Highlights
- Macquarie estimates China's export controls on critical minerals like samarium, terbium, and gallium could cut over $1 billion from US GDP annually.
- China controls approximately 70% of America's rare earth compounds and 90% of global separation capacity.
- US dependence isn't on raw minerals (only 3% of $65 billion imports) but on processed rare earths used for defense, EVs, and semiconductorsโwhere supply disruptions can halt entire production chains worth billions.
- Australia cannot yet replace Chinese imports without massive investment in refining and metallization infrastructure; raw ore alone is insufficient to offset China's midstream dominance.
Macquarie Groupโs (opens in a new tab) chief economist Ric Deverell (opens in a new tab) and his team have issued a fresh modeling analysis estimating that Chinaโs export controls on a narrow set of critical mineralsโsamarium, lutetium, terbium, dysprosium, and galliumโcould carve more than $1 billion out of U.S. GDP annually. The headline via Indonesia Mining Association, seems shocking, yet the underlying data reveals an even more important story: Americaโs rare earth vulnerability is not about total import volume from China, but about where the bottlenecks sit in the value chain.
Table of Contents
Even though China directly supplies only about 3% of total U.S. critical minerals imports ($2B of $65B), it supplies ~70% of Americaโs rare earth compounds and metals, the materials used in defense, EV motors, magnetics, advanced electronics, and semiconductor tooling. In other words, Chinaโs true leverage is not bulk mineralsโit is processed rare earths, where it still controls ~90% of global separation and refining capacity.

The Numbers Behind the NarrativeโA Closer Look
First, the dependence no one can deny. Macquarie notes the U.S. is 100% import reliant on 12 critical minerals and over 50% reliant on another 33. Rare earth metals remain the soft underbelly: in 2024, the U.S. imported $170M in rare earths, $120M directly from China. For galliumโan essential semiconductor materialโthe dependency is even more acute.
Where Macquarie Is Right
- A GDP hit of ~$1B is plausible given the high-value industries (defense, semiconductors, EVs) affected by even short-term supply shocks.
- The strategic cost dwarfs the GDP cost. Disruptions in Dy/Tb supply can halt magnet production, defense maintenance cycles, and traction motor manufacturing.
Where the Article Overreachesโor Underexplains
- The GDP figure doesnโt capture cascading effects: loss of magnet production halts entire defense systems, not just commodity flows.
- The suggestion that U.S. reliance on China is โless than publicizedโ is technically true for raw minerals, but misleading; the dependence exists in refined oxides, metals, and alloys, not ore.
- Australia's โreplacing all Chinese importsโ is aspirational. The country has reservesโbut not yet the processing, refining, or heavy-REE capability to substitute China.
The Real Story for REE Investors: Processing, Not Mining
The U.S. imports approximately only $170M in rare earth mineralsโbut those dollars underpin billions (even hundreds of billions) in downstream economic value. A single kilogram of terbium can influence a fighter jet program. Gallium affects AI chip production.
Macquarieโs final pointโAustralia as a replacement sourceโis interesting but incomplete. Without massive investment in refining, metallization, and magnet plants, raw ore alone cannot offset Chinaโs dominance.
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