Emergence of an Ex-China Rare Earth Pricing Index

Highlights

  • China controls 90% of rare earth supply, effectively setting global prices through opaque, state-influenced benchmarks.
  • Critical industries like defense, automotive, and green energy are increasingly willing to pay premiums for secure, non-Chinese rare earth supplies.
  • Emerging initiatives like REEx and government interventions aim to create transparent, independent rare earth pricing indices outside of China.

Rare earth elements – the 17 metals critical for technologies from fighter jets and electric vehicles to smartphones and wind turbines – have a pricing system as strategically important as it is opaque. China currently dominates about90% of the rare earth supply, and for years it has effectively set global prices through state-influenced benchmarks. Outside China, there is no open market or public exchange for rare earths, only private contracts often tied to those Chinese price indices as cited by Rare Earth Exchanges (REEx). This lack of transparency has long hindered non-Chinese producers and deterred investment in new mines. The nascent Rare Earth Exchanges (REEx) ex-China rare earth pricing index is being developed to change that dynamic by providing an independent, transparent benchmark for rare earth prices outside of China. This introduction explains why such an index is needed, how recent events have elevated ex-China pricing, and what it means for key industries and investors.

An Opaque Market Dominated by China

China’s rare earth pricing power stems from deliberate policies and a tightly controlled domestic market. Chinese commodity platforms like Asian Metal and Shanghai Metals Market publish daily rare earth oxide prices, which serve as the de facto world price references. However, even Chinese industry insiders admit these benchmarks “are not a reflection of free market dynamics” and are heavily influenced by state interventions. In practice, the “market price” on Asian Metal often reflects Beijing’s strategic goals – keeping prices low enough to undercut foreign competitors or pushing them up when it benefits Chinese enterprises. For example, in 2022 Chinese authorities responded to surging rare earth prices by ordering a “guide [of] product prices to rationality,” after which rare earth prices quickly plummeted. By 2023, Chinese domestic prices for key magnet metals like neodymium oxide had fallen by nearly 40% from 2022 highs, undermining profitability for any potential mines elsewhere.

Outside China, rare earth pricing has been shrouded in secrecy. There is no London Metal Exchange or other public marketplace to discover prices as we have discussed at Rare Earth Exchanges (REEx). Instead, the handful of non-Chinese producers – such as Australia’s Lynas Rare Earths and America’s MP Materials – sell their output through bilateral off-take contracts with end users. These contracts are confidential, with individually negotiated terms on volumes, pricing formulas, and duration. In other words, rare earths trade in an opaque, closed-door world where each deal might have bespoke pricing. As Nasdaq’s commodities desk observes, “unlike prices for gold and silver, rare earth element prices are hard to come by, as there is no widely used public exchange for rare earths.” Publishers like Fastmarkets or Argus are now working to offer price assessments by surveying market participants, but those reports are subscription-only and based on limited data. Opacity reigns over transparency in the current system.

Critically, most Western supply agreements still peg their prices to Chinese benchmarks. Industry insiders note that in the absence of an independent reference, contracts for rare earth oxides are commonly indexed to a percentage of the Asian Metal price averaged over a prior period. Some deals include floor or ceiling clauses to blunt extreme Chinese price swings, but fundamentally “everyone references the Chinese price in one form or another,” according to one Chief Executive Officer of a major junior prospector on condition of anonymity.

The result is that when China’s state-driven policies cause domestic prices to slump, non-Chinese producers see their realized prices dragged down as well.

Over much of 2023 and 2024, for instance, the Asian Metal (opens in a new tab) index price for neodymium-praseodymium (NdPr) oxide languished around $50–$60 per kilogram, a level at which no new Western mine could break even. Lynas, the largest ex-China producer, disclosed an average selling price of only A$60.2 per kilo (≈US$40) for its mixed rare earth oxide product in mid-2025, as we reported– reflecting a basket weighted toward low-value elements and the depressing effect of Chinese-indexed pricing. This “China price” linkage has kept rare earths artificially cheap in global markets, stalling development of alternative supply chains.

Did you know: Chinese domestic prices for NdPr oxide (orange line, in yuan per metric ton) have remained low in recent years due to ample supply and state influence. The U.S. Department of Defense’s newly guaranteed floor price (dashed line, equivalent to $110/kg, or roughly 800,000 yuan/ton) highlights an emerging effort to lift prices outside China to economically sustainable levels. And according to a prominent investment banker tracking the rare earth sector more deals may be on the way.

Critical Industries Caught in the Squeeze

This opaque, China-centric pricing system doesn’t just affect miners – it cascades down to manufacturers in defense, automotive, green energy, and high-tech electronics that depend on rare earth materials. When prices are kept low (or volatile) by non-market forces, it can discourage new supply even as demand soars, leaving these industries vulnerable to shortages or strategic supply cut-offs. Recent events have provided stark examples across multiple sectors:

Defense

Advanced military hardware relies on rare earth magnets and components (for example, precision-guided missiles, fighter jet sensors, and satellite systems). Yet the U.S. has almost no domestic supply chain for these materials. In 2025, the Pentagon took the extraordinary step of directly intervening in the market: the Department of Defense inked a 10-year deal with MP Materials to guarantee a price floor of $110 per kilogram for MP’s neodymium-praseodymium output. This price assurance – nearly double the prevailing Chinese price at the time – was meant to ensure a stable U.S. supply even if China floods the market with cheap product. As one analyst noted, This is a game changer for the ex-China industry,” because it signals to producers that they can count on higher revenues than the distorted China price. The DoD, normally just a buyer of materials, effectively stepped in as a market-maker to prop up non-Chinese production for defense needs, underscoring how critical rare earths are to national security. But does this pricing apply across the board?

Automotive (Electric Vehicles):

Electric car manufacturers and their suppliers need rare earth magnets for efficient motors. They typically sourced magnet materials from China at low cost, but this created a fragile dependency. In April 2025, Beijing imposed export permit restrictions on certain magnet-related rare earths, suddenly choking off exports to a trickle. The effect was immediate chaos: some automotive and industrial manufacturers in the West had to halt production lines due to a lack of magnet components, as we reported. This scare flipped the script on pricing. Automakers that had long resisted paying more for non-Chinese material found they had little choice but to consider premiums to secure an alternate supply. By mid-2025, industry reports emerged of car companies willing to pay around $80 per kg for NdPr oxide from non-Chinese sources (opens in a new tab) – roughly a 30% premium over the ~$62/kg Chinese price at that time. One rare earth executive noted that auto procurement departments, traditionally obsessed with cost-cutting, were starting to realize “they’re losing more by having to close a plant for a month than paying a premium to guarantee supplies (opens in a new tab).” In short, the EV sector has been jolted into valuing supply security over rock-bottom pricing.

Clean Energy (Wind Turbines)

The wind power industry faces a similar predicament to EVs, since large wind turbines use tons of NdFeB (neodymium-iron-boron) magnets in their generators. China’s magnet export curbs in 2023–2025 also threatened wind turbine supply chains. Turbine manufacturers, like automakers, have been forced to weigh paying more for magnets produced outside China versus project delays. An executive at Europe’s Less Common Metals, a rare earth alloy producer, observed (opens in a new tab) that “post-April 4, it’s like someone stuck a cattle prod into the whole industry” – demand for non-Chinese magnet material spiked almost overnight as wind and EV companies scrambled for alternatives. These green energy firms now recognize that a somewhat higher upfront cost for rare earths may be preferable to the risk of sudden shortages derailing renewable energy projects.

High-Tech Electronics

Rare earths are also essential in consumer electronics – from neodymium magnets in speakers and vibration motors, to europium and terbium in smartphone screens and displays. This sector historically enjoyed China’s low prices, but supply anxieties are creeping in here as well. For instance, one supplier for Samsung phones reported (opens in a new tab) that its customers are prepared to pay 15–20% more for magnets made in Vietnam (using non-Chinese rare earth feedstock) instead of relying solely on Chinese-made magnets. Similarly, Japan learned in 2010 how rare earth supply shocks can cripple high-end tech manufacturing: a Chinese embargo that year sent rare earth prices skyrocketing and forced Japanese electronics makers to frantically seek alternate sources. Today, with China again showing willingness to leverage its rare earth dominance, electronics firms are quietly diversifying suppliers – even if it means higher costs – to avoid being caught off-guard. In short, whether it’s an F-35 fighter jet, a Tesla Model Y, a GE wind turbine, or an iPhone, the end-users of rare earths are finding that price transparency and supply diversity are no longer mere commercial concerns but strategic imperatives.

Shifting Trends (2023–2025): Premiums and Policy Interventions

From January 2023 to today, the rare earth market has seen a remarkable shift in pricing dynamics. Early in this period, prices were depressed following China’s moves to cool an overheated 2021–2022 market. Neodymium-praseodymium oxide, for example, averaged around $80/kg in 2023 (down from over $130/kg in 2022) as cited in a USGS report (opens in a new tab), and other key oxides like dysprosiumand terbium also fell significantly from prior peaks. Such low prices – dictated largely by Chinese domestic conditions – squeezed Western producers’ margins and stalled new projects. MP Materials, the sole U.S. miner, even reported (opens in a new tab) a net loss in 2022 due in part to weak rare earth prices. By late 2023, many rare earth prices hovered near multi-year lows, providing little incentive for investors to fund non-Chinese mines or refineries.

2024 began to show subtle changes. Supply chain planners grew increasingly uneasy about China’s dominance, especially after the announced export controls on magnet materials. By mid-2025, a turning point had arrived: Western buyers were actively paying premiums and governments were stepping into the market. The magnet export clampdown (part of a U.S.–China trade spat) served as a wake-up call. “The phone is ringing off the hook,” said one executive in mid-2025, describing how customers suddenly flooded Western suppliers with inquiries when Chinese magnets became scarce (opens in a new tab). Crucially, these customers were now often willing to shoulder higher prices for guaranteed non-Chinese supply. This was virtually unheard of in prior years.

Analysts note that a fundamental repricing may be necessary to sustain an ex-China supply chain. Critical minerals consultancy Project Blue (opens in a new tab) calculates that NdPr oxide needs to reach $75–$105 per kg to incentivize enough new production to meet surging demand (opens in a new tab). Some investment banks go further – Australia’s Barrenjoey (opens in a new tab) estimates $120–$180 per kg may be required to justify a wave of new rare earth mines globally. In this context, the U.S. Department of Defense’s $110/kg price floor for MP Materials’ output can be seen as a bold attempt to anchor prices at a level that makes non-Chinese production viable. Did the DoD deal, announced in July 2025 establish a quasi-benchmark outside China? Did this effectively create a two-tier market: the traditional “China price” (~$50–60/kg for NdPr oxide in mid-2025) and a new “Western price” around $110? REEx suggested the deal did so for at least one producer.

Observers say this could lift prices globally. “This benchmark is now a new centre of gravity in the industry that will pull prices up,” according to Adamas Intelligence (opens in a new tab), meaning other producers and even consumers may start referencing that higher level (opens in a new tab). Indeed, soon after the Pentagon deal, Lynas’s CEO mentioned that U.S. interest and support were likely to strengthen rare earth prices going forward, as cited in the Australian Financial Review. Western rare earth developers welcomed the news; it opened “new strategic paths” for projects from Chile to Australia, as it indicated large buyers are prepared to pay more for a secure supply. Still, it’s a fine balance: if prices shoot too high, major consumers like automakers worry about demand destruction or cost impacts on their products.

For now, the trend since 2023 has been toward acknowledging a price premium for ex-China rare earths as a necessary cost for supply chain resilience. What was once a seller’s pipe dream – getting $80–$100+ per kg for NdPr when China offered $50–$60 – is gradually becoming reality in negotiated deals. This upheaval sets the stage for a transparent pricing index to formalize and broadcast those non-China prices.

Toward a Transparent Ex-China Price Benchmark

Recognizing the need for market-based pricing outside China’s shadow, various initiatives have sprung up to lay the groundwork for an independent rare earth price benchmark. In mid-2025, UK-based Benchmark Mineral Intelligence, a leading critical minerals price reporting agency, launched new ex-China rare earth price assessments for NdPr oxide delivered to Western markets. These weekly published prices (for material on a CIF Europe or North America basis) were hailed as_“a key milestone in price transparency for REE supply outsideof China.”_ They give producers and consumers a reference point beyond the Asian Metal index, much like Benchmark and others do for lithium and cobalt. It’s an early step, and such assessments will only gain traction if enough actual transactions occur and are reported. But it signals that the era of relying solely on Chinese quotes may be ending.

Another major step is the creation of Rare Earth Exchanges LLC (REEx), a Salt Lake City, USA-based platform dedicated to developing and accelerating ex-China rare earth market. Launched in January 2025, REEx was established as a media and intelligence platform to catalyze investment across the rare earth supply chain and foster a transparent marketplace for prices outside China. The team behind REEx is taking a comprehensive approach: providing real-time news and analysis, industry forums, podcasts, and data tools for investors – and ultimately developing an Ex-China Rare Earth Pricing Index. The vision for this index is to aggregate real transaction data, contract prices (and other pertinent terms), and user-submitted quotes to produce a reliable benchmark for rare earths sold outside of China. This is no simple task – it requires cooperation from companies to share pricing info and a rigorous methodology to normalize different grades and products – but if achieved, it could be transformative for the industry.  Imagine a transparent index for, say, NdPr oxide delivered in the U.S. or EU, updated regularly and accessible to all. Buyers and sellers could finally negotiate contracts based on a published “Western price” rather than peering at Chinese indices and then applying opaque adjustments. Such an index could also enable financial instruments like futures or hedging contracts down the line, further normalizing the market and achieving the REEx mission.

REEx and similar efforts are essentially trying to build trust and context around production and price data. As John Parkinson Chief Business Officer for REEx put it, “You need more than just a price ticker – you need context and credibility around that price. We’re trying to build both the information network and the trust, so that an ex-China price can emerge and be believed.” In practical terms, that means combining transparent pricing with robust information on supply, demand, and project developments. The REEx platform, for example, not only plans to publish price indices but also ranks emerging rare earth projects (light and heavy) by objective criteria, helping investors identify which new mines or refineries are likely to succeed. These rankings are being developed for refineries, magnet producers and even recycling methods and technologies as well. By chipping away at information asymmetry, these initiatives aim to create the ecosystem needed for a functioning ex-China market.

Policy support from Western governments is reinforcing these grassroots market efforts. The U.S. DoD’s involvement with MP Materials, though targeted at one company, essentially sets a minimum price signal and shows long-term demand commitment.  And we have been told more than likely more deals are on the way. The Department of Energy and DoD are also funding programs for data-sharing and stockpile transparency related to critical minerals. Nations or regions that have traditionally been allies are moving in parallel: Japan and the European Union have invested in rare earth separation facilities and begun requiring more market reporting, all aimed at loosening China’s stranglehold on pricing. Each of these steps – pricing floors, independent benchmarks, data transparency mandates – contributes to a more open and investable market environment.

Did you know that global demand for rare earth permanent magnets (key drivers of rare earth consumption) is projected to more than double by 2035, exceeding 600,000 tonnes per year (opens in a new tab). The United States alone is expected to have the fastest growth in rare earth magnet demand in the coming years. Meeting this surge will require significant new rare earth production outside China, underscoring the importance of transparent pricing that can attract investment in mines and processing plants.

Creating an ex-China rare earth pricing index is about leveling the playing field and reducing strategic risk. Transparency in pricing allows mining companies, refiners, magnet manufacturers, and end-users to plan with better confidence. Investors can then evaluate projects with a clear sense of potential revenue per kilogram, rather than guessing discounts off a Chinese benchmark. Manufacturers in the West could hedge or lock in prices for critical materials, just as they do for aluminum or copper, if credible indices and maybe future exchange contracts develop. Ultimately, breaking the current opacity could unleash capital into new rare earth sources by proving that producing these elements can be profitable on market terms (not just via subsidies or government deals). As one industry report put it, without transparent pricing “the West’s quest to diversify rare earth supply could stall,” but a robust ex-China price discovery mechanism will draw capital by showing a viable business case.

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