Highlights

• Major shifts in rare earth contracts are moving from China-indexed pricing to complex, risk-managed pricing mechanisms like floor/ceiling bands and provenance premiums.
• Western governments and companies are prioritizing supply security over lowest cost, willing to pay premiums for non-Chinese rare earth materials and developing independent pricing strategies.
• New contract structures include:
  • Basket pricing
  • Conversion-fee models
  • Magnet bill-of-materials pricing
  • Strategic partnerships to diversify and secure rare earth supply chains

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For years, rare earth deals outside China were still largely tied to Chinese price indexes (like Asian Metal or Shanghai Metals Market), with buyers simply paying the Chinese price plus extra for shipping and tariffs. In other words, even “ex-China” contracts used to mirror the “China price”. This meant Western producers were essentially price-takers: if China’s state-influenced market pushed prices down, overseas suppliers suffered. However, that paradigm is changing fast. Western companies and governments are pioneering new pricing mechanisms – from independent benchmarks to custom formulas set by major automakers and industrial consumers. The goal is to decouple from China’s opaque pricing and protect non-Chinese supply chains from Beijing’s whims.

Floor–Ceiling Price Bands: A Big Shift in Contracts

One of the biggest shifts in new rare earth contracts outside China is the use of floor–ceiling price bands.Instead of accepting volatile spot prices, buyers and sellers agree on aprice range: a minimum floor price (to protect the miner if markets crash) and a maximum ceiling price (to protect the buyer if prices soar). These bands are typically adjusted or reviewed periodically (e.g., quarterly) against market indices to stay realistic. A landmark example is the U.S. Department of Defense’s recent deal with MP Materials, which guarantees a price floor of $110 per kilogram for NdPr oxide over a 10-year span. That floor is nearly double the prevailing Chinese price (~$50–60 at the time), effectively insulating MP from China-driven price dips and ensuring a stable domestic supply for defense needs.

While the DoD-MP contract doesn’t publicly reveal a ceiling, the concept of a capped upper price is gaining traction. In theory, a ceiling would prevent buyers from overpaying if, say, NdPr skyrockets above a set level – with the contract resetting if market conditions greatly exceed the band. Some deals explicitly forego ceilings to let both parties benefit from any price upside; for instance, Australia’s Northern Minerals chose to exclude a price cap in its dysprosium supply agreement with Thyssenkrupp, allowing full upside sharing if heavy rare earth prices rise. Overall, floor/ceiling clauses are emerging as a key risk-balancing tool: they give miners confidence to invest (knowing they have a safety net), and give buyers cost predictability over the contract term.

New Pricing Tactics in the Playbook

In addition to floor/ceiling bands, a variety of innovative contract tactics have appeared in recent ex-China rare earth deals. These include:

Basket pricing

Instead of pricing each rare earth separately, some contracts price a “basket” of magnet metals together. For example, a buyer might pay a single blended rate for a mix of neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, and terbium in agreed proportions. This ensures supply of all critical magnet ingredients at a stable average cost. It’s especially useful when a project produces multiple rare earths – the contract can specify a combined basket value rather than separate deals for each element. (In practice, many mine offtakes already resemble basket pricing by selling a mixed rare earth concentrate or carbonate valued on its total contained oxides.) Basket pricing simplifies transactions and guarantees the buyer a package of magnet materials without having to chase each one on the market.

Dy/Tb adder caps

Dysprosium and terbium are scarce and expensive heavy rare earths added in small quantities to NdFeB magnets for high-temperature performance. Traditionally, magnet suppliers charge an “adder” on top of the base magnet price for any Dy or Tb content since these heavies can cost hundreds or even thousands of dollars per kilogram. Now, contracts are capping these adders. In other words, if Dy or Tb prices spike, the surcharge to the buyer is limited by an agreed ceiling. This prevents sudden cost blowouts for the buyer if heavy rare earth markets go crazy (as they did in 2011). It also shares some price risk back with the supplier. While specific deals with published Dy/Tb caps are confidential, the trend is to avoid open-ended exposure to heavy RE price volatility. Notably, contracts for heavy rare earth supply tend to be shorter or more flexible due to this volatility, and introducing cap clauses is a logical extension to tame unpredictable costs.

Conversion-fee models

Also known as tolling agreements, these deals flip the traditional model: the buyer (or an upstream miner) provides rare earth raw material to a refiner, and the refiner is paid a fixed processing fee per kilogram to convert it into refined oxides or alloys. The refiner doesn’t take ownership of the material or bear commodity price risk – they earn a stable fee for the service. This ensures the processing plant has a steady income regardless of market swings, which can encourage new refineries to get built. For example, Energy Fuels and Neo Performance Materials created a cross-continental supply chain in 2021: Energy Fuels ships mixed rare earth carbonate from its U.S. facility to Neo’s separation plant in Estonia, where Neo processes it into individual oxides for a fee. In effect, Neo acts as a toll refiner, earning conversion fees, while Energy Fuels secures a path to market for its product without China. Such conversion-fee or “tolling” contracts are expected to increase as more independent refineries come online in North America and Europe, providing an alternative to sending material to China. It’s a win–win: miners get their material processed with cost certainty, and refiners get utilization and income without gambling on feedstock prices.

Magnet-linked formulas

Here, the contract pricing is tied to the final magnet product rather than just raw oxides, using a transparent bill-of-materials approach. The buyer pays for a finished NdFeB magnet based on the sum of its parts: the cost of NdPr in it (usually indexed to NdPr oxide price), plus any Dy/Tb content (indexed to those oxide prices, possibly with a cap as noted), plus fabrication costs (labor, energy) and a factor for scrap losses during manufacturing. Essentially, it’s cost-plus pricing itemized by component. This formula ensures both parties see exactly what they’re paying for and allows quarterly or periodic adjustments as raw material prices change. An automaker contract might say, for instance: “Magnet price = NdPr oxide price * X kg + Dy oxide price * Y kg (capped at Z) + $A processing fee + $B scrap allowance.” We are indeed seeing deals move this direction. An example is General Motors’ alliance with MP Materials: GM’s contract for U.S.-made magnets required MP to not only supply magnets but also to source the raw REEs and build a new magnet factory. While the exact GM-MP pricing terms are confidential, industry experts note that such downstream agreements often use a cost-plus formula based on the magnet’s rare earth content. This means GM’s magnet price effectively fluctuates with NdPr (and any Dy) costs, rather than being a fixed number – providing flexibility if material prices change, but with the structure agreed in advance. The bill-of-materials pricing brings clarity to an otherwise opaque magnet market.

Reopener clauses

Given the geopolitical sensitivity of rare earths, contracts now frequently include “reopener” or renegotiation clauses triggered by extraordinary events. If the market index a deal is pegged to breaks down or no longer reflects reality – for instance, if China bans exports or imposes sudden quotas – the parties agree to revisit the pricing mechanism temporarily, rather than blindly stick to a broken benchmark. In legal terms, this often ties into force majeure or regulatory change provisions. Many rare earth contracts already treat government export restrictions or mine nationalizations as force majeure events excusing non-performance A renegotiation clause goes further by saying, “if the referenceprice becomes unworkable, we’ll meet and adjust the price formulain good faith.” This kind of clause was rarely seen in the past, but after episodes like China’s abrupt magnet export license restrictions in 2023–2025, which threw off market pricing, both sellers and buyers see value in a safety valve. Essentially, it bakes in an agreement to be flexible if politics or force majeure disrupt the market.

Provenance premiums

Perhaps the most striking change is that Western buyers are now often willing to pay a premium for non-Chinese material – effectively valuing security of supply and ethical sourcing over the absolute lowest price. This is a sea change from a decade ago when cost was king. In mid-2025, for example, some automakers were prepared to pay around $80/kg for NdPr oxide from non-Chinese sources, even though the Chinese price was only ~$62/kg at the time. That ~30% premium is essentially the price of peace of mind. It reflects a realization that not having material (and having to halt production lines) is far more costly than paying extra to diversify supply. We also see “provenance” premiums in government contracts – the DoD’s $110/kg floor for domestic NdPr is a form of paying extra to ensure sourcing from a trusted, U.S. supplier. Likewise, manufacturers concerned with sustainability or ESG standards might pay more for rare earths that are traceable to an environmentally responsible mine outside China. These premiums are quietly enabling new projects outside China to become viable, since investors can believe that Western customers will ultimately pay more than the suppressed “China price” for a reliable non-Chinese supply.

Common Emerging Deal Structures

All of the above tactics are being mixed and matched into new deal structures that would have been unheard of a few years ago. Some common structures gaining ground include:

Floor-anchored price bands

Multi-year contracts that set a hard price floor and ceiling for key rare earth oxides, with periodic adjustments. For instance, a deal might fix NdPr oxide within a $110–$150/kg band for 18 months, with quarterly check-ins against an independent index to decide if the band needs tweaking. The U.S. DoD–MP Materials contract is a real-world example of a floor being instituted ($110/kg); one could imagine a ceiling being added if prices overheated. Such bands give investors confidence (the project won’t sell below cost) while assuring customers they won’t have to pay for exorbitant spikes, at least in the medium term.

Dual-index hybrid pricing

Contracts that split the price reference between a China-based index and a Western index. For example, a supply agreement might say the price will be an average of 50% Asian Metal index + 50% Fastmarkets or some other index for NdPr, or “Chinese index ± X% but capped at Y% move per quarter”. This kind of hybrid formula is a transitional strategy – it acknowledges the reality of the Chinese market influence, but also starts incorporating nascent ex-China benchmarks. Some agreements limit how much the China-linked portion can change period-to-period. The effect is to dampen volatility and prevent a steep drop in Chinese prices (perhaps due to subsidies or state intervention) from immediately tanking the contract price. As Western pricing references gain credibility (for example, Benchmark Mineral Intelligence launched new Europe and North America rare earth price assessments in 2025), we expect to see more contracts evolve from 100% China-indexed to partly indexed to non-China markets. A dual-index approach can also be a hedge against Chinese price manipulation – if China tries to undercut prices, the non-China index portion cushions the impact.

Basket pricing with adder caps

This structure combines a basket approach for the main light rare earths with limits on heavy rare earth surcharges. A real example could look like: NdPr oxide at $X per kg (negotiated base price or indexed price), plus Dy/Tb surcharges if needed, capped at $Y per kg. The contract might be for a “basket” of, say, 1 ton of NdPr for every 30 kg of Dy and 5 kg of Tb (approximating magnet alloy needs). The buyer agrees to pay for the whole basket at a blended rate, and if dysprosium or terbium costs go above a threshold, the cap kicks in and the seller and buyer might split or renegotiate the difference beyond the cap. This structure was virtually nonexistent in the past because few deals outside China involved heavy rare earths explicitly – but that’s changing as projects like Northern Minerals (Australia) or NioCorp (USA) look to supply Dy/Tb for magnets. In 2023, automaker Stellantis signed a term sheet with NioCorp to eventually buy NdPr and dysprosium and terbium oxides from the upcoming Nebraska mine, hinting that future contracts will bundle light and heavy magnet materials. A capped-adder basket deal ensures cost containment on the most volatile elements while guaranteeing the buyer the full magnet alloy suite. It’s essentially a way to share the risk: the producer might accept a limit on charging for Dy/Tb in exchange for the buyer committing to buy a broad range of products from them.

Refiner fee (toll) contracts

As noted, this model is picking up where a customer finances or supplies feedstock to a refiner. We can think of it as the “just pay the processing fee” approach. The buyer takes on the commodity price risk (and often technically owns the material throughout), while the refiner earns an agreed fee for turning, say, concentrate into separated oxides. A number of proposed rare earth separation facilities in the West are pursuing this approach to attract customers. For instance, Europe’s new separation plants could sign deals with African or Australian mines where the miner ships concentrate to Europe and pays the plant a fixed conversion rate (e.g., $X per kg of TREO processed). This is analogous to how custom smelters operate in base metals. One early example was Vital Metals (Canada) planning to send concentrate to REEtec (Norway) for toll separation, with REEtec then on-selling oxides to a German end-user. In practice, Vital’s project stumbled, but the model remains compelling. By decoupling the processing from the commodity pricing, refiner-fee contracts de-risk the midstream segment and can be key to launching new refineries outside China.

Magnet “bill-of-materials” pricing

Rather than pricing rare earth raw materials, some contracts now focus on the finished magnet and build the price from the ground up. As described earlier, this means the contract defines how the magnet cost is calculated each quarter based on inputs. It’s effectively an open-book cost model between the magnet maker and the buyer. For example, a European wind turbine manufacturer could contract a local magnet producer and agree that each quarter, the magnet price will be updated to reflect the current market price of NdPr oxide (for the NdPr content in the magnet) plus any heavy REEs, plus a fixed fabrication margin. If rare earth prices go up, the magnet price goes up accordingly (perhaps with some lag or averaging); if they go down, the savings are passed on to the buyer. This approach is transparent and fair, aligning with how some battery materials contracts work in the lithium and cobalt space. It also forces both parties to pay close attention to material efficiencies – for instance, the contract might include a scrap factor, say 5-10%, acknowledging that some fraction of the material is lost as waste in magnet production and effectively billing the buyer for that loss. The benefit is that neither side is caught off guard by market swings: it’s baked into the formula. MP Materials’ deal with General Motors and other automakers likely uses variants of this model, given that the contracts span from raw material supply all the way to magnet fabrication. The “magnet BOM” pricing is a big step toward full value-chain integration in pricing, rather than siloed negotiations at each stage.

Recycled feed discounts

With growing interest in rare earth recycling, some contracts differentiate between virgin rare earth material vs. recycled material. Scrap magnets and end-of-life electronics can be processed to recover rare earths, often at lower cost (and lower environmental footprint) than mining fresh ore. Deals are now being structured where, if the supplier uses recycled feedstock, the buyer gets a discount on the price. For instance, a magnet contract might stipulate a 10-20% lower price for magnets made from reclaimed rare earths compared to those from newly mined oxides. This incentivizes the use of recycled material. However, these contracts also recognize that if primary supply gets very tight (and new material prices shoot up), the discount narrows – because recycled material becomes equally valuable. A case in point: Noveon Magnetics, the Texas-based magnet producer, uses a portion of recycled rare earth inputs for its magnets. When Noveon signed its supply deal with GM, part of the appeal was its recycling-enabled technology that can lower dependency on Chinese raw oxide feeds. We don’t have public data on the pricing, but it’s reasonable to assume any cost savings from using recycled NdPr were factored into Noveon’s magnet price to GM.

Meanwhile, Apple’s recent rare earth initiative with MP Materials is entirely built around recycled magnets – recovering rare earths from old iPhones and using them in new devices. Such deals likely feature pricing that reflects Apple’s providing of scrap or at least benefits from the scrap (Apple’s $500 million commitment to MP will help establish a recycling line at Mountain Pass). In short, recycled feed discounts ensure that when scrap is available and cheaper, the savings are shared. Still, if the market tightens, the contract can adjust so that suppliers aren’t selling recycled material at an unnecessarily steep discount to market value.

Recent ex-China Rare Earth Deals (Summer 2025)

To put these concepts into context, here are some notable deals in the past few months outside China that highlight the new trends in pricing and contract structure:

U.S. Department of Defense & MP Materials (July 2025)

In an unprecedented public-private partnership, the Pentagon took an equity stake (~15%) in MP Materials and signed a 10-year offtake agreement to bolster U.S. supply wordpress-1542803-6000058.cloudwaysapps.com. Under the deal, the DoD guarantees a minimum price of $110/kg for MP’s neodymium-praseodymium (NdPr) oxide – roughly double the going China price – ensuring MP’s Mountain Pass production is profitable wordpress-1542803-6000058.cloudwaysapps.com. This floor pricing, backed by Defense Production Act funds, essentially underwrites the economics of MP’s planned magnet factory in Texas. It protects MP if market prices drop, in exchange for MP supplying the U.S. defense-industrial base. Observers have called this a “game changer” that could serve as a model for future government-supported contracts wordpress-1542803-6000058.cloudwaysapps.com. It’s the clearest example yet of a Western entity breaking from the Chinese index: the U.S. government is literally setting a new price benchmark to encourage non-Chinese production.

General Motors & Noveon Magnetics (August 2025)

Auto giant GM struck a multi-year supply deal with Noveon Magnetics, a startup in Texas that is currently the only U.S. producer of sintered NdFeB magnets. Announced on August 6, 2025, the deal calls for Noveon to supply magnets for GM’s electric pickup trucks and SUVs, with deliveries that began in July. This is GM’s third domestic magnet sourcing agreement – the company previously lined up MP Materials (California) and Vacuumschmelze’s U.S. arm (South Carolina) for magnets – and with Noveon added, the majority of magnets in GM’s EV motors will now come from U.S. production. The contract details aren’t public, but GM is clearly prioritizing supply security by diversifying away from Chinese magnets. Noveon’s magnets also incorporate recycled rare earths, supporting GM’s cost and sustainability goals. This flurry of activity was spurred by China’s spring 2025 export controls on magnet alloy, which caused shortages and even forced Ford to idle a plant for a week. GM’s response, exemplified by the Noveon deal, is to lock in domestic capacity via long-term agreements. It demonstrates automakers’ new willingness to sign contracts with emerging suppliers (and likely include provisions like index-linking or cost sharing) to ensure they aren’t wholly reliant on China.

Iluka Resources & Lindian Resources (August 2025)

A significant mine-to-refinery supply deal was inked between Australia’s Iluka Resources and junior miner Lindian Resources. Announced in early August, the agreement is 15 years long and will supply 6,000 tonnes per year of high-grade rare earth concentrate (55% TREO) from Lindian’s Kangankunde deposit in Malawi to Iluka’s new Eneabba refinery in Western Australia. This volume represents about 10% of the planned capacity of the Eneabba separation plant, which is under construction as Australia’s first fully integrated light and heavy rare earth refinery. Notably, Eneabba’s development is co-funded by the Australian government, and the Iluka–Lindian deal secures a non-Chinese raw material pipeline for the refinery’s startup in 2027. In terms of pricing, Iluka likely secured the concentrate at a formula tied to rare earth oxide values (minus processing costs) – a common structure for concentrate offtakes. The strategic importance, however, goes beyond price: this long-term offtake anchors a new supply chain linking African raw material to Australian processing to serve global (ex-China) demand. It’s a prime example of how cross-border partnerships are forming to break China’s monopoly. By committing to take Lindian’s output for 15 years, Iluka gives Lindian bankable revenue certainty (helping finance the mine), while Iluka ensures its refinery will have feedstock. Such contracts, often with floor price clauses or government backing, are the backbone of the emerging non-China supply network.

Apple & MP Materials (mid-2025)

In a noteworthy move beyond the automotive realm, Apple Inc. entered the rare earth supply chain with a $500 million+, multi-year agreement with MP Materials. Announced in 2025 as part of Apple’s $600 billion U.S. investment initiative, the deal will secure Apple a domestic source of rare earth magnets for its devices. Under the agreement, MP Materials will supply Apple with high-performance NdFeB magnets made entirely from recycled rare earth material recovered from electronics. To make this happen, Apple provided a large up-front prepayment to MP (essentially a form of supply chain financing) to expand MP’s forthcoming magnet factory in Fort Worth, Texas, and to jointly establish a rare earth recycling line at the Mountain Pass site in California. In effect, Apple is paying to build out capacity in exchange for guaranteed, traceable magnets that meet its sustainability and security criteria. This deal’s structure hits several new notes: it’s a prepaid offtake (Apple is funding MP now for product later), it’s focused on recycled feedstock (underscoring the recycled discount concept), and it very likely involves a magnet price formula tied to input costs (so that Apple isn’t overpaying if recycled material is cheaper). Apple’s willingness to invest in its upstream supply for rare earths was hailed as a potential “game-changer” that could prompt other tech companies to strike similar deals. It also illustrates the theme of provenance premium – Apple is deliberately buying U.S.-sourced, U.S.-made magnets, presumably accepting a higher price than off-the-shelf Chinese magnets, in order to ensure supply chain integrity (and to align with U.S. policy incentives for domestic content).

Lynas & JS Link JV (July 2025)

In a sign that allied countries are coordinating on critical minerals, Lynas Rare Earths of Australia and JS Link of South Korea announced a memorandum of understanding in late July 2025 to collaborate on rare earth magnet production. The plan outlined in the MoU (made public in early August) is to build a 3,000 tonne-per-year NdFeB magnet plant in Malaysia, adjacent to Lynas’s processing facility. Lynas will provide the neodymium-praseodymium feedstock from its Mt. Weld mine (via its Malaysian refinery), and JS Link will contribute its magnet-making technology. Once operational (targeted by 2026), this plant would serve customers in Asia and beyond, supplying magnets for electric vehicles, wind turbines, and robotics. While this is an JV partnership rather than a buyer–seller contract, it shows another approach to “ex-China” expansion: joint ventures to create vertically-integrated capacity outside China.

By co-locating a magnet factory with a rare earth refinery, the Lynas-JS Link venture will streamline the supply chain and avoid middlemen. The venture will likely involve long-term agreements for Lynas to sell NdPr to the JV at stable terms, and for the JV to sell magnets to Korean and global clients – effectively setting up new contracts that don’t depend on Chinese intermediaries. This deal highlights how countries like Australia, Korea, Japan, and European nations are increasingly partnering to build an independent rare earth ecosystem. It complements formal offtake deals by addressing the processing/manufacturing end of the chain and adds to the diversification of magnet supply (beyond China’s dominant magnet industry).The bottom line is that Western buyers are moving from “just accept China’s price” to structured, risk-managed contracts. All these agreements – whether floor price guarantees, baskets with capped adders, or OEM prepayment deals – are not just about purchasing metal at the lowest cost. They are about paying for the security of supply. In a market long dominated by China’s state-controlled pricing (which often kept prices artificially low to kill competition), Western governments and companies are now willing to invest more upfront and agree to innovative terms to ensure they have the rare earth materials when they need them. These new contracts are making previously marginal projects financially viable by de-risking investments – a miner can build a mine knowing it has a guaranteed buyer at a decent price; a refiner can open a plant knowing it will be paid for its output or processing service; a magnet maker can expand capacity knowing automakers have committed to buy locally.

Final Thoughts: Paying for Security of Supply

Looking ahead over the next couple of years, expect to see more U.S. and European initiatives along these lines. Price floors backed by governments might expand (Australia is already discussing underwriting rare earth prices to support its miners). We may see “capped basket” deals where Western magnet manufacturers contract for a suite of REEs with cost controls on the volatile elements.

Major automakers and even defense primes could provide prepayment or co-investment to develop dedicated magnet production (similar to how Tesla and others have co-funded battery factories). Essentially, rare earths are following the path seen in semiconductors and energy: when a resource is strategic, buyers will sign long-term, tailored agreements rather than rely on spot markets controlled by a rival power.

Meanwhile, China isn’t sitting still. Beijing continues to leverage its dominance – from production quotas to export license controls – and can use state-backed firms to undercut prices if it wants to keep competitors at bay. Chinese industry consolidation (like the mega-merger of rare earth companies in 2021) and investments in new magnet capacity show that China will fight to maintain its edge. This competitive pressure is exactly why the ex-China pricing and contract system is emerging so rapidly – it’s a direct response to China’s monopoly and its ability to dictate prices. The new wave of contracts is building a parallel market where prices and supplies can be secured on Western terms, not just Chinese terms.

In summary, rare earth supply deals are undergoing a revolution: from secretive one-off deals linked to Chinese benchmarks, to transparent, collaborative arrangements that share risk and reward across the supply chain. The shift is about creating a stable foundation for the “Rest-of-World” rare earth industry. It’s no exaggeration to say these contracts will determine how quickly the West can scale up rare earth mining, refining, and magnet manufacturing in the years ahead. By breaking free from Beijing’s grip on pricing, the West is effectively financing its own supply chain security – and that may prove priceless in the long run.

Sources:

• Rare Earth Exchanges – “Rare Earth Pricing: Inside China’s Grip and the Fight for Transparency Outside” (July 27, 2025)wordpress-1542803-6000058.cloudwaysapps.com.
  

  Rare Earth Exchanges – “Cracking the Rare Earth Code: Contracts, Pricing, and the Battle for Market Clarity” (July 30, 2025)wordpress-1542803-6000058.cloudwaysapps.com.* Rare Earth Exchanges – “Survey of Rare Earth Supply Chain Contracts (Ex-China Focus)” (Aug 6, 2025)wordpress-1542803-6000058.cloudwaysapps.comwordpress-1542803-6000058.cloudwaysapps.comwordpress-1542803-6000058.cloudwaysapps.com.

• Rare Earth Exchanges – “Rare Earth Industry Deals Roundup – Week of August 4, 2025” (Aug 7, 2025)wordpress-1542803-6000058.cloudwaysapps.comwordpress-1542803-6000058.cloudwaysapps.comwordpress-1542803-6000058.cloudwaysapps.comwordpress-1542803-6000058.cloudwaysapps.comwordpress-1542803-6000058.cloudwaysapps.comwordpress-1542803-6000058.cloudwaysapps.com.
• Rare Earth Exchanges – “Rare Earth Price Floors Down Under? Talk Turns to Traction” (Aug 5, 2025) wordpress-1542803-6000058.cloudwaysapps.com.
• Rare Earth Exchanges – “Contracts Linking Automakers & Defense OEMs with Rare Earth Magnet Suppliers (2020–2025)” (2025) wordpress-1542803-6000058.cloudwaysapps.com.
• Reuters – “Rare earth magnet users jolted into paying premium prices for ex-China supply” (Jul 1, 2025), as cited in Rare Earth Exchanges wordpress-1542803-6000058.cloudwaysapps.com.