Highlights

• China's rare earth dominance stems from integrated ecosystems linking mines to separation, magnets, and manufacturing—not merely resource abundance or geology.
• Western rare earth processing was hollowed out by industrial policy and short-term capitalism, not ESG constraints alone, while China leveraged state capital and long-term vision.
• Korea's call for a rare earths complex is sound but requires decade-long commitment, guaranteed offtake, and allied coordination to avoid collapsing back into Chinese dependency.

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The Korea JoongAng Daily column argues that rare earth dominance flows not from geology, but from integration—mines linked to separation, magnets, and end-use manufacturing (opens in a new tab). On this central point, the author is correct as the Rare Earth Exchanges™ community is fully aware. China’s advantage is not merely resource abundance but ecosystem design, exemplified by hubs such as Bayan Obo Mining District and downstream magnet clusters. The Two Rare Earth Bases China paradigm, now on an accelerated trajectory with patients, innovation and monetization across relevant sectors.

The article correctly highlights the chemical difficulty of separating 17 near-identical elements and the industrial importance of solvent-extraction know-how accumulated over decades. This is aligned with global expert consensus and with REEx’s own supply-chain mapping.

The ESG Mirage and the Cost Story

Environmental constraints are portrayed as the West’s primary barrier. That framing is directionally true but incomplete. ESG hurdles matter, as seen in controversies surrounding Lynas Rare Earths operations in Malaysia, but they are not the decisive constraint.

The deeper truth: China’s advantage stems from state-coordinated capital, tolerance for long payback periods, vision to strategy to execution, and the willingness to run loss-leading separation capacity to defend downstream dominance. ESG alone did not hollow out Western processing—industrial policy did. Not to mention the short-termism associated with modern-day capitalism.

Where the Narrative Overreaches

The column leans into a deterministic tone: China’s system is portrayed as effectively unassailable. That crosses from analysis into strategic fatalism. While it is true that China produces roughly 85–90% of rare earth permanent magnets, the suggestion that alternative ecosystems are futile understates recent progress in Australia, the U.S., and Japan—albeit fragmented and underscaled.

Speculation also appears in references to thorium reuse via molten salt reactors. This remains experimental and commercially unproven, not a current cost-offset mechanism.

Korea’s Dilemma: Vision vs. Execution

The call for a “Korea-style integrated rare earths complex” is intellectually sound. Korea sits downstream of rare earth value creation—EV motors, semiconductors, displays—but lacks refining and magnet sovereignty. The article is right to warn that mine-only strategies collapse back into Chinese dependency.

What’s missing is time, capital, and alliance math. Integration requires a decade-long commitment, guaranteed offtake, security-priced inputs, and coordination with allies—not editorial urgency alone.

Why Relevant Now?

A notable topic, reflective of a broader Asian reassessment: rare earths are no longer a procurement issue, but a national industrial architecture problem. Korea is asking the right question. Whether it can execute before the next “valve turn” is the unanswered risk investors must price.

Citation

Lee, C-m. “Building a Korea-style integrated rare earths complex.” Korea JoongAng Daily, Jan 26, 2026.