment framework and proposed holding company. Translation: structure first, capital later.

What’s Solid Bedrock—and What’s Still Sand

What Rare Earth Exchanges™ can confirm:

• This is a government-to-government alignment mechanism.
• DFC and potentially EXIM involvement signal project finance pathways.
• Processing capacity is explicitly included, not treated as an afterthought.

Also accurate: Uzbekistan holds significant tungsten, uranium-linked rare metals, and prospective lithium resources. The Koytash–Ugat tungsten belt is a credible example of near-term developmentpotential.

What is unresolved:

• No specific deposits are formally designated.
• No published feasibility studies tied to the U.S. track.
• No disclosed capitalization terms for the proposed holding company.

This matters. In the rare earth supply chain, geological potential is common. Bankable midstream capacity is rare.

The Midstream Is the Prize

From a supply-chain perspective, the notable feature is the emphasis on processing. China’s dominance is not just mining—it is separation, refining, and magnet production. Any serious ex-China strategy must build midstream capability.

If Uzbekistan’s projects move beyond extraction and into separation or refined outputs meeting Western specifications, that shifts value capture away from Chinese processors. If they remain concentrated exporters, little changes.

Today’s account frames this as diversification “without dependency.” That is directionally correct. However, diversification only works if power, water, logistics, environmental compliance, and enforceable contracts are bankable. Central Asia has struggled historically with these execution layers.

Reading Between the Lines

The tone leans optimistic. It assumes that competitive capital will raise standards and accelerate capability. That is possible—but not guaranteed. Central Asia remains a contested terrain among China, Europe, Japan, and now Washington. Political alignment does not equal processing throughput.

For investors, this is a structuring event, not a supply event. No new rare earth oxide hits the market tomorrow. But if this evolves into midstream build-out, it becomes strategically meaningful. The real test will not be MoUs. It will be audited feasibility studies, offtake agreements, and metallurgical recovery rates.